Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
APPLICATIONS OF THE PURGED TIME-IDEAS.
[23] Do [all the conditions of an act of visual percep-
tion:—] eye, visible objects, visual consciousness, light,
attention, when past, exist? If you say 'yes,' you should
also admit that one sees the object that is past with an eye
that is past. Similarly, for all the conditions of all other
varieties o f sense-perception that are past—to wit: ear,
audible objects, auditory consciousness, space,
3
attention ;
the nose, odours, olfactory consciousness, air, attention;
the tongue, sapid objects, sapid consciousness, liquid, atten-
tion; body, touches, body-consciousness, extensity, atten-
tion; mind, objects of consciousness, reflection, the seat
[of mental activity],
4
attention. For instance, taking the
last: you should then also admit that one perceives the
' past' object of consciousness with the ' past' mind.
3
Sic, presumably conceived as full of air (vayo); cf . smell below.
4
Vatthu. Note the silence as to the heart.—Compendium, 277.
[24] Similarly, if the conditions of a future act of sense-
perception exist—e.g., eye, visible objects, visual conscious-
ness, light, attention, then one should see future object -with
future eye, and so on. [25] For i f you say that the con-
ditions of present visual and other perception exist, and
that you see present objects with an eye, etc., that is
present, so, i f you maintain that the past conditions of sense-
perception e
exist,' must you say that with the past eye one
sees past objects, etc.; [26] and similarly for future con-
ditions of sense-perception.
[27] If you deny that with the past eye, visible objects,
visual consciousness existing, one does not see past objects
with past eyes, equally must you deny that, with the
conditions for present vision existing, one does not see
present objects with present eyes. Similarly for the
other senses.
[28] Similarly for future vision.
[29] Does past coming-to-know1
exist ? If you assent,
you must admit that the function of knowing is done by
that same [past] coming-to-know. And if you admit that,
you must also admit that by that same [past] coming-to-
know one understands Ill , puts away its cause, realizes its
cessation, practises the Path [not by present cognition].
[30] The same argument applies to future -coming-to-
know.
[31] Does present coming-to-know, or cognition, exist,
and is the function of knowing performed by that same
present cognition ? If you assent, you must admit that, past
coming-to-know also existing [§ 29], the function of know-
ing is performed by that same past cognition. So that if,
by that present cognition, the nature of Ill be understood,
its cause put away, its cessation realized, the path leading
thereto be practised, it is no less by that past cognition
that all this is effected. [32] The same reasoning precisely
holds good to the extent to which you maintain that piesent
coming - to - know exists. [33] But you maintain that,
1
Nanang :—the process is meant, not the ' body' of knowledge, or
knowing conceived as a product.
whereas the past process-of-knowing exists, it is impossible
to perform the function of knowing with it. Then, by
parity o f reasoning, surely it is equally impossible to know
with the existing present process-of-knowing. More par-
ticularly, if you cannot carry out the Four Truths con-
cerning Ill [§§ 29, 31] with past existing cognition, neither
can you do so with present existing cognition—which is
absurd. [34] Future knowing and present knowing are
mutually involved in just the same way.
[35] Do the corruptions of [his] past exist for the Ara-
hant ?
1
You reply ' yes.' But is the Arahant [now] lustful
with [that past, yet existing] lust, hostile with that hate,
ignorant with that dulness, vain with that conceit, errant
with that error, perplexed with that doubt, torpid with that
sloth, distracted with that excitement, shameless with that
impudence, reckless with that indiscretion, all of which are
past and yet ' existing3
?
[36] Similarly, you say that the past [five lower] fetters
and corruptions exist for the Never-Returner. But is he
now holding that theory of soul, perplexed with that doubt,
infected by that contagion of mere rule and ritual, subject-
to residual sensuous passions and ill-will, that are past and
yet 'existing ' ?
[37] Similarly, you say that the same past fetters, and
grosser sensuous passions and coarser forms of ill-will
'exist' for the Once-Returner. But is he now bound by
those fetters, and subject to those grosser passions and
coarse forms of ill-will ?
[38] Similarly, you say that the past three fetters
2
and
lust, hate and dulness entailing the rebirths of misery,
exist for the Stream-Winner. But is he now bound by
those fetters and those vices ?
[39] Granting that past lust exists for an average man,
is he affected by that same lust ? Yes ? Then, surely,
if past lust ' exists' for an Arahant, he also is affected by
that same lust? Similarly for the other nine corruptions
1
A fortiori, since ' all exists' (§ 1). The ten corruptions (pp. 65,
n. 4 ; 66, n. 4) follow.
2
Soul-theory, doubt, ritualism.
[§ 35]. [40-42] If you say that the average man is still
subject to corruptions or fetters, past, yet ' existing,' you
must also admit that past corruptions and fetters, in so
far as they ' exist' in those who have reached any stage of
the path, involve their being subject to them at present.
[43-6] Conversely, i f it is impossible for an Arahant, or
one in any lower stage of the path, to be now subject to
certain corruptions or to fetters which ' exist' for him as past,
it is equally impossible for the average man to be subject
to a corruption or fetter which ' exists' for him as 'past.'
[47] Do past hands exist ?
1
Then must you also admit
that taking and laying down by them is also apparent [as
existences]. Similarly for legs, feet, and their going to
and fro, for joints of limbs, and their contracting and
extending, for the stomach, and its hunger and thirst.
[48] Does the past body exist? Then must you also
admit that the past body undergoes lifting and lowering,
annihilation and dissolution, the being shared by crows,
vultures, and kites; also that poison, weapons, fire may get
access to the body ; also that this past body may be liable
to be bound by confinement by rope or chain, by village,
town, or city jail, by fourfold restraint, and by the fifth,
to wit, strangling.
2
[49] Do the [other] past elements [of the past body]
exist — its cohesiveness, heat, mobility?
3
If you assent,
then you mast admit that with each past element the past-
body still performs the corresponding function.
[50] Do past and future as well as present material
aggregates exist ? If so, then there must be three material
aggregates. And i f you say that past and future as well as
present fivefold aggregates exist, you must admit that there
are fifteen aggregates. [51] Similarly, you must admit
three organs of sight, or thrice twelve organs and objects
1
As part of 'everything' (§ 1).
2
Literally, by the neck.
3
The first, ' hardness' (or solidity), has been implicitly dealt with
under § 47. 'Cohesiveness' may be rendered fluidity. The four
elements are the philosophic or abstract conceptions of the popular
four elements : earth, water, etc.
of sense.
1
[52] Similarly, you must admit three elements
of sight, or eighteen elements multiplied by three time-
divisions, fifty-four in all. [58] Similarly, you must admit
three visual controllers,
2
or sixty-six controllers in all.
[54] Would you say that a Wheel-turning monarch3
of
the past or of the future, as well as one of the present,
'exists'? But this amounts to saying that three Wheel-
turning monarchs are actually living.
4
The same impli-
cation lies in a similar assertion respecting Perfectly
Enlightened Ones [Buddhas].
[55] Does the past exist ? 'Yes' you reply. Then, is the
existent the past ? You reply ' the existent may be past,
and may be not-past.' But herein you make out that the
past may be the past and may be the not-past. Your
position is wrong, and you are refuted.
5
[56] You are similarly involved if you say that, whereas
the future exists, the existent may be future [and] may not
be future. [57] So also for ' the present.' [58] Similarly,
if you affirm that Nibbana exists, but that the existent may
be Nibbana,
6
may not be Nibbana:—this amounts to saying
that Nibbana [is or may be] not Nibbana, not-Nibbana [is,
or may be] Nibbana.
1
The six senses and their objects multiplied by three time-divisions.
2
Indriya's. See p. 16; Vibhanga, 122; Yamaha, ii. 61, 288.
3
Or world-emperor.
4
Literally, there is for them the state of being face to face. It is
orthodox to hold that there can neither be two such monarchs, nor two
Buddhas (Saviour-Buddhas) at the same time. Digha-Nik, iii. 114 ;
Vibhanga, 886.
5
The position of the Theravadin is, of course, by European logic,
only tenable if the major term 'exist,'
4
the existent,' be distributed:
does (A) the past = (B) all that exists. But since, in Buddhist or
natural logic, B coincides with A in one and the same object, we can
substitute B for A; and we may then follow the argument. But that
such an argument as that above could be introduced in serious dia-
lectical discussion shows how the Indian mind grasped particular
concepts in philosophical discussion.
6
Read, for atitan, nibbanan(ti), in PTS. edition.
[59] S.—Is it wrong to say 'the past exists,'
' the future
exists '?
Th.—Yes.
S.—But was it not said by the Exalted One: ' What-
soever material quality, bhikkhus, whether past, future,
or present, is either internal or external, gross or subtle,
common or excellent, distant or near, is called the material
aggregate. Whatsoever feeling, whether past, future, or
present, of which the foregoing may be said, is termed the
aggregate of feeling. So also are the other three aggregates'?1
Surely then the past exists, the future exists.
[60] Th. — But was it not said by the Exalted One :
' These' three modes in word, term, or name, bhikkhus, which
have been distinct in the past, are now distinct, and will be
distinct, are not condemned by recluses and brahmins who are
wise. Which three ? (1) That material aggregate which is past,-
which has ceased, which is changed, is reckoned, termed, named
"has been"; it is not reckoned as " exists," nor as "will be."
And so for the aggregates of feeling, perception, mental co-
efficients, consciousness. (2) That material aggregate which
is not yet born, and which has not appearedis reckoned,
termed, named "will be," but is not reckoned as "exists "
nor as " has been." And so for the mental aggregates.
(3) That material body which has come to birth, has appeared,
is reckoned, termed, named "exists," but is not reckoned as
" has been," nor as "will be." And so for the mental aggre-
gates. Verily these three modes in word, term, or name, bhik-
khus, are distinct, have been distinct in the past, are not,
will not, be condemned by recluses and brahmins who are
wise.
' Bhikkhus, the folk of Ukkala, Lenten speakers of old,
2
1
Majjhima-Nik., iii. 16 f.; Samy.-Nik., iii. 47,
2 Ukkala -vassa bhanna . In Bh
Okkala . . . , The Br.
translation renders this by adipurisa, men of old. But that, the
district so-called (? identified with Orissa) is referred to is Buddha-
ghosa's opinion:
4
Those dwelling in the country Ukkala.' He divides
the rest : vasso (sic) ca bhanna ca — 'for these causation-
theorists are two.' Presently, however, he refers to them collectively
Casualists, Deniers of the Deed, Sceptics—even they, too,
judged that these three modes of reckoning, terming, or naming,
should not he condemned or repudiated. And why ivas that ?
Because they were afraid of blame, of unpopularity, of incur-
ring opposition" ?1
[61] Again, did not the venerable Phagguna say to the
Exalted One: ' Does the eye {or sight), lord, still exist by
which past Buddhas, who have completed existence, have cut
off the multipliers of life,
2
have cut off its cycle, have exhausted
it, ancl utterly passed beyond all 111, might be revealed ? Or
does the ear, the nose, the tongue, the co-ordinating sense, still
exist unth which one might do this ' 1 ' Nay, Phagguna, the
eye does not exist, nor any sense by which past Buddlias, who
have so wrought, might be revealed' P
Is the Suttanta thus ? Then it must surely not be said
-that ' the past is,' ' the future is.'
[62] Again, was it not said by the venerable Nandaba:
£
Formerly there was greed [ivithin him], that was bad; that
this no longer exists is good. Formerly there were hate and
didness, that tvas bad; that these no longer exist, that is
good!
4
Is the Suttanta thus? Surely then it should not be
said that ' the past exists.'
[63] S.—But was it not said by the Exalted One: ' If
bhikkhus, there be lust after, pleasure in, craving for, edible
food,
s
consciousness establishes itself and gro ws there. Wherever
as j ana, people, thus: 'These two (classes of) people and these
three views.' These three views he tersely characterizes by referring to
(1) Makkhali Gosala's formula (.Dialogues, i. 71; Majjh.-Niki. 407);
(2) the words karoton a karlyat i papag—'evi l result befalls
not the doer' (Angutt-NiTc., i. 192); (B) Ajita Kesakambali's view
(.Dialogues, i. 78). Saratthappakasim, VI. 487. Cf . Vin. Texts,
i. 81; Rhys Davids, Bud. Birth Stories, 110. Cf . JRAS., 1910,
526 f. , where the reviewer, E. Miiller, overlooks this passage.
1
Samyutta-Nik, iii. 71.
2
Natural desires (tanha)—so Buddhaghosa's Commentary; else-
where conceit" and erroneous views are added.
3 - Op cit, iv. 52. 4 Anguttara-Nik., i. 197 (III. 66).'
5
Support, proximate cause ; see next page, n. 4.
consciousness establishes itself and groivs, there doth exist an
entry
1
for mind and body. Wherever an entry for mind-and
body doth exist, there do grow 2
mental coefficients. Wherever
mental coefficients do grow, there re-becoming in the future doth
exist. Wherever re-becoming in the future doth exist, there
do follow future birth, decay, and dying. Wherever future
birth, decay, and dying do exist, I, bhikkhus, do declare that
to be accompanied by grief, anguish,
3
and despair. And
whether the food " be [edible, or] contact, or act of will,
or consciousness,
4
I declare it to be accompanied by grief
anguish, and despair' ? 5
Is the Suttanta thus ? Hence must it not surely be
said ' the future exists' ?
6
[64] Th.—But was it not also said by the Exalted One :
i
If there be no lust after, pleasure in, craving for, edible food,
consciousness doth not establish itself or grow there. IVher-
ever consciousness doth not establish itself and grow, there doth
not exist an entry for mind and body. Wherever an entry
for mind and body doth not exist, there doth exist no growth
of mental coefficients. Wherever growth of mental coefficients
doth not exist, there doth exist no future re-becoming. Wher-
ever future re-becoming doth not exist, there doth exist no
future birth, no decay ancl dying. Wherever there doth exist
in the future no bi/rth, decay, oi dying, I declare, bhikkhus,
that such edible food is not attend d by grief, anguish, and
despair. Or whether the " foodJ
be contact, or act of will,
1
Avakkanti , an opportunity for rebirth as the resultant of
foregoing consciousness, i.e., in a previous life.
2
The Burmese translation also reads vuddhi , though Br
. has
buddhi .
3
Sadarang. So Singhalese MSS. PTS edition and Br. read
sarajat ) (with) ' dust,' a figure for the passions which cause obscurity
•of ' vision.'
Cf. Dialogues, ii. 32.
4 As one of the four 'foods' or proximate causes taught in the
Dhamma, vinnana (consciousness), functioning at death, is the
•cause of fresh effect-vinnana beginning in the conceived germ. Cf .
Mrs. Rh. D., Bud. Psychology, 1914,22,61; also Bud. Psy. Bth., 30, n. 1.
5
Samyutta-Nik., ii. 101.
6
In PTS edition either na must be suppressed, or ? must be
inserted. The Hanthawaddy Br. edition omits na vattabbang .
t.s . v .
or consciousness, I declare it to be unattended by grief
anguish, and despair' ?1
Is the Suttanta thus ? Surely then it should not he said
that 'the future exists.'
1
This passage in the Sutta quoted, follows immediately on the previous
quotation. The Opponent's emphasis lies on the atthi , ' doth exist,'
of the solemn categorical declaration in the Sutta. The Theravadin,,
by completing the declaration, shows that the future, so far from
existing, depends entirely, for its coming-to-exist at all, on the circum-
stances attending the occurrence of a certain pre-requisite, or ante-
cedent condition. Before it exists, certain conditions must have come
to pass. So the Corny.: 'the words "there doth exist in the future
re-becoming," etc., do not amount to a ''state of existing," but refer to-
certainty of result, given the consummation of the conditions.'
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