Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
BOOK IX
I. Of Release through seeing the Good.1
Controverted Point.—That the Fetters are put of f for one
who discerns a blessing (in store).
From, the Commentary.—In our doctrine we are convinced that
when anyone discerns (a) the ' world ' (literally, ' the conditioned ') as
fnll of peril, and (6) Nibbana as a blessing, the ' Fetters' are put off .
But some—for instance, the Andhakas—take one of these two alterna-
tive statements, and say it is only2
by the latter discernment that
the Fetters are put off . It is to rebuke this partial view that the
Theravadin speaks.
[1] Th —But are not the Fetters also put off when the
world3 is considered as impermanent? You admit this, of
course. But [then you should not confine yourself to the
optimistic side].
[2] You admit, too, they are put off when the world is
considered as full of Ill , as disease, as a canker, a piercing
dart, as woe, as unbearable,4 as an enemy,5 as crumbling
away, as a calamity, as oppression, as peril, as trouble, as
fluctuating, as dissolving, as transient, as shelterless, as no
retreat, as no refuge, as without protection, as empty, bare
and void, as without soul, as full of danger, and mutable.
[But your statement hereby becomes one-sided.]
1
Anisangsa (literally, 'praise,' with two intensive prefixes; com-
mendable, because good; profit, advantage). The argument is that
the realization of present actual evils is as strong a stimulus, as vis
a tergo, to betterment, as the faith in the happiness of that betterment
attained—-the vis a fronte.
2
In the PTS edition read va or eva for evang.
3
Sankhara .
4
Or 'an affliction' (abadhato).
5
Literally, 'as other.'
[3] You admit then that (at the same moment) a man
can both consider the impermanence and so on of the
world, and see the blessings in Nibbana? No? But you
have admitted that he loses the Fetters when he does both.
You admit then that he can? But does this not involve us
in two simultaneous mental reactions, two consciousnesses,
and so on?
[4] A.—You reject my proposition. But did not the
Exalted One say: 'Take, bhikkhus, the ease of a bhikkhu
who lives contemplating the happiness in Nibbana, perceiving
and feeling that happiness continually, constantly, and un-
diluted, convinced of it in his mind and permeated with it by
insight?1 . . .
Surely then it is for one who discerns the happy prospect
that the Fetters are put off .
2. Of the Ambrosial2 as an Object by which we are
bound.
Controverted Point— That the Ambrosial as an object of
thought is a ' fetter.'
From the Commentary.—This is an opinion held, for instance, by
the Pubbaseliyas, and due to careless inference from such passages as
'He fancies things about Nibbana.'3
1
Anguttara-Nik., iv. 14. Cf. the Commentary (Manoratha-
purani ) on this passage. The K. V. Commentary concludes that
whereas the work of insight into the actual, the perilous present;
occupies the entrant at the threshold of the Ariyan Way, the Fetters
get removed, as, during his progress, he discerns the blessings of
Nibbana. The sense seems to require abbocchinnang, 'without
a break,' or 'uninterruptedly,' for abbokinnang , 'undiluted.' One
is tempted to render cetas a adhimuccamano by 'of his own
freewill.'
2
Amata, or 'not-dead.' As this term does not for Buddhists, as
it might for Europeans, suggest immortal life, we have not rendered
it by 'the Immortal,' but by a term which, though it literally does
mean that, has a vague suggestion of bliss.
3
See Majjhima-Nik., i. 4.
[1] Th.—If you say that, are you prepared to admit
that the Ambrosial is the object of consciousness accom-
panied by ' Fetters,' 'Ties,' ' Floods,' 'Bonds,' ' Hind-
rances,' ' Infections,' 'Graspings,' ' Corruptions '?1 Is
it not rather an object accompanied by the very oppo-
site ?
[2-4] You affirm that, on account of the Ambrosial occu-
pying the mind, lust, hate, ignorance may spring up. But
are you prepared to admit that the Ambrosial itself con-
duces to occasions for lusting, to lusting after, wishing for,
being inebriated, and captivated by, languishing for ?
That it conduces to occasions for hatred, anger, and resent-
ment? That it conduces to occasions for delusion, for
depriving of knowledge, for blinding vision, for suspend-
ing insight, for siding with trouble,
2
for failing to win
Nibbana? Is it not rather the opposite d f all these?
How then can you say that, on account of the Ambrosial
occupying the mind, lust, hate, and ignorance spring up ?
[5] All these things you may truly predicate as springing
up bedkuse of the occupation of the mind with material
qualities (rupa). But material qualities are not the
Ambrosial.
[6] You would not say that, whereas *the Fetters spring
up because of material qualities, the latter do not conduce
to Fetters, Ties, Floods, and all such spiritual defects and
dangers. How then can you affirm just the same of the
Ambrosial: that, whereas the Fetters spring up because of
it, it does not conduce to Fetters, and so forth? Or that,
whereas lust, hate, and ignorance spring up because of the
Ambrosial, nevertheless the Ambrosial is not an occasion
for lusting and all the rest ?
[7] P.—But was it not said by the Exalted One: 'He
perceives Nibbana as such, and having perceived it he
imagines things about Nibbana, with respect to Nibbana,
1
On these spiritual categories cf. p. 115, § 1; and see Bud. Psy.
Eth., iii., chaps, v., x., xii,, xiii.
2
Br, reads vighatapakkhiyang.
things as Nibbana, that "Nibbana is mine" dallying with
the idea'?1
Therefore the Ambrosial is an object of thought not yet
freed from bondage.
1
Majjhima-Nik., i. 4 : a Sutta, says the Commentary, which is
here inconclusive, because the Nibbana spoken of is simply temporal
well-being, so called. ' Falsely mistaken by the worldling for the real
thing; a matter connected with the satisfaction of natural desires
only,' wrote Buddhaghosa in the Papanca Sudani (Commentary on
the Majjhima-Nik.).
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