Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
8. Of Some of the Past and Future as still Existing.
Controverted Point.—That (i.) some of the past exists,,
some does not; (ii.) some of the future exists, some does not.
From the Commentary.—The Theravadin by his questions seeks to
break down the opinion, held by those seeeders from the Sabbatthi-
vadins known as Kassapika's, that the past survives, as presently
existing, in part.
[1] (i.) Th.—Does the past exist ? Some of it exists, you
reply, some does not exist. You must then admit, [in
equivalent terms], that some of it has ceased, departed,
passed away, utterly passed away; some of it has not ceased,,
departed, passed away, utterly passed away. Yet you
deny this.
[2] You must also admit, more specifically, that of past
things of which the results are not yet matured some are
existent, some not—you deny this—and that of past things,
of which the results are matured, some are existent, some
not—you deny this—further, that of things which are with-
out result,1 some exist, some do not. This also you deny.
[3] Again, referring to your declaration that the past
exists in part, which of the past exists, which not?
K.—Those past things of which the effect is not matured
exist; those past things of which the effect is matured
do not.
Th.—But if you admit the existence of the former part,
you must also admit the existence of the latter part, and
also the existence of those past things that are without
1
Avipaka = avyakata (or abyakata) . These include all
classes of consciousness which happen as moral effects or resultants
(vipaka citta), and are morally inoperative, also all material
qualities, and Nibbana. Cf . Compendium, pp. 19, 20; Bud. Psych.
Eth.} p. 156, n. 1; 168.
effect.1 Again, if those past things of which the effect
is matured are non-existent, no less are those past things
of which the effect is not matured existent, as well as those
things which are without effect. Once more, you say,
those past things the effect of which is not matured exist,
but might not such past things be said to have ceased ?
You admit this ? But you cannot say that a thing both is
•and has ceased.
[4] Do you contend that those past things, the effect of
which is not yet matured, but which have ceased, exist ?
Then must you also admit that those past things, the effect
of which is matured and which have ceased, exist, as well
as those past things which are without effect—that these,
too, exist.
If, on the other hand, you say that those past things, the
effect of which is matured, and which have ceased, do not
exist, then must you also admit that those past things, the
effect of which is not yet matured, and which have ceased,
do not exist [contradicting what you have previously
affirmed], as well as those things which are without effect.
Or do those past things, the effect of which is not yet
matured, but which have ceased, exist? And are those
past things, the effect of which is matured, but which have
ceased, non-existent? Then you hereby affirm also that
some of those past things, the effect of which is in part
matured, and in part not yet matured, but which have
•ceased, exist, while some do not exist—which you deny.
[5] K.—Is it then wrong to say ' those past things, the
effect of which is not yet matured, exist' ?
Th.—Yes.
K— Is it not a fact that past things, the effect of which
is not yet matured, will become mature as to effect?
Th—Yes.
1
' Queries and answers all revolve about these three groups : incom-
plete results, completed results, and the indeterminate, or absence of
results. Of the act producing rebirth, life and decease are its result,
and the maturing of that result, accordingly, lasts from birth to death.'
—Comy
K.—If that be so, then it is surely not wrong to say
that past things yet immature in their effect exist.
Th.—Granting that such past things will become mature
as to their effect , can they be said to exist ? Yes, you say;
but granting that they will in this respect mature, can they
be said to be present ? If you admit this,1 then, granting
that present things will perish, are they non-existent ?
[6]2 (i.) To the question 'Does the future exist?' you reply
'some of it exists, some does not.' You must then admit [in
equivalent terms] that some of it is born, produced, has
happened, appeared, some of it not. Yet you deny this.
Granting your declaration, do some things that have been
inevitably determined3
exist, and some not? You are
committed to this, and also to this: that some future things
which are not inevitably determined exist, and some not.
[7] Referring to your declaration (ii.):—which of the
future exists, which does not exist? You reply: 'Those
future things which are inevitably determined exist, those
that are not so determined do not.' You deny then that
those future things not inevitably determined do exist,
though you are really committed to this by the former half
of your reply. Again, if future things not inevitably
determined are non-existent, then also future things which
are inevitably determined are also non-existent.
With regard to those future things inevitably determined
which you say 'exist,' would you not admit that such future
things have not been born ? Yes ? Then how can you say
that things not yet born exist ?
[8] Or, i f inevitably determined future things, which are
not yet born, do exist, then future things not so determined,
which are not yet born, exist. Or again, if future things
1
Namely, that past things are present things.
2
§§ 6-10 correspond to §§ 1-5.
3
Uppadino. Cf Bud. Psy. Eth., § 1037, n. 4. They will
certainly arise from the fact that their conditions are stable, however
long the maturing may take, e.g. the consummation to be achieved
in the coming of Metteyya Buddha. Atthasalini, 361.
not inevitably determined, which are not yet born, are non-
existent, then you must say no less of similar but inevitably
determined things.
[9] K.—Then is it wrong to say ' those future things
which are inevitably determined exist' ?
Th.—Yes.
K—But will not future things which are inevitably
determined happen ?
Th.—Yes.
K.—Surely then things inevitably determined exist.
[10] Th.—Granting that future things, i f inevitably
determined, will happen, do they exist ?
K.—Yes.
Th.—Granting they will happen, are they present ?
K.—No [the future is not the present].
Th.—I repeat my question.
K.—Yes [since, if they are existent, they are present].
Th—And granting that present things will cease, are
they non-existent ?
K.—Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Th.—But you have already admitted this.
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