Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
BOOK XI
1. Of Three Facts about Latent Bias.
Controverted Points.—(i.) That latent bias1 is unmoral
(indeterminate).
From the Commentary. — That latent bias in its seven forms is
(i.) unmoral, (ii.) without moral or immoral motive, (iii.) indepen-
dent of mind, is an opinion held, for instance, by the Mahasanghikas
and the Sammitiyas. They allege that it is not right to say that the
average man, while moral, or unmoral consciousness is going on, has
latent bias, since the motive or condition of such consciousness cannot
cause latent bias [to manifest itself], nor is such consciousness con-
joined with any form of bias.
[1] Th.—But are you prepared to identify latent bias
with any of the morally indeterminate ultimates—with
resultant or with inoperative indeterminates, with matter
or body, with Nibbana, or with the organs and objects of
sense ? Of course you deny this. . . .
[2-8] Again, take each form of bias—unless you can
prove that each form is something different in kind or
degree from the corresponding kind of 'fetter,' or 'outburst,'
or 'flood,' or 'yoke,' or 'hindrance,' which are indisputably
immoral states, you cannot call the corresponding form of
bias unmoral, whether it be sensual desires, or enmity,
or conceit, or mere opinion, or doubt, or lust of life, or
nescience.2
[9] M. S.—Well, but would you say that an average
man, while thinking moral or tmmoral thoughts, had latent
bias ?
Th.—Yes.
1 On this term see III. 2 f. ; IX. 4.
2 The 'seven forms.'
M. S.—Do you tell me then that good and bad ideas
can come together side by side in consciousness ?
Th—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
M. S.—Then latent bias must be unmoral.
Th.—Then you must go further and admit that lust is
unmoral, because you will agree that the average man,
when thinking good or unmoral thoughts, has not got rid
the while of the root-condition of lust or greed. . . .
(ii.) That latent bias is without moral motive (or root-
condition).1
[10] Th.—Since you cannot identify latent bias with
any ultimate [cf. § 1], these being admittedly independent
of the root-conditions or hetu's, it only remains for you to
show that each form of latent bias is something different
in kind or degree from the corresponding kind of 'fetter,' or
'outburst,' or 'flood,' or 'yoke,' or 'hindrance,' which are
indisputably motived by the root-conditions of lust, or
enmity, or dulness. .. .
[11] M. S.—You urge that latent biases are not uncon-
ditioned by these root-conditions, and you still maintain
that an average person, while thinking moral or unmoral
thoughts, is possessed the while by forms of latent bias.
But you deny that these forms are conditioned by any of
the root-conditions accompanying those thoughts. Surely
then latent-bias is unconditioned.
2
Th.—You admit that such an average person is still
possessed of lust, even while thinking moral or unmoral
thoughts. But you deny that that lust is conditioned by
the 'hetu' accompanying those thoughts. According to
you, therefore, lust is unconditioned—which is absurd.
1
On hetu, see Compendium, 279 f.; cf. .Duka-patthana, (PTS), '
xii., xiii.
2
The argument is complicated by ra g a being classed as both
(i.) 'root-condition,' or het n (as such it is sometimes called
lobha) , and (ii.) the first in the list of seven forms of latent bias :
kama-raga .
(iii.) That latent bias is independent of consciousness.
[12-19] Argued verbatim as in IX. 4, § § 1-8, substituting
' independent of' or ' conjoined with ' ' consciousness ' for
' without' or 'with ' ' mental object' respectively.
[20] M. S.—You affirm that an average person is still
possessed of latent bias, even while thinking moral or
unmoral thoughts. But you deny that the latent bias is
conjoined with such thoughts. Surely then latent bias is
independent of mind.
Th.—If, as you admit, such a person is still possessed of
lust while thinking moral or immoral thoughts, your
denial that lust is conjoined with those thoughts does not
necessarily lead to the false conclusion that lust is inde-
pendent of mind.
2. Of Insight.
Controverted Point.—That it is wrong to say 'he has
insight' of one who, though he has banished nescience,
has thoughts not conjoined with insight.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Mahasanghikas, hold that
one who, having banished spiritual ignorance by Path-insight, is
experiencing ordinary cognitions by way of sense, cannot at the time
be said to ' have insight,' since Path-consciousness is then not active.
The criticism reveals their ineptitude in the notion of what an [Ariyan]
person is, and also the propriety of ascribing insight to one who,
having acquired insight [has it always potentially, if not actually].1
[1] Th.—Then you must also admit it is not right to
say that, when lust has departed, a man has ' done with
lust.' Similarly for hate, and for dulness, and for worldly
corruptions generally. [2] If, on the contrary, you main-
tain that it is right to affirm these latter propositions, then
it is no less right to say, of one for whom nescience is
departed, but for whom cognition not conjoined with insight
is active, that he has insight.
1
Cf . this borrowing of a modern turn (anticipated by Aristotle) in
X. 12, p. 248.
[3] M.—But if it be right to say thus of that person, is
it in virtue of past insight? Can he be said 'to have in-
sight ' by an insight that has ceased, that is past, that has
subsided ? You deny this . . .
3. Of Insight and Ordinary Consciousness.
Controverted Point.—That insight (nana) is not con-
joined with consciousness.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Pubbaseliyas, hold that,
inasmuch as an Arahant, who is said to have insight on account of
that which he has won by the Path, may experience sense-cognitions
which "are not conjoined with that insight, therefore insight is inde-
pendent of ordinary consciousness. The criticism shows that, if
insight be detached from consciousness, it must be identifiable with
one of the categories of things that are other than consciousness.
[1] Th.—But are you prepared to identify insight,
with all that is admittedly detached from consciousness:
—with matter, Nibbana, or the organs and objects of sense ?
Scarcely! .. .
Or are you prepared to declare 'insight' as having
nothing in common with understanding?1 For you will
admit that understanding, as controlling power or force, as
supremely right view, as intuitive search for truth,2 is not
detached from, but is bound up with, consciousness?
[2] Insight, again, as* we agree, includes, involves the
activity of the aggregate of the coefficients of conscious-
ness, [3] as also does understanding. Both of these are
conjoined with consciousness. How then can insight be
detached from it ? [4] Hence, if you maintain that insight
and understanding, both involving conscious coefficients,
are respectively detached from and conjoined with con-
1
Panna . It is possible to translate both terms by the same
English term, none fitting exactly. Both are aspects of ' knowledge.'
Cf . Ledi Sadaw, JPTS, 1914, 142 ;' Mrs. Rh. D.: Buddhism, 1914,
pp. 94, 130, 201; also on the Patisambhiddamagga, JRAS,1906, 239 f.
2
Cf. Dhamma-sangani, § 292.
sciousness, you are committed to this: that the aggregate
of coefficients is in part conjoined with, in part detached
from, consciousness—which you of course deny. . . .
[5] P.—You contend then that an Arahant who is
enjoying cognitions by way o f sight, etc., may be said to
'have insight'?
Th.—Yes.
P.—But is his insight conjoined with that consciousness
(sight, etc.) ?
Th.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
P.—Then my proposition holds.
Th.—But such an argument holds equally for 'under-
standing,' if you substitute that for 'insight.' And you
have admitted the connection between understanding and
consciousness.
0 comments:
Post a Comment