Kathavatthu - Of What Does My Past Consist ?

Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A

7. Of what does my 'Past' Consist?
Controverted Point.—That one's past consists in [bodily
and mental] aggregates.
2
[1] Opponent.—If you affirm that [my] past consisted in
aggregates—as you do—you must also admit that the past
exists
3
—which you deny. This is also the position in the
case of the organs and objects of sense, the elements,
4
or
all o f the three taken together. [2] Again, i f you admit
that [my] future will consist in aggregates—as you do—you
must also admit that the future exists—which you deny.
This is also the position in the case of the organs and ob-
jects of sense, the elements, or all of the three taken together.
[8] If you admit—as you do—that [my] present consists
in aggregates and that it exists, you must also admit that
1
This passage in the Sutta quoted, follows immediately on the previous
quotation. The Opponent's emphasis lies on the atthi , ' doth exist,'
of the solemn categorical declaration in the Sutta. The Theravadin,,
by completing the declaration, shows that the future, so far from
existing, depends entirely, for its coming-to-exist at all, on the circum-
stances attending the occurrence of a certain pre-requisite, or ante-
cedent condition. Before it exists, certain conditions must have come
to pass. So the Comy.: 'the words "there doth exist in the future
re-becoming," etc., do not amount to a ''state of existing," but refer to-
certainty of result, given the consummation of the conditions.'
2
This is a supplementary discussion to the foregoing, the Opponent,
in the absence of any new allocation by the Commentator, being
doubtless still a Sabbatthi vadin. His ' opinion is that past and
future both exist, because the aggregates and other factors of our
experience retain their state [as a sort of complex soul]. The
Theravadin's " yes " summarizes the past as khandha s (read
khandhasangahitatta , as in Br.}.'-— Comy.
3
The factors of individual life—in their ultimate terms—were
among the 'phenomenal realities' of orthodox doctrine.
4
The elements were the physical irreducibles in the organism, and
the sentient apparatus * derived' from them. Vibhanga, 82-5.


my past, which consisted in aggregates, exists. Similarly
for other present factors o f experience. [4] Similarly,
again, for my future.
[5] Again, if you admit a past consisting in aggregates
—or other factors, such as sense-organs, etc.—which does
not [now] exist, you must admit that the present consist-
ing (as you agree) in aggregates, etc., no longer exists.
[6] Similarly as to a future consisting in aggregates, etc.,
but not existent.
[7] Again, a little more specifically, if you admit that
material qualities in the past formed my aggregates, sense-
organs and objects, elements, or all of these together, then
you must also admit that past material qualities exist.
[8] And if you admit that material qualities in the future
will form my aggregates, etc., you must also admit that
future material qualities exist.
[9] Again, if you admit that material qualities in the
present form my bodily aggregate and the other factors, and
that the present exists, you must also admit that my past
material qualities, having consisted in bodily aggregate,
etc., exist.
[10] The same reasoning holds good, if, for 'past,
' future ' material quality be substituted.
[11] Again, if you admit past material qualities existing
as an aggregate, and hold the view that those past qualities
do not exist, then you must admit that present material
qualities existing as an aggregate, and other present factors,
do not exist. [12] Similarly as to future material qualities
existing as an aggregate, and other future factors, held by
you to be non-existent.
[13] This also holds good if, for 'material qualities,' any of
the four mental aggregates be substituted. For instance,
1
if you admit that consciousness in the past formed my
aggregate, sense-organs and objects, or elements [all of
which you would call real], then you must also admit
that past consciousness exists. [14] Similarly, if you
admit that future consciousness will form my aggregate,
1
§§ 13-18 are parallel to §§ 7-11.


etc., you must also admit that future consciousness exists.
[15] Again, if you admit that present consciousness forms
my aggregate, with other factors, and that the present
exists, you must also admit that my past consciousness,
consisting in aggregate, sense-organ, and the rest, exists.
So again for future consciousness.
[17] Once more, i f you declare, o f past consciousness
existing as an aggregate, and the rest, that that conscious-
ness does not exist, then you must admit that present
consciousness, existing as an aggregate, does not exist.
[18] Similarly as to future consciousness.
[19] Th.—Is it then wrong to say that my past and
my future consisting in aggregates, elements, sense-organs
and -objects, do not exist ?
Opp.—Yes.
Th.—But was it not said by the Exalted One: 'These
three modes in word, in term, or in name9 bhikkhus, which are,
and were, formerly held distinct, are not mixed, luill not be
confused, are not condemned by recluses and brahmins icho are
wise:—which three? (1) Those aggregates, material and
mental, which are past, have ceased, are changed, are reckoned,
termed, named "have been" ; they are not reckoned as " are"
(or "exist"), nor yet as "will be" Similarly, (2) for those
aggregates that "will be," and (3) for those that "are" . . .'?1
Is the Suttanta thus? Then it should surely2 be said
that my past and future consisting in aggregates, elements,
sense-organs and -objects, exist.
[20] Opp.—But was it not said by the Exalted One:
'Whatsoever material qualities, bhikkhus, whether past, future,
or present, are either internal or external, gross or subtle,
common or excellent, distant or near, are called the material
aggregate. Whatsoever feeling, or other mental aggregate,
whether past, etc. . . '? 3

1 This quotation, cut short in the original, is that of § 60 in the
preceding discourse.—Samy.-Nik., iii. 71.
2 In the PTS text n a should be omitted. Br. reads n a both here
and in the final sentence. The Comy, assigns the question and citation
in [20] to the Opponent. Hence the two conclusions must differ.
3 Samyutta-Nik., iii. 47 ; quoted also above, I. 7, § 59.


Is the Suttanta thus ?
Th.—Yes.
Opp.—Hence it should certainly not be said that 'my
past and future consisting in aggregates,' etc., do not exist.