Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
3. Of Matter as Subjective.
Controverted Point.—Whether matter should be termed
subjective or objective.
From, the Commentary.—It is an opinion of some—for instance,
the Uttarapathakas—that matter should be termed sarammana
(i.e., co-object), not because it is so in the sense of making a mental
object [for itself], but inasmuch as it causes mental presentation.
The argument seeks to point out the distinction be ween the two
meanings of arammana.2
[1] Th.—If that is so, you must also affirm of matter or
body, that it has the mental features of ' adverting,' idea-
ting, reflecting, co-ordinated application, attending, willing,
anticipating, aiming3
—things which you would, on the
contrary, deny of matter.
[2] All, or any of them you can rightly affirm of mental
properties, such as contact (mental reaction), feeling, per-
ception, volition, cognition, faith, energy, mindfulness,
concentration, understanding, lust, hate, illusion, conceit,
2
So Br. edition: arammana-dvayassa vibhaga-das -
san'atthang . The PTS reading is not intelligible. Saram-
mana , in the orthodox view, means 'subjective,' because mind has
mental object. The opponent takes sarammana to mean ' objective,'
because matter is presented as object. This confusion of the terms
applicable to mind arises from the fact that he substitutes aram-
mana for paccaya in the compound sappaccaya, and misreads
sarammanatthena sarammanang . Thus the word aram-
manang has two meanings—' object' and paccaya. See § 4.
3
See VIII. 9, § 1.
erroneous opinion, doubt, mental inertia, distraction, im-
modesty, indiscretion—all of which you admit as subjective.
But matter is not one of these, and therefore such things
may not be affirmed of it.
[3] You deny in the case of matter all those mental
features—adverting, etc.—but claim for it the term ' subjec-
tive,' which is really applicable to ' contact,' sensation, etc.
These, as you admit, do not lack those mental features named.
[4] U.—But is not matter correlated (as an object)?1
Of course you assent. Then as correlated it is surely right
to apply the term 'subjective' to matter, etc. [since ' object'
is one of the twenty-four (causal) relations].
4. Of Bias as without Menial Object.
Controverted Point.—That latent (immoral) bias2 is with-
out mental object.
From the Commientary.—Some—for instance, the Andhakas and
certain of the Uttarapathakas—hold that what are called the (seven)
latent biases, being something distinct from mind, unconditioned,
indeterminate, are thereby without concomitant mental object. The
Theravadin's questions are to show what sort of phenomenon it is
that'has no mental object.'
[1] Th.—Then the forms of latent bias must be either
material quality, or Nibbana, or one of the five organs or
five objects of sense,3 which you deny.
1
Dhammasangani, § 595: rupang sappaccayang (translated
as 'conditioned ' in Bud. Psy. Eth.); Compendium, 194.
2
Anusaya. On this sevenfold 'Category of Evil,' see Com-
pendium, p. 172, n. 2. In the Yamaka it bulks very large. The
Commentary on that work attributes the metaphor to the relatively
ineradicable nature of the seven modes lying latent throughout the
life-term of the individual, and quotes the present argument as showing
a rejection of all the qualities claimed for anusaya (JPTS,
1910-12, p. 86). This deep-rootedness is brought out in Pss. of
the Brethren, verses 12, 768. Herbert Spencer's use of 'bias' first
suggested to us the suitability for it. See JRAS, 1894, p. 324.
3 Only sense - co-ordinating and sensations as co-ordinated have
'mental objects' (Vibhanga, 428).
But let us take the first form, the bias of sense-desire.
If this is without mental object, must you not also affirm
the same of all manifestations and notions of sense-desire
—to wit, sense-desire as lust, as an outburst of lustful desire,
as a Fetter, as a Flood, as a Bond, as an Obstacle ? Would
you not rather affirm just the opposite of these, that they
are concomitant with mental object ?
[2] Or again, in what aggregate is latent bias included ?
The aggregate of mental coefficients,
1
you say. But these
are concomitant with object not less than the other mental
aggregates: this you of course admit. How then can you
maintain your proposition ? [3] If you affirm that (a) the
bias of sense-lust has the aggregate of mental coefficients
involved with it, and yet is without mental object, you
must say no less of (b) sense-lust in general. But you
refuse (making of sense-lust as bias a thing apart).
[4] Thus you get: (a) aggregate of mental coefficients
without mental object; (b) aggregate o f mental coefficients
with mental object.
Then is that aggregate partly with, partly without,
mental object ? Then must you affirm the same of all the
mental aggregates
2
. . . which you may not. . . .
[5] Or, passing over the next five latent biases—resent-
ment, conceit, mere opinion, doubt, lust of rebirth—as
disposed of by this same argument, take similarly the
seventh—nescience—if this as latent bias is without object,
it must be no less without mental object when figured as
Flood, Bond, Outburst, Fetter, Obstacle—which you deny
[keeping the latent bias a thing apart].
[6, 8] The argument about the aggregates applies no
less to this form of bias.
[9] A. U.—But is it not right to say that, when an
average man of the world is thinking of something that is
morally good or indeterminate, he may be described as
1
Sankhara's . Cf. p. 229, n. 2.
2
These were taught as being all 'with mental object.' Bee Vib-
hanga, p. 428.
'having latent bias'? And are not [at that moment] those
forms of bias [latent in him] without mental object?
[10] Th.—But you could equally well say of him at such
a moment that he had lust in his -heart,1 and you deny
that lust is without mental object.2 . . .
5. Of Insight as without Mental Object.
Controverted Point—That insight3 is without mental
object.
From the Commentary.—Inasmuch as an Arahant cannot be said
to lack insight, that insight must, at least at times, be practically
without object, namely, when his visual consciousness is active, for
then he is occupied with the visible object engaging his sense of sight.
So think some, for instance, the Andhakas.
[1] Th.—Then insight must be either material quality,
or Nibbana, or one of the five organs of sense, or their five
external objects (since these are the things that are without
mental object). But this you deny. . . .
You deny also that understanding, as controlling power
or force, as right views, as the search for truth by intui-
tion,4
is without mental object, affirming the contrary.
Then why exclude insight ?
[2-4] Here, too, you judge that the aggregate o f mental
coefficients is involved. But as in the preceding discourse,
so here: you cannot say, a mental aggregate is without
object, or partly so. And you cannot affirm that under-
standing, which is involved in that aggregate, is with
mental object, while insight, also involved in it, is
without.
1
I.e., potentially, as something not extirpated.
2
' Hence the objectlessness of 'latent bias' is not properly sub-
stantiated.'—Comy.
3
Nanang—i.e. , Arahatta-magga-nanang—insight belonging
to the highest Path, that of Arahantship.
4
Dhammavicayo. Cf. Bud. Psy. Eth., p. 18, n. 1 (reading
E.g. for I.e.), with Compendium, p. 180, n. 3.
[5] A.—You deny that insight is objectless. Is it right
to say that the Arahant is ' full of insight,'1 while he is
visually cognitive ?
Th.—Yes.
A.—Has his insight at that moment an object ?
Th.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. .. . [6] But if you
substitute ' full of understanding' for 'full of insight,' you
yourself admit that he is full of understanding while visu-
ally cognitive, and at the same time you deny that his
understanding, during that process, has an object.2
1
Nani . It is used as a synonym of pannava in § 6. Cf.
Anguttara-Nik., iv. 340.
2
The insight is potential, not always actualized, i.e., exercised
about an object. There cannot be two mental objects at the same
instant of time.
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