Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
6. Of Space.
Controverted Point.—That space is unconditioned.
From the Commentary.—Space is of three modes: as confined or
delimited, as abstracted from object, as empty or inane. Of these the
first is conditioned; the other two are mere abstract ideas. But some,
like the Uttarapathakas and Mahingsasakas, hold that the two latter
modes also, inasmuch as [being mental fictions] they are not condi-
tioned, must therefore be unconditioned.
[1] Th.—If space is unconditioned, as you affirm, you
must class it with Nibbana, or you must affirm two [sorts
of ] unconditioned—and so two Nibbanas—all of which you
deny. . . .
[2] Can anyone make space where there has been no
space? Then one can make that which is conditioned
unconditioned—which you deny. . . . So, too, for the
reverse process. .. .
[8] Again, if you admit that birds go through space,
moon, sun, and stars go through space, supernormal move-
ment is worked in space,
1
the arm or hand is waved in
space, clods, clubs, a supernormally moved person, arrows
are projected through space, you must state as much about
movement through or in the unconditioned—which you
cannot. .. .
[4] Again, if people enclose space when they make
houses or -barns, do they enclose the unconditioned ? Or
when a well is dug, does non-space become space ? Yes ?
Then does the unconditioned become conditioned? Or,
when an empty well, or an empty barn, or an empty jar, is
filled, does ' space ' disappear ? If so, does the uncon-
ditioned disappear ?
[5] U. M.—If then it is wrong to say space is un-
conditioned, is it conditioned? You deny. Then it must
be unconditioned.2
1
Akase . . . iddhing vikubbanti.
2 On space see Bud. Psy. Eth., lviii. 194, and cf. Milinda, ii. 103,
and 316 f.
7. Of Space as visible.
Controverted Point.—That space is visible.
From the Commentary,—This is the view, among the Andhakas for
instance, namely, that because we have cognition of enclosed space,
such as keyholes, etc., therefore all void space is visible. They argue
that in that case space is rupa , that is, material visible object. In
ijhe absence of a Sutta authorizing this, the opponent rejects it, yet
insists on the testimony of pillar-interstices, etc., as visible things.
In such cases, however, what is seen are the pillars, trees, and so forth.
That what lies between is space, there being no visible objects, is an
act of ideation, not of sense-cognition.
1
This applies throughout.
Hence the opponent's argument is not conclusive.
[1] Th.—If this is so, you commit yourself to saying
that space is visible material, visible object and element,
and therefore, as such, is either blue-green, yellow, red, or
white, is cognizable by the eye, impinges on the eye or
organ of vision, enters into the avenue of sight—which you
deny. . . .
[2] Substituting 'space' for 'visible object,' you must
affirm or deny that 'because of eye and space visual con-
sciousness arises.' If not, your proposition falls through.
If you agree, you cannot quote any Suttanta to establish
this. All that the Suttanta says is: ' Because of eye and
visible object visual consciousness arises,'2 as you agree.
Hence you must either call space visible object (with its
properties), or fail to maintain your position.
[3] A.—If I am wrong, you must nevertheless admit that
you ' see' the interval between two trees or two posts, the
space in a keyhole or in a window. Surely then space is
visible.
1
Manodvaravinnanang uppajjati, na cakkhuvin-
nanang. This advance in psychological explanation is a notable trait
in Buddhaghosa's age.
2
Samyutta-Nik., ii. 72; iv. 33; Majjhima-Nik., i. 259.
8. Of the Four Elements, the Five Senses, and of Action
as Visibles.
Controverted Point.—That each of these is visible.
From the Commentary.—This opinion is also maintained by such as
the Andhakas, from the fact that we 'see ' oscillations in stones, water,,
flames, trees, as well as colours of sentient surfaces and the shapes of
hands, feet, etc., on occasion of bodily intimations. The rest may be
understood by the text.
1
[1-9] The discourse is verbatim identical with VI. 7, each
of the 'four elements/ 'the organ of sight' alone, and 'bodily
action' being substituted for' space.' The opponent's rejoinders
are severally as folloivs :
A.—But do we not see earth, a stone, a mountain ?
water? fire blazing? trees waving in the wind? The eye,
the ear, the nose, the tongue, the body? anyone advancing,
retreating, looking forward, looking backward, stretching
forth, retracting?
1
Pali-anusarena. The psychology is similar. The four 'ele-
ments ' were not the material compounds, earthy, etc., but the abstract
common qualities distinguishing the four groups so-called. Indriya
is the controlling power or faculty exercised in sense. Kamma is
the notion of ' action' in overt physical movements. All that we
actually see are changing coloured surfaces. On Dhatu, Indriya,
see Compendium: Notes s.vv.
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