Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
6. Of Everything as persistently existing.
Controverted Point.—That everything exists.
From the Commentary.-This question was asked by one of ours, in
order to break down an opinion, held at present by the Sabbatthivadins,
2
that, judging by the Suttanta passage:'Whatever is material quality,
2
Sansk. Sarvasthivadins, literally, ' everything-exists-believers.'
On the history and literature of this influential school, see Professor
Takakusu in JPTS, 1905, 67 f.; T. Watters, On Yuen Chwang (in
which consult Index).
past, present, future,' etc., all phenomena, past, present, future [once
they arise among the aggregate constituents of personal life and
experience] persist in that state,
1
and that therefore all go on existing.
TO PURGE [ABSTRACT TIME-]IDEAS.
[1] Theravadin.—You say that 'all'
2
exists. Hereby
you are involved in these further admissions:—
All exists everywhere,
3
at all times, in every way,
4
in all
things, not in a combined state, the non-existent exists,
5
the right view which looks upon your wrong view as wrong
exists.
[2] Again, taking all in terms of time, you affirm that
the past exists, the future exists, the present exists. But
is not the past [something that has] ceased—that is,
departed, changed, gone away, gone utterly away ? How
then can you say ' the past exists' ? Again, is not the
future [something that is] not yet born, not yet come to
be, not yet come to pass, has not happened, not befallen,
is not manifested ? How then can you say ' the future
exists' ?
The present, you say, exists; and the present is [some-
thing that has as yet] not ceased, not departed, not changed,
not gone away, not utterly gone away. And the past, you
say, ' exists '; then you should say of the past also that it
has not ceased, not departed, and so on.
Again, the present, you say, exists—that is, it is born,
1
Literally,' do not abandon that state.'
2
'All,' in the Nikayas, stands for everything accessible to sentient
experience. 'I will teach you the "all"'—what is that? The
sense-organs and their objects and the co-ordinating mind. If anyone
say : ' " I reject this all, and teach you another all" he could not
explain . . . he would be out of his range.V Sayyutta-NiJc., iv. 15 ;
cf. Majjhima-Nik., i. 3.
3
' In the whole body.'—Comy.
4
' In various colours,' is the illustration given by the Burmese
translator.
3
I.e., chimaeras, such as a sixth personal aggregate (one more than
the orthodox five constituents mental and bodily), or horns in a hare,
etc.—Comy.
has become, has come to pass, happened, befallen, is mani-
fested. And the future, you say, ' exists '; then you should
say of the future also that it is born, has become, and so on.
Again, the past, you say, exists, and yet that it has
ceased, departed, and so on. And the present, you say,
exists; then you should say of the present also that it has
ceased, departed, and so on.
Once more, the future, you say, exists, and yet that it is
not born, not become, and so on. And the present, you
say, exists; then you should say of the present also that
it is not born, not become, and so on.
[8] Do past material qualities
1
exist? 'Yes,' you say.
But i f you describe these in terms of what 'has ceased,'
and so on, as aforesaid, how can you say 'those past qualities
exist' ? Similarly, for future material qualities—if they [in
common with all that is future] are not born, and so on,
how can they be said to exist ?
[Similarly, the other more general admissions afore-
stated apply also to material qualities in particular:] if
in saying 'present material qualities exist,' you mean they
have 'not ceased to be,' etc., then if past material qualities
' exist,' they also have 'not ceased to be,' etc. And if, in
saying present material qualities ' exist,' you mean they
are ' born, are come to be,' etc., then, if future material
qualities ' exist,' they also are ' born, are come to be,' etc.
Again, if in saying ' past material qualities exist,' you mean
that they have ' ceased, departed,' etc., then, if present
material qualities 'exist/ they also have 'ceased,' etc.
And if, in saying 'future material qualities exist,' you
mean they are 'not yet born,' etc., then, if present material
qualities ' exist,' they also are ' not yet born,' etc.
[4] And all these arguments apply equally to each of the
other four aggregates—:to feeling, to perception, to mental
coefficients, to consciousness.
For instance, if, in saying, 'present consciousness exists,'
you mean it has not ceased to be, not departed, etc., then,
1
Rupang. ' The time-reference is now connected with the aggre-
gates (khandha's, mental and bodily constituents).'—Comy.
if past consciousness [still] 'exists,' it also has not 'ceased
to be, departed,' etc. And if, in saying ' present conscious-
ness exists,' you mean it is born, is come to be, etc., then,
if future consciousness, as you say, 'exists,' it also ' is born,
is come to be,' etc. Again, if, in saying 'past consciousness
exists,' you mean it has ceased, departed, etc., then, if present
consciousness, as you say, ' exists,' it also has 'ceased,
departed,' etc. And if, in saying ' future consciousness
exists,' you mean it is not yet born, has not come to be,
etc., then, when you say ' present consciousness exists,' it
also is 'not yet born, has not come to be,' etc.
[5] In the expression " present material-aggregate,'
1
in
whichever order you use the two terms, if no distinction is
made
2
between each, if they are used as identical, of one
import, as the same, as of the same content and origin,
then when you say, that (A) present material-aggregate, on
ceasing, gives up its present state, you must also admit
that (A1) material-aggregate gives up its materiality. Simi-
larly, when you say, that (a) present material-aggregate on
ceasing does not give up its materiality, you must also admit
that (a1) it does not give up its presence (present state).
[6] S.—But in the expression 'white cloth,' in which-
ever order you use the terms, if no distinction is made
between each, if they are used as identical, of one import,
as the same, as one in content and origin, then when you
say (A) ' white cloth when it is being dyed loses its white-
ness/ you must also admit (A1) it loses its ' clothness.'
Again, in the expression ' white cloth/ in whichever order
you use the terms, i f no distinction is made between each,
if they are used as aforesaid, then when you say (a) ' white
cloth when it is being dyed does not give up its clothness/
you must also admit that (a1) it does not give up its white-
ness. . . .
[7] Th.—If you assert that the material - aggregate
retains its materiality, you must admit that the material-
1
Paccuppannang rupang.
2
Appiyang karitva . Ekatthata anunnata . —Comy.
aggregate is permanent, persistent, eternal, not subject to
change. You know that the opposite is true; hence it
should not be said that materiality is retained.
[8] Nibbana does not abandon its state as Nibbana—by
this we mean Nibbana is permanent, persistent, eternal,
not subject to change. And you ought to mean this, too,
in the case of material-aggregate, if you say that the latter
does not abandon its materiality.
Do you mean by' material-aggregate does not abandon its
materiality,' that the aggregate is impermanent, non-persis-
tent, temporary, subject to change ? You assent. Well, then,
you should affirm the same with regard to Nibbana when
you say: Nibbana does not abandon its state as Nibbana. . . .
[9] If, in your statement 'the past exists' (§ 2), you
mean it retains its pastness or preterition, then in your
statement ' the future exists' (§ 2) you ought to mean: it
retains its futurity, and in your statement ' the present
exists,' you ought to mean: it retains its presentness, or
presence. [10] Each of these affirmations involves a similar
affirmation respecting the other two divisions o f time.
[11] If the past ' exists' and retains its preterition, then
must it be permanent, persistent, eternal, not subject to
change; and this, you admit, is not right. [12] When you
say Nibbana exists, and retains its state as Nibbana, you
mean: it is permanent and so on. So much also must you
mean i f you predicate the same respecting 'the past.' Or,
i f you do not mean that the past is permanent and so on,
when you say 'it exists and retains its pretention,' then when
you say this of Nibbana, you imply that Nibbana is imper-
manent and so on.
[13-20] All the foregoing •(§§ 9-12) applies equally to
the particular past, future, and present things called 'the
five aggregates'—e.g.:—
If, in your statement 'past consciousness exists,' you
mean: it retains its preterition, then, in your statement
'future consciousness exists,'you must ;piean: conscious-
ness retains its futurity; also, in your statement' present
consciousness exists,' you must mean such consciousness
retains its presence. And each of these affirmations involves
a similar affirmation respecting the other two divisions of
time. Again, if past consciousness exists and retains its pre-
tention, then must it be permanent, persistent, eternal, not
subject to change—and this you admit is not right. When
you say, ' Nibbana exists and retains its state as Nibbana,'
you mean it is permanent and so on. So much also must
you mean, if you predicate the same respecting past con-
sciousness. Or, if you do not mean that past consciousness
is permanent and so on, when you say 'it exists and retains
its pretention,' then when you say this o f Nibbana, you imply
that Nibbana is impermanent, not persistent, temporary,
subject to change. .. .
[21] Is the past a non-existent thing ? If you say ' yes,'
you must reject your view that the past exists. If you say
'the non-past exists,' then to say 'there exists a past,' is
equally wrong.
Again, is the future a non-existent thing ? If you say
'yes,' you must reject your view that the future exists. If
you say 'the non-future [alone] exists,' then to say 'there
exists the future,' is equally wrong.
[22] Does that which has been future become present ?
If you assent,1 you must admit that that which was future
is the same as that which is now present. You admit this ?
Then you must admit that anything which having been
[future], is [present], will in turn, having been [future],
become once more [present].2 You admit this ? Then you
must also admit that that which, not having been [future],
is not [present], will not in turn have been [future] only to
become [present] again.3
1
He first denies because the future was then not yet present; he then
assents, because an anticipated thing when realized is present.—Corny.
2
The translation from Pali into Burmese has: 'Having become
present, does it become future and then again present?' The Corny.
explains that the opponent admits the repetition of this imaginary
process of becoming, because he thinks he can speak of an anticipated
thing realized as ' having been, is.'
3
E.g., a chimaera like the horn of a hare.—Corny. Or as we might
say, a unicorn.
[This series of dilemmas is also applicable to ' present'
and 'past,' thus:] Does that which has been present
become past ? If so, you must admit that that which was
present is the same as that which is past.
1
If you do
admit this, you must also admit that anything which
having been [present], is [past] will in turn have been
[present] only to become [past once more]
2
If you do admit
this, you must also admit it as true for their contradictories.
Similarly for future, present, past:—Does the future,
having been, become present, and the present, having
been, become past ? If so, you must admit that these three
are identical, and that the process of becoming the one
after having been the other is repeated. If you do admit
this, you must admit it as true for their contradictories.
1
In the Burmese translation : Is [just] this 'past' that present, or
that (present) this past ?
2
The opponent invests time with objective reality, but practically
rejects all time distinctions. According to him 'will be ' becomes 'is,'
merges into 'was.' The Theravadin tests this by inverting the time-
process, and showing the endlessness of such imaginary processes.
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