Showing posts with label Abhidhamma Pitaka. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Abhidhamma Pitaka. Show all posts

Saturday, June 25, 2011

Kathavatthu - Of Animals in Heaven; the Ariyan Path; Insight

Points of Controversy
Subjects of Discourse

4. Of Animals in Heaven.
Controverted Point.—That animals may be reborn among
the devas.
From the Commentary.—Among devas many—for instance, Eravana
'—assume animal shapes, such as those of elephants or horses, but
no animals are reborn as such among them. Some, however, like the
Andhakas, assume that because such celestial shapes have been seen,
therefore these were celestially reborn animals.
[1] Th.—Do you then imply that conversely devas are
reborn as animals ? Or that the deva-world is an animal
kingdom? That there may there be found moths, beetles,
gnats, flies, snakes, scorpions, centipedes, earthworms ?
You deny all this. Then you cannot maintain your pro-
position. .. .
[2] A.—But is not the wondrous elephant Eravana there,
the thousand-wise yoked celestial mount?3
[3] Th.—But are there also elephant and horse stables
there, and fodder and trainers and grooms? . . .

5. Of the Ariyan Path.
Controverted Point—That the Path is fivefold [only].
From the Commentary.—Some, such as the Mahingsasakas, hold
that in general terms the [Ariyan] Path is only fivefold. They infer

Yana, literally vehicle. See above, p. 127, n. 4.

this both from the Sutta, 'One who has previously been quite pure,'
etc., and also because the three eliminated factors- speech, action,
and livelihood—are not states of consciousness like the other five.1
[1] Th.—But was not the Path pronounced by the
Exalted One to be eightfold—namely, right views, right
purpose, right speech, action, and livelihood, right effort,
mindfulness, and concentration ? [2] And did he not
also say:
' Of all the means the Eightfold Path is best,
And best of all true things the Stages Four;
Best state of mind disinterestedness,2
And of all bipeds best the man-who-sees'?3
Surely, then, the Path is eightfold.
[3] But you tell me that though these three—right
speech, right action, right livelihood—are factors of the
Path, nevertheless they are not path, [4] while the other
five are both factors of the Path and Path. Why this
distinction ?
[5] M.—But was it not said by the Exalted One: 'For him
who has hitherto been quite pure in karma of deed and of ivord
and of livelihood, this Ariyan Eightfold Path toill go to per-
fection of development
Hence surely the Path is fivefold.
[6] Th.—But was it not said by the Exalted One: 'In what-
soever doctrine and discipline, Subhadda, the Ariyan Eightfold
Path is not found, neither in it is there found a saintly man5
of the first, or of the second, or of the third, or of the fourth
degree. And in whatsoever doctrine and discipline, Subhadda,
the Ariyan Eightfold Path is found, in it is such a saintly
man found. Now in this doctrine and discipline, Subhadda,

As discussed above, X. 2.
2 Virago , absence of greed or passion.
Dhammapada, ver. 273.
We have not traced this passage. Purity of act, word, and life, is
essential as a preliminary qualification for the Path; much more are
these three factors of the Path.

is found the Ariyan Eightfold Path, and in it, too, are found
men of saintliness of all four degrees. Void are the systems
of other teachers, void of saintly men'?1
Hence surely the Path is eightfold.

6. Of Insight.
Controverted Point.—That insight into the twelve-fold
base is spiritual.2
From the Commentary.—There is an opinion—held by the Pub-
baseliyas, for instance—concerning the ' twelve constituent parts' in
the First Sermon, 'The Turning of the Norm-Wheel'—namely, that
knowledge based on those twelve belongs to the Four Paths and Fruits.
[1] Th.—Do you mean that there are twelve kinds of
insight ? You deny. I ask again. You admit.3 Then are
there twelve [First or] Stream-winning Paths? or Fruits
thereof ? Or twelve of any of the other Paths or Fruits? . . .
[2] P.—But was it not said by the Exalted One: '(A, i.) That
this Ariyan Truth concerning Ill,4 O bhikkhus, was not among
the doctrines handed down, but there arose in me the vision,
there arose in me the insight (nanang), there arose in me the
wisdom, there arose in me the understanding, there arose in
me the light; (ii.) that this Ariyan fact of Ill must be com-
prehended; (iii.) that it was comprehended; (B, i.) that this
tvas the Ariyan Truth concerning the Cause of Ill; (ii.) that
the Cause of Ill was to be put away . . (iii.) wets put away;
(C, i.) that this was the Ariyan Truth concerning the Cessa-
tion of Ill; (ii.) that this Cessation was to be realized; (iii.) had
been realized; (D, i.) that this was the Ariyan Truth concern-

Dialogues, ii. 166.
Lokuttara. See above, p. 134, n. 4..
He first denies because of the oneness of the Paths; he then assents
because of the diverse knowledge —as tp nature, the need to do and
the being done—respecting each Truth.—Comy.
The Br. translator renders 'That this Ill constitutes an Ariyan

big the Path going to the Cessation of Ill; (ii.) that that Path
was to be developed; (iii.) that it had been developed'?1
Hence surely the insight based on these twelve parts is

1 Vinaya Texts, i. 96 f.; Buddhist Suttas (SBE, XI.), 150-152.
'The citation is inconclusive, as it does not show the twelve kinds of
Insight of the Ariyan Path, but merely a distinction between prior and
later knowledge.—Comy.

Kathavatthu - Of Unintentional Crime; Insight; the Guards of Purgatory

Points of Controversy
Subjects of Discourse

Of Unintentional Crime; Insight; the Guards of Purgatory


1. Of Unintentional Crime.
Controverted Point.—That the five cardinal crimes, even
when unintentionally committed, involve retribution im-
mediately after death.
From the Commentary. - Inasmuch as the grounds for immediate
retribution after death are very weighty and grave, some—for instance,
the Uttarapathakas—hold that even the unintentional infliction of such
injuries calls for it.
[1] Th.—But you imply that if I accidentally take away
life, I am a murderer, [2] and [similarly as to two of the
other four wicked deeds forbidden by morality] that if I
accidentally take what is not given, I am a thief . . .
if I utter untruths unintentionally, I am a liar. You
deny. Yet you wish to make exceptions [to the relative
innocence of such acts] in just those five serious cases. . . .
[3] Can you-cite me a Sutta judging unintentional
crime like that which says: 'He that intentionally takes
his mother s life incurs immediate retribution'?1 You cannot.
Neither can you maintain your proposition.
[4] U.—But does not the fact remain that the mother's
life is taken ?2 Surely then the unintentional slayer also
incurs immediate retribution. [5-7] Similarly, too, does
We cannot trace this passage. So far as his own future is con-
cerned, the individual's mental acts rather than his deeds create it.
Cf. Majjhima-Nik., i. 372 f ; cf. iii. 207. See above, 80, n. 5; cf. 274.
This question is answered in the affirmative with reference to
accidental loss of life under medical treatment.—Comy.

one who unintentionally kills father or Arahant, or sheds a
Buddha's blood, incur a like doom.
[8] Th.—[Now as to the fifth of such crimes]: do you
imply that all schismatics incur such a doom ? You deny.
But think again ! You now assent.1 But does a schismatic
who is conscious of right incur it ? You deny. But think
again! You now assent. But was it not said by the
Exalted One: 'There is a kind of schismatic, Upali, ivho
incurs disaster, purgatory, misery for an ceon, who is incur-
able ; there is a kind of schismatic, Upali, who does not incur
such a doom, who is not incurable '?2
Hence it is not right to say that a schismatic who is
conscious of [stating what is] right incurs such a doom.
[9] U.—But was it not said by the Exalted One: ' He
who breaks up the Order is doomed to remain for an ceon in
states of suffering and woe'?
'He who delights in party strife, and adheres not to the
Dhamma, is cut off from Arahantship.3 Having broken up
the Order when it was at peace, he must be cooked for an ceon
in purgatory' ?4
Hence surely a schismatic incurs retribution immediately
after death.

2. Of Insight.
Controverted Point.—That' insight' is not for the average
From the Commentary.—'Insight' (nana) is of two kinds—worldly
and spiritual. The former is intellection concerned with various

He denies, because he is judging such an one to be convinced that
his side is in the right; he assents, in the case of one who knows that
right is on the other side.—Comy. Cf . Anguttara-Nik., i. 85 f .
Similarly in the following change of reply.—Comy.
Vinaya, ii. 205, v. 202, 203; Vinaya Texts, iii. 268. The latter
mistakes bad doctrine or discipline for good, good doctrine or discipline
for bad, and records his opinion by his acts. His intentions are good.
In the Vmaya passage atthi, 'there is,' is rendered as siya,
'there may be.'
Literally, from the yogakkhema , or safety, salvation. Cut off
that is, while this world-cycle lasts.

attainments, and in noting the course of karma by way of righteous
acts of giving, etc.; the latter is intuition concerned with the Paths
and their Fruits, Path-intuition being learned by analysis of truth.1
Now some, like the Hetuvadins, failing to distinguish this, accept only
Path-intuition as insight.2 Hence they deny it in the average man.
[1] Th.—But you imply that a worldly man has no
analytic discernment, no analytic understanding, no ability
to investigate or examine, no faculty of research, no ability
to mark well, observe closely, mark repeatedly.3 Is not the
opposite true ?
[2] Again, you admit, do you not ? that there is not one
of the four Rupa-jlianas or of the four Arupajhanas to
which a man of the world may not attain, and that he
is capable of liberality towards the Brethren as to the four
requisites : raiment and so forth. Surely then it is not
right to say a worldly man can have no insight.
[3] H.—If he can have insight, does he by that insight
recognize the truth about Ill , eliminate its cause, realize
its cessation, develop the Path going thereto ? You
admit that he does not. Therefore, etc. . . .

3. Of the Guards of Purgatory.
Controverted Point.—That in the purgatories there are
no guards.
From the Commentary.—Some—for instance, the Andhakas—hold
that there are no such beings, but that the hell-doomed karmas in the
shape of hell-keepers purge the sufferers.
[1] Th.—Do you imply that there are no punishments
inflicted4 in the purgatories ? You maintain the contrary ?
But you cannot maintain both propositions.

The instantaneous penetration (ekabhisamaya) of truth by
one who has reached the Path is intuitive, but he is also able to
analyze truth. See Appendix : article 4.
On the ambiguity of this term, see also II. 2.
Cf. Dhamma-sangani, § 16. All these are synonyms of nana.—
Comy. We have brought out the force of the prefix 'pa' in the
first two (panna, pajanana) .
Kamma-karanani . On this term, see JPTS,1884,76, and
references given.

[2] You admit that on earth there are both punishments
and executioners ? Yet you deny that the latter exist
in purgatory. .. .
[3] Moreover, was it not said by the Exalted One :
'Not Vessabhu nor yet the Petas' King,
Soma, Yama, or King Vessarana—
The deeds that -were his own do punish him
Who ending here attains to other worlds'?1
Hence there are guards in purgatory.
[4] Again, was it not said by the Exalted One: ' Him,
bhikkhus, hell's guards torture2 with the fivefold punishment;
they thrust a hot iron stake through one hand, then another
through the other hand, then one through the foot, then another
through the other foot; they thrust a hot iron stake through
the middle of the chest. And he thereupon feels painful,
piercing, intolerable suffering, nor does he die till that evil
deed of his is cancelled
[5] Again, was it not said [further] by the Exalted One :
'Him, bhikkhus. hell's guards make to lie down and flay him
until hatchets . . . they place him head downwards and flay
him with knives . . . they bind him to a chariot and drive
him to and fro over burning, blazing, glowing ground . . .
they lift him up on to a great hill of burning, blazing,
white - hot coals and roll him down the fiery slope . . .
they double him up and cast him into a hot brazen jar,
burning, blazing, glowing, where he boils, coining up like a
bubble of foam, then sinking, going now to this side, now
to that.4 There he suffers fierce and bitter pain, nor does he
die till that evil karma is cancelled. Him, bhikkhus, they
cast into the Great Purgatory. Now this :

We cannot trace these verses, hence cannot indicate the context.
Our text has kammang karenti ; the Nikaya (PTS edition)
has . . . karonti .
Majjhima-Nik., iii. 182 f.; Anguttara-Nik., i. 141. The Br.
translation here and below reads: 'and he dies till that evil deed,' etc.
Milinda, ii. 261 (translation); Jataka, iii. 46 (text).

In districts measured out four-square four-doored,
Iron the ramparts hounding it, with iron roofed,
Iron its soil welded by fiery1 heat,
Spreading a hundred leagues it stands for aye'?2
Hence there surely are guards in purgatory.

The Br. and the Nikaya have jalita ; the PTS alita maybe
a misprint.
Majjhima-Nik., ibid. ; Anguttara-Nik., ibid.

Kathavatthu - Of Assurance which is not Final; the Moral Controlling Powers

Points of Controversy
Subjects of Discourse

7. Of Assurance which is not Final.
Controverted Point.—That the average man may possess
final assurance.1
From the Commentary.—Certain of the Uttarapathakas, judging by
the Sutta—'once immersed is so once for all,' etc.2—hold the view
above stated.
[1] Th.—Do you mean that he has that assurance even
if he commit the worst crimes—matricide, parricide,
Arahanticide, wounding a Buddha, breaking up the Order ?
'Nay,' you say.3
Again, could an average man holding that assurance feel
doubt about it? 'Yes,' you say. Then he cannot feel assured.
[2] Surely you agree that, if he feel assured, he cannot
feel doubt.4 Now has he put away doubt ? 'No,' you say.5
But think! You now assent.6 Then has he put away
doubt by the First Path ? or the Second, Third, or Fourth
Path? How, then?
U.—By a bad path.
Th.—[Do you tell me that] a bad path leads aright,
goes to the destruction [of lust, hate, etc.], goes to en-
lightenment, is immune from intoxicants, is undefiled ? Is
it not the opposite of all this ? . . .
[3] Could the Annihilationist view be adopted by a
person assured and convinced of the truth of the Eternalist

Accanta , i.e., ati-anta, very final. The Br. translator
renders this by 'true,' because all assurance for a finite period is not a
true assurance. Thus our conviction that the sun will rise to-morrow,
though it is exceedingly likely to be justified, is based only on a belief
that no cosmic dislocation will intervene, and is therefore no 'true'
assurance either.
See next page.
3 'The heretic, incorrigible as a tree-stump, is more or less assured
of cherishing his fixed opinions in other future existences. But the
matricide, etc., is assured of retribution in the next existence only.
Hence he must reject.'—Comy.
4 'He assents, because a man cannot doubt his own opinion if it be
repeatedly cherished.'—Comy,
'Because it has not been put away by the Ariyan Path.'— Comy.
Doubt not overriding the cherished opinion.— Comy

view?1 'Yes,' you say. Surely then the assurance of the
average man in his Annihilationist convictions is no 'in-
finite assurance.'
[4] If you now deny in reply to my question, I ask again,
has he put away [the Annihilationist view] ? If so, by which
of the Four Paths ? You reply, as before, ' By a bad path.'
That is to say, by a bad path he puts away a bad view. . . .
[5, 6] A similar argument may be put forward for an
Annhilationist who adopts the Eternalist view.
[7] U.—If I am wrong,2 was it not said by the Exalted
One: ' Take the case, bhikkhus, of a person whose mental
states are entirely black-hearted3 and immoral—he it is who,
once immersed, is so once for all'?4
Surely then any average man can attain infinite
[8] Th.—Is that which you have quoted your reason for
maintaining your proposition ? You admit it is. Now the
Exalted One said further: ' Take the case, bhikkhus, of a
person who, having come to the surface, is immersedNow
is this [supposed to be] happening all the time ?5 Of course
not. .. . [9] But again he said: ' Take the case, bhikkhus,
of a person who, having emerged, so [remains]; of one who,
having emerged, discerns, glances around; of one who, having
emergedf swims across; of one who, having emerged, wins a
footing on the shore.'
Now is each of these persons doing so all the time?
And does any of these cases furnish you with a reason
for saying that any average person can have final assurance
[in his convictions]?

In the eternal duration of soul and universe. The former view
holds that the soul ends at death. Dialogues, i. 50, § 32.
In the Commentary, PTS edition, p. 181, line 14, read puccha
paravadissa. Suttassa . .. .
Ekanta-kalaka...dhamma ,
Anguttara-Nik., iv. 11, the 'water-parable' of seven classes of
persons. Discussed in Puggalar-Pannatti, 71.
The Theravadin asks this question in order to show the necessity
of a critical study, by research, of the spirit of Texts, without relying
too much on the letter.—Comy.

8. Of the Moral Controlling Powers.1
Controverted Point.—That the five moral controlling
powers—faith, effort, mindfulness, concentration, under-
standing—are not valid as 'controlling powers ' in worldly
From the Commentary.—This is an opinion held by some, like the
Hetuvadins and Mahingsasakas.
[1] Th.—Do you imply that there can be no faith, or
effort, or mindfulness, or concentration, or understanding
in worldly concerns ? You deny. [2] On the other hand,
you maintain that there is faith, etc., in such a connection,
but that none of them avail for moral control.
[3] You admit that both mind and mind as a controlling
power are valid in worldly matters. And you admit a similar
validity in both joy and joy as a controlling power, in both
psychic life and psychic life as a controlling power.
[4] Why then exempt those five ?
[5] Again, you admit that there is both a spiritual2
faith and a controlling power of that faith—why not both
a worldly faith and a worldly controlling power o f faith ?
And so for the rest. [6] Why accept in the one case, deny
in the other ?
[7] Moreover, was it not said by the Exalted One : ' And I,
bhikkhus, with the eyes of a Buddha surveying the world, satv
beings living whose vision loas dim with dust, in some but
slightly, greatly in others, beings whose faculties were here keen,
there blunt, of good disposition . . . apt to learn . . . some
among them discerning the danger and defect of [rebirth in]
other worlds'?3
Surely then the five moral controlling powers are valid in
worldly matters.

Or five faculties or factors of 'moral sense' (indriya) . See
above, pp. 16 ; 65 f.; 194, n. 1. These five are pre-eminent in doctrine
as ranking among the 'thirty-seven factors of Enlightenment.'
Or supra-mundane and mundane.
Dialogues, ii. 31 f . The two lacunae (of one word each) occur in
both Br. and PTS editions.

Kathavatthu - Of Attainment; Thusness (Suchness); Nibbana as Morally Good

Points of Controversy
Subjects of Discourse

4. Of Attainment (patti).
Controverted Point—That attainment is unconditioned.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Pubbaseliyas again, hold
that the winning of any acquisition is itself unconditioned.
[1] Is similar to § 1 in the foregoing.
[2-4] Th.—Again, do you imply that the winning
[through gifts] of raiment, almsfood, lodging, medicine,
is unconditioned ? But if so, the same difficulty arises as
in the case of attainment in general (§ 1). In fact, you
would have in these four and Nibbana five ' unconditioned's.'
[5, 6] A similar argument is used for the winning of any
of the Rupa Jhanas (4), or of the Arupa Jhanas (4), or of
the Four Paths and Four Fruits, concluding with :—
In fact, you would have in these eight and Nibbana nine
'unconditioned's,' etc.

[7] P.—But if I am wrong, can you identify winning
with any one of the five aggregates, bodily or mental ?
If not, then it is unconditioned.

5. Of ' Thusness.'
Controverted Point.—That the fundamental character-
istics of all things (sabba-dhamma) are unconditioned.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Uttarapathakas, hold that
there is an immutable something called thusness (or suchness)1 in the
very nature of all things, material or otherwise [taken as a whole].
And because this 'thusness' is not included in the [particular] con-
ditioned matter, etc., itself, therefore it is unconditioned.
[1] Th.—Do you then identify those fundamental charac-
teristics or ' thusness' with Nibbana, the Shelter . . . the
Goal, the Past-deceased, the Ambrosial ,? Or are there two
'unconditioned's'? You deny both alternatives [but you
must assent to one or the other]. If to the latter, I ask,
are there two kinds of Shelters and so on ? And is there
a boundary or . . . interstice between them?
[2] Again, assuming a materiality (rupata) of matter or
body, is not materiality unconditioned ? You assent. Then
I raise the same difficulties as before.
[3] I raise them, too, if you admit a 'hedonality' of feel-
ing,2 a 'perceivability' of perception,2 a sankharata or

Tathata . The Br. translation renders this by 'immutable
reality.' Cf . VI. 3, above. Br. reads here, differently from PTS
edition: sabbadhammanang rupadibhavasankhata tathata
nama atthi. On the metaphysical expansion of the notion, rendered
by those who have translated Asvaghosa from the Chinese as tathata
see T. Suzuki's Awakening of Faith, p. 53, etc. Tathata does not
occur again throughout the Pitakas. The Commentary attaches no
increased interest or importance to the term, and the argument in the
text is exactly like that in the foregoing discourse. But because of
the importance ascribed to ' thusness ' or ' suchness ' by certain of the
Mahayanists, and because of the unique abstract forms coined for the
argument, we do not condense this exposition.
Vedanata, sannata.

co-efficiency of mental co-efficients, a consciousness of
being conscious.1 If all these be unconditioned, are there
then six categories of 'unconditioned's'?
[4] U.—But if I am wrong, is the ' thusness ' of all things
the five aggregates [taken together] ?
U.—Then that' thusness ' of all things is unconditioned.
6. Of Nibbana as Morally Good.
Controverted Point—That the element (or sphere)2 of
Nibbana is good.
From the Commentary.—All 'good' mental states are so called,
either because they can, as faultless, insure a desirable result-in-
sentience (vipaka) , or because they as faultless are free from
the corruptions. The idea of faultlessness is applied to all except
immoral states. The desirable result takes effect in a future rebirth,
either at conception or later. The first term in the triad :—good, bad,
indifferent—applies to the moral cause producing such a result. But
the Andhakas makes no such distinction, and call Nibbana 'good'
just because it is a faultless state.
[1] Th.—Do you imply that it has a mental object,
involving a mental process of adverting, reflecting, co-
ordinating, attending, willing, desiring, aiming ? Is not
rather the opposite true ?
[2] These things we can predicate of all morally good
mental states—of disinterestedness, love, intelligence, faith,
energy, mindfulness, concentration, understanding. But
if we cannot predicate them of Nibbana, then is the element
of Nibbana not rightly called morally good.
[3] A.—But is not the element of Nibbana faultless?
If so—and you do assent—then it, not being immoral, is

Vinnanassa vinnanata .
Nibbana-dhatu , Nibbana considered in itself, independently
coming to pass, ultimate, irreducible.

Kathavatthu - Of Getting Rid of Corruption; the Void; the Fruits of Life in Religion

Points of Controversy
Subjects of Discourse


1. Of getting rid of Corruption.
Controverted Point.—That we may extirpate corruptions
past, future, and present.1
From the Commentary.—Inasmuch as there is such a thing as
putting away corruptions, and for one in whom this is completed both
past and future, as well as present, corruptions are put away, there-
fore some—certain of the Uttarapathakas, for instance—hold that we
can now put away the corruptions of our past, etc.
[1] Th.—In other words, we may stop that which has
ceased, dismiss that which has departed, destroy that which
is destroyed, finish that which is finished, efface that which
has vanished. For has not the past ceased ? Is it not
non-existent? . . .
[2] And as to the future, you imply that we can produce
the unborn, bring forth the non-nascent, bring to pass the
unhappened, make patent that which is latent. . . . For
is not the future unborn ? Is it not non-existent ? . . .
[3] And as to the present: does the lustful put away
lust, the inimical put away hate, the confused put away
dulness, the corrupt put away corruption ? Or can we put
away lust by lust, and so on? You deny all this. But
did you not affirm that we can put away present corrup-
tions? .. .
Is lust and is 'Path' a factor in conscious experience?2
You assent, of course. But can there be a parallel con-

For the 'ten corruptions,' see above, pp. 65, n. 4, 66, n. 4. On [1] f .
cf. p. 85, § 2f.
Literally, 'conjoined with consciousness.' We cannot at the same
time give play to immoral thought and be developing the Ariyan mind.

scious procedure [of both] at the same time ? . . . If lust
be immoral, and 'Path' moral consciousness, can moral
and immoral, faulty and innocent, base and noble, sinister
and clear mental states co-exist side by side [at the same
moment] ? You deny. Think again. Yes, you now reply.
But was it not said by the Exalted One : ' There are four
things, bhikkhus, very far away one from the other ; what are
the four ? The sky and the earth, the hither and the yonder
shore of the ocean, whence the sun rises and where he sets, the
norm of the good and that of the wicked. Far is the sky,
etc. . .
Hence those mental opposites cannot co-exist side by side.
[4] U.—But if it be wrong to say 'we can put away past,
future, and present corruptions,' is there no such thing as
the extirpation of corruptions ? You admit there is. Then
my proposition stands.2

2. Of the Void.
Controverted Point.—That ' the Void ' is included in the
aggregate of mental co-efficients (sankharakkhandha) .
From the Commentary.—'The Void [or Emptiness] has two im-
plications : (a) Absence of soul, which is the salient feature of the five
aggregates [mind and body]; and (b) Nibbana itself. As to (a), some
marks of ' no-soul' may be included under mental coefficients (the
ourth aggregate) by a figure of speech.3 Nibbana is not included there-
under. But some, like the Andhakas, drawing no such distinction, hold
the view stated above.
[1] Th —Do you then imply that the 'Signless,' that
the 'Not hankered-after' is also so included ? If not, ' the

See VII. 5, § 3, for the full quotation.
The putting away of corruptions, past, future, or present, is not a
work comparable to the exertions of a person clearing away rubbish-
heaps. With the following of the Ariyan Path having Nibbana as its
object, the corruptions are 'put away' simply because they don't get
born. In other words, the past has ceased; the cure as to present and
future is preventive.—Comy.
Ekena pariyayena. Marks of other aggregates cannot be so
included, even by way of figurative speech.

Void' cannot be,1 [2] for you cannot predicate of the last
that which you deny of the former two.
[3] Again, if the fourth aggregate be made to include
'the Void,' it must be not impermanent, not arisen through
a cause, not liable to perish, nor to lose lust, nor to cease,
nor to change!
[4] Moreover, is the 'emptiness' of the material aggre-
gate included under the fourth aggregate ? Or the 'empti-
ness ' of the second, third, and fifth aggregates thereunder ?
Or is the ' emptiness ' of the fourth aggregate itself included
under any of the other four ? [5] If the one inclusion is
wrong, so are all the other inclusions.
[5] A.—But was it not said by the Exalted One:
'Empty is this,2 bhikkhus—the sankhara's—either of soul
or of what belongs to soul'?

3. Of the Fruits of Life in Religion.
Controverted Point.—That the fruit of recluseship is
From the Commentary.—Our doctrine has judged that the term
'fruits of life in religion' means the mind in general which results
from the processes of thought in the Ariyan Path, and occurs in the
mental process attending the attainment of its Fruits. But there are
some, like the Pubbaseliyas, who, taking it otherwise, mean by it just
the putting away of corruptions and success therein.3
All three being names for Nibbana, they are adduced to expose
the flaw in a theory which does not discriminate.—Comy. Cf. Com-
pendium, p. 216.
See I. 1, §§ 241, 242. The nearest verbatim reference that we can
trace is Samyutta-Nik., iv. 296 ; but even there the word sankhara,
which here seems dragged in by the opponent, is omitted. 'The
Theravadin suffers it to stand, because it is not inconsistent with the
orthodox "sabbe sankhara anicca," where sankhara stands
for all five aggregates [exhausting all conditioned things].'—Comy.
Hence unconditioned, i.e., unprepared, uncaused, unproduced by
the our conditions—karma, mind, food, or physical, environment
(utu). Cf. Compendium, p. 161.

[1] Th.—Do you then identify that 'fruit' with
Nibbana:—the Shelter, the Cave, the Refuge, the Goal, the
Past-Decease, the Ambrosial ?1 Or are there two 'uncon-
ditioned's'? You deny both alternatives [but you must
assent to one or the other]. If to the latter, I ask are
they both . . . Nibbanas, and is there one higher than the
other, . . . or is there a boundary .. . an interstice between
[2] Again, do you imply that recluseship itself is uncon-
ditioned ? 'No, conditioned,' you say. Then is its fruit or
reward conditioned ? . . .
[3, 4] You admit, again, that the four stages in the
recluse's Ariyan Path—the Four Paths—are conditioned.
Yet you would deny that the Four Fruits are conditioned!
[5] In fact, you would have in these four and Nibbana
five ' unconditioned's.' Or if you identify the four with
Nibbana, you then get five sorts of Nibbana, five Shelters,
and so on. . . .

1 Cf. VI. 1, § 1.
2 Ibid. The text abbreviates even more than we do.

Friday, June 24, 2011

Kathavatthu - Of the Transitions from One Jhana to Another; Jhana and its Intervals; Hearing in Jhana; the Eye and Seeing

Points of Controversy
Subjects of Discourse

6. Of the Transition from One Jhana to Another.
Controverted Point.—That we pass from one Jhana to
another [immediately].

From the Commentary.—Some, like the Mahingsasakas and certain
of the Andhakas, hold that the formula of the Four Jhanas [in the
Suttas] warrants us in concluding that progress from one Jhana-stage
to another is immediate without any accessory procedure.
[1 ] Th.—Does this imply that one can pass over from
First to Third, from Second to Fourth Jhana ? You deny
[setting an arbitrary limit]. .. .
[2] Or take only a passing over from First Jhana attain-
ment to that of Second—which you affirm to be possible—
you are implying that the mental process—adverting, re-
flecting, co-ordinating, attending, willing, wishing, aiming1
—called up for First Jhana is the same as that required for
Second Jhana. But you dissent. Do you mean that no
[preliminary] mental process of adverting, etc., is required
for Second Jhana ? On the contrary, you agree that Second
Jhana arises after a certain mental process—adverting, etc.
Therefore one does not pass over directly from First Jhana
to the next.
[3] [Again, take the objects and characteristics of First
Jhana.} The First Stage, you admit, may come to pass
while one is considering the harmfulness of sense-desires;2
moreover, it is accompanied by application and sustenta-
tion of thought. But neither that object nor these charac-
teristics, you must admit, belong to the Second Stage.
Yet your proposition really commits you to asserting identity
between First and Second Jhana.
[4] The same argument [2] applies to transition from
Second to Third Jhana. [5] [Again, take the specific objects
and characteristics of the Second Stage :] the Second Stage,
you admit, may come to pass while one is considering the
harmfulness of application and sustentation of thought ;
moreover, it is accompanied by zest. But neither that
object nor these characteristics, you must admit, belong to
the Third Stage. Yet your proposition really commits you

Cf . VII. 5, §2.
Kama ; the object being to supersede earthly consciousness (that
of the Kama-loka) by a heavenly or angelic consciousness (that of
the Rupa-loka).

to an assertion of identity between Second and Third
[6] The same argument [2, 4] applies to transition from
Third to Fourth Jhana. [7] [Again, take the specific
objects and characteristics of the Third Stage:] the Third
Stage, you admit, may come to pass while one is considering
the harmfulness of zest; moreover, it is accompanied by
happiness. But neither that object nor these character-
istics, you must admit, belong to the Fourth Stage. Yet
your proposition really commits you to an assertion of
identity between Third and Fourth Jhana.
[8] M. A.—But was it not said by the Exalted One :
' Here, bhikkhus, when a hhikkhu, aloof from sense-desires, etc.
. .attains to and abides in First . . . Fourth Jhana' ?1
According to that [formula] one does pass over
immediately from Jhana to Jhana.

7. Of Jhana and its Intervals.
Controverted Point.—That there is an intermediate stage
between the First and Second Stages.2
From the Commentary.—The Sammitiyas and certain other of the
Andhakas hold the view that, in the Fivefold Jhana series,3 the
Exalted One did not intend to classify, but only to indicate,- three
forms4 of concentration. But not knowing that form of concentration
to be possible which is accompanied by sustained thought (savicara),
and counting only initial application (vitakka) , they hold that the
former intervenes between First and Second Jhana, thus making up a
later fivefold series.

E.g., Dialogues, i. 84 f.; passim in Nikayas.
The words 'First,' etc., to 'Fourth,' in this discourse must be
understood solely with reference to the fourfold classification.
I.e., when First Jhana is divided into two, according as it is
accompanied or unaccompanied by initial application of thought. See
Bud. Psy. Eth., cf. p. 43 with p. 52. The Four Nikayas recognize
only four stages.
Namely, as specified above, IX. 8, §§ 3, 4. The first and second
divide First Jhana into two aspects, the third refers to the other
three Jhanas.

[1] Th.—But this is to imply intervening stages between
contact or feeling, or perception. . . .
Again, why deny intermediate stages between Second
and Third, or Third and Fourth Jhana ? If you deny them
here, you must deny them between First and Second Jhana.
[3] You cannot maintain the intermediate stages between
First and Second Jhana only, [4] denying the existence of
such stages between the others.
[5] You say that concentration of mind accompanied by
sustained thought only, without its initial application, con-
stitutes the intermediate stage. But why make an excep-
tion in this way ? Or why not include the other two forms,
accompanied by both or by neither ? [6] If you deny that
concentration with or without initial and sustained applica-
tion of thought is a Jhanic interval, why not deny it in the
case of concentration without initial application, but with
sustentation of thought ?
[7] You maintain that in the interval between the mani-
festation of two stages of Jhana there is concentration in
sustained thought only, without initial application of
thought. But while such concentration is proceeding, is
not the first Jhana at an end and the second Jhana mani-
fested ? You assent, but you contradict thus your proposi-
[8] S. A.—If we are wrong, does concentration in sus-
tained thought only, without initial application of thought,
constitute any one of the Four Jhanas ? You say, no.
Then it must constitute an interim state—which is what
we affirm.
[9] Th.—But did not the Exalted One declare three
forms of concentration, namely, in both applied and sus-
tained thought, in the latter only, and where there is
neither?1 If so, you cannot single out the second form of
concentration as a state intermediate between Jhanas.

Samyutta-Nik., iv. 363, etc. See above, IX. 8, § 4. For those
unacquainted with the classic procedure in Jhana, it may be explained
that whereas, in the first stage of attained ecstasy, consciousness
includes (a) initial and sustained application of thought, (b) zest,

8. Of Hearing in Jhana.
Controverted Point.—That one who has attained Jhana
hears sound.
From the Commentary.—The opinion is held by some—the Pubba-
seliyans, for instance—that because the Exalted One called sound a
thorn to First Jhana, and since sound, if not heard, cannot be a thorn
in the flesh of one who had attained that state, it was inferable that
such an one was able to hear.
[1] Th.—If so, it must be equally allowed that he can
also see, smell, taste and touch objects.1 This you deny
. . . You must also allow that he enters .Jhana enjoying
auditory consciousness. You deny, for you agree that con-
centration arises in one who is enjoying mental objects as
such ? [2] But if you admit that anyone who is actually
enjoying sounds hears sounds, and that concentration is
the property of one who is actually enjoying mental objects
as such, you should not affirm that one in the concentration
of Jhana hears sounds. If you insist that he does, you
have here two parallel mental procedures going on at the
same time. . . .
[3] P.—But was it not said by the Exalted One that
sound is a thorn for First Jhana ?2 Hence one in Jhana can
surely hear sound.
Th.—You say that one in Jhana can hear sound, and
quote the Word as to it being for First Jhana a ' thorn.'
Now it was further said that thought applied and sustained
is a thorn for Second Jhana—does one in Second Jhana
have applied and sustained thought? . . . Again, it was
further said that the mental factor last eliminated is a thorn

(c) pleasure, in the second stage (a) is eliminated, in the third (b), and
in the fourth (c) are eliminated. Now, in 'fivefold Jhana,' (a) was
resolved into two stages. (Theragatha, 916, gives a different pan -
cangiko samadhi. )
1 'But there is no five-door procedure (of sense) in Jhana.'—Comy.
2 Anguttara - Nik., v. 133-135. 'This was said because sound
induces distraction. When a loud noise strikes the ear, one is aroused
from First Jhana.'—Comy. See above, p. 123.

for the stage newly attained—zest for Third, respiration
for Fourth Jhana,1 perception of visible objects for con-
sciousness of space-infinity, this perception for that of con-
sciousness as infinite, this perception for that of nothingness,
perception and feeling for cessation of these in trance. Now
is ' the thorn ' actually present on the winning of the stage
whence it is pronounced to be a thorn ? If not, then how
can you say that the ' thorn ' of hearing sound is present
to one in First Jhana ?

9. Of the Eye and Seeing.
Controverted Point.—That we see visible objects with
the eye.
From the Commentary.—Here, judging by the Word-—'When he
sees an object with the eye'—some, like the Mahasanghikas, hold that
the sentient surface in the eye is that which ' sees.'
In the quoted passage the method of naming a necessary instrument
is followed,2 as when we say ' wounded by a bow,' when the wound
was inflicted by an arrow. So the words 'sees with the eye' are
spoken of a seeing by visual consciousness.
[1] Th.—Then you hold that we see matter by matter. . . .
You deny. But think ! And if you now assent,3 you imply
that matter is able to distinguish matter. You deny. But
think! And if you now assent, you imply that matter is
mind. . . .4
[2] Again, you are implying that the eye can 'advert'
or reflect, co-ordinate, will, etc.,5 albeit you agree that the
contrary is true.

So the Sutta. We should have expected sukha (pleasure or
happiness). See Jhana formula.
Sambhara-katha. Cf. Atthasalini, 399 f. in Bud. Psy. Eth.,
p. 351, n. 2.
'First he rejects, because of the [separate] category, "object of
vision"; then assents, with respect only to the eye.'—Comy.
Rupang manovinnanang.
As in VII. 5, § 2. If the 'eye' sees, it should be immediately
preceded by 'adverting' in the same way as the sense of sight
(cakkhu-vinnana).-— Comy.

[3, 4] .These arguments hold good for similar claims put
forward by you for the other four senses.
[5] M.—But was it not said by the Exalted One : 'Here,
bhikkhus, a bhikkhu sees objects with the eye, hears sounds,
and so on '?1 Hence surely we see visible objects with the
eye and'so on.
Dhammasangani, § 597, gives the passage verbatim as to the
process—cakkhuna . . . rupang . . . passati ; but though allu-
sions to the visual process abound in the Nikayas, we have not traced
the exact passage as in an exhortation to bhikkhus, except in the,
'Guarded Doors' formula, e.g., Samyutta-Nik., iv. 104, where the
formula has disva, 'having seen,' for passati, 'sees.'

Kathavatthu - Of the Buddha and this World; Of how the Norm was Taught; Pity; Fragrant Things; a One and Only Path

Points of Controversy
Subjects of Discourse


1. Of the Buddha and this World.
Controverted Point — That it is not right to say < The
Exalted Buddha lived in the world of mankind.'
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Vetulyakas,1 carelessly in-
terpreting the Sutfca, 'born in the world, grew up in the world, dwelt,
having overcome the world, undefiled by the world,' hold that the
Exalted One, when born in the heaven of Delight,2 dwelt there while
visiting this world only in a shape specially created. Their citation
of the Sutta proves nothing, since the Master was undefiled, not by
being out of the world, but by the corruptions of heart with respect
to the things in the world.
[1] Th.—But are there not shrines, parks, settlements,
villages, towns, kingdoms, countries mentioned by the
Buddha ?3 [2] And was he not born at Lumbini, super-
enlightened under the Bodhi tree ? Was not the Norm-
wheel set rolling by him at Benares? Did he not renounce
the will to live at the Chapala shrine ?4 Did he not complete
existence at Kusinara ?
[3] Moreover, was it not said by the Exalted One:
'Bhikkhus, I tvas once staying at Ukkattha in the Subhaga
See above, XVII. 6.
Tusita-bhavana . This was traditionally the Buddha's last
celestial life (Pss. of the Sisters, 3).
Reading Buddha-vuttan i with Br. and the PTS edition.
The Siamese printed edition reads -vutthani ,
dwelt in by the
Buddha.' Either compound is very uncommon in older Pali.
Dialogues, ii. 113. 'Sankhara' may be used for cetana, the
foremost of the sankhara's.

Wood by -the Kings-Sal Tree.'1 . . .'I was once staying
at Uruvela by the Goatherds' Banyan before I was super-
enlightened.2 .. . I teas once staying at Rqjagaha in the
Bamboo Wood at the Squirrels' Feeding-ground. .. . I was
once staying at Savatthi in Jeta's Wood, Anathapindika's
Park .. . I was once staying at Vesdll in the Great Wood
at the Gable House Hall' ?
Surely then the Exalted Buddha lived among men.
[4] V.—But did not the Exalted One, ' bom in the world,
enlightened in the world, live, having overcome the ivorld, un-
defiled by the world' ?3
Hence it is surely not right to say ' The Exalted Buddha
lived in the world of mankind.'4
2. Of how the Norm was taught.
Controverted Point,—That it is not right to say 'The
Exalted Buddha himself taught the Norm.'
From the Commentary.-—This is another point in the foregoing
heresy. The created shape taught the Norm on earth to the Venerable
Ananda, while the Exalted One lived in the city of Delight and sent
forth that shape.
[1] Th.—By whom then was it taught ?
V.—By the special creation.
Th. — Then must this created thing have been the
Conqueror, the Master, the Buddha Supreme, the Omni-

Majjhima-Nik., i. 326.
Samyutta-Nik., v. 185. The Buddha is in many Suttas related to
have been staying at each of these places, and as telling 'bhikkhus'
that he had done so on this or that occasion.
Samyutta-Nik., iii. 140, where the first two words quoted—loke
jato—seem to have been omitted.
On this 'Docetic ' heresy, which throve later among Ma ayanist
Buddhists,' Prof. Anesaki's article, s.v. 'Docetism,' Ency. Religion
and Ethics, should be consulted.

scient, All-seeing, Lord o f all things, Judge of Appeal of all
things! . . .1
[2] I ask again : By whom was the Norm taught ?
V.—By the venerable Ananda.
Th.—Then must he too have been the Conqueror, the
Master, etc. [3] But was it not said by the Exalted One:
Sariputta, I may teach the Norm concisely and I may teach it
in detail, and I may teach it both ways. It is only they who
understand that are hard to find'?2
Hence surely the Buddha himself taught the Norm.
[4] And again, was it not said by the Exalted One: ' By
the higher knowledge, bhikkhus, do I teach the Norm, not
without the higher knowledge; a Norm with [reference to]
cause do I teach, not one without; a wonder-working Norm do
I teach, and none not wonder-working. And that I, bhikkhus,
thus teach the Norm, a homily should be made, instruction
should be given, to wit, let this, bhikkhus, suffice for your con-
tent, let this suffice for your satisfaction and for your glad-
ness :—the Exalted One is Buddha Supreme! the Norm is
well revealed! the Order is well trained! Now when this
declaration was uttered, ten thousand world-systems trembled'?3
Hence surely the Exalted Buddha himself taught the

3. Of the Buddha and Pity.
Controverted Point.—That the Exalted Buddha felt no
From the Commentary.—The procedure of those who have not
conquered their passions, on the occasion of misfortune, to the objects
of their affection, inclines the beholder to say that compassion is only

Of these eight titles, the first three are frequent in the Nikayas;
the last four are found usually in later books ; but Anguttara-Nik.,
i. 199, has the last one : dhamma Bhagavang-patisarana .
Anguttara-Nik., i. 133.
"We have not succeeded in discovering this passage verbatim in the
Nikayas. The burden of it does not constitute one of the Eight Causes of
Earthquake enumerated in Dialogues, ii. 114 f. But cf. ibid. 112; i. 55.

passion. Hence some, like the Uttarapathakas, judge that the passion-
less Buddha felt no compassion.
[1] Th.—But this implies that neither did he feel love
or sympathetic joy or equanimity. You deny. [2] But
could he have these and yet lack pity ?1
[3] Your proposition implies also that he was ruthless.
Yet you agree that the Exalted One was pitiful, kindly to
the world, compassionate towards the world, and went
about to do it good.'2 [4] Nay, did not the Exalted One
win to the attainment of universal pity?3
[5] U.—But if there was no passion (raga) in the Exalted
One, surely there was in him no compassion (karuna) ?

4. Of the Buddha and Fragrant Things.
Controverted Point. — That [even] the excreta o f the
Exalted Buddha excelled all other odorous things.
Frotn the Commentary.—Out of an indiscriminate affection for the
Buddha, certain of the Andhakas and Uttarapathakas hold this view.
[1] Th.—This would imply that the Exalted One fed on
perfumes. But you admit only that he fed on rice gruel.
Hence your proposition is untenable.
[2] Moreover, i f your proposition were true, some would
have used them for the toilet, gathering, saving them in
basket and box, exposing them in the bazaar, making cos-
metics with them. But nothing of the sort was done. ... .
5. Of a One and Only Path.
Controverted Point—That the fourfold fruition of the
religious life is realized by one path only.

Referring to the Four Sublime Mood's or Infinitudes, exercises in
the development of these emotions. See above, p. 76, n. 2. It is note-
worthy that the opponent does not reserve the last of them, ' equanimity,'
as alone predicable, from his point of view, of the Buddha.
Except the third, these phrases are hard to trace in the Nikayas,
albeit the ascription in other terms is frequent enough.
See Patisambhida-Magga, i. 126 f., 'The Tathagata's Insight by
Great Pity.'

From the Commentary.—The same sectaries, on the same grounds,
hold that the Exalted One, in becoming Stream-Winner, Once-Returner,
Never-Returner, Arahant, realized all these four Fruits by one single
Ariyan Path [and not in the four distinct stages each called a path].
[1] Th.—This implies a fusion of the four distinct con-
scious procedures [experienced in each stage of progress],
which you deny.
Moreover, if there be one path only, which of the four
is it?
A. U.—The path of Arahantship.
Th.—But do we teach that by that path the three first of
the ten Fetters are removed—to wit, theory of soul, doubt,
and infection of mere rule and ritual ? Did not the Exalted
One say that these are removed by the Stream-Winning Path ?
[2] And are gross passions and malevolence removed by
the path of Arahantship ? Did not the Exalted One say
that the fruit of the Once-Returner was the state of having
reduced these to a minimum ? [3] And is it by the path
of Arahantship that that minimum is removed ? You know
it is not. If you assent, I can refer you to the words of the
Exalted One, who said that the fruit of the Never-Returner
was the state of having removed that minimum without
[4] A.U.—But if we are wrong, and the Exalted One
developed each Path in succession, can he be called Stream-
Winner and so on ? You deny, but you have implied it.1
[5J Th.—But if the Exalted One realized these four
fruits of the religious life by one Ariyan Path only, and the
disciples by four Paths, they have seen what he did not see,
they arrive, at where he did not arrive, they realize that
which he did not realize. You cannot admit this . . .

On the theory, combated above, IV. 4, 9, that past acquisition
remain permanent possessions instead of being wrought up into higher
powers. See also p. 66, and Samyutta-Nik., v. 356 f.

Kathavatthu - Of the Buddha and the Fruit of Giving; the Sanctification of the Gift

Points of Controversy
Subjects of Discourse

10. Of the Buddha and the Fruit of Giving.
Controverted Point—That it should not be said that
'Anything given to the Buddha brings great reward.'
From the Commentary.—From the same source comes the theory
that because the Exalted Buddha did not really enjoy anything, but
only seemed to be doing so out of conformity to life here below, nothing
given him was really helpful to him.
[1] Th.—Now was not the Exalted One of all two-footed
creatures the highest and best and foremost and uttermost,
supreme, unequalled, unrivalled, peerless, incomparable,
unique ? How then could a gift to Him fail to bring great
reward ? [2] Are there any equal to Him in virtue, in
will, in intellect ?
[3] And was it not said by the Exalted One: 'Neither
in this world nor in any other is any to be found better than,
or equal to the Buddha who has reached the summit of them
who are worthy of offerings, who are desirous of merit, who
seek abundant fruit'?3
Hence surely anything given to the Buddha brings great

11. Of the Sanctification of the Gift.
Controverted Point— That a gift is sanctified by the giver
only, not by the recipient.
From the Commentary.—-Some, like the Uttarapathakas, hold this
view for this reason : If a gift were sanctified by the recipient, it
would become a great blessing. Now if the donor gives and the donee

Not traced.

produces the result, this would mean that the former causing the latter
to act for him, his own happiness or misery would be wrought by
another. In other words, one would sow, another reap. [This is
[1] Th.—Now are not some who receive gifts 'worthy of
offerings, attentions, gifts, salutations, the world's supreme
field of merit' ? [2] And did not the Exalted One pronounce
the four pairs of men, the eight kinds of individuals to be
worthy of gifts ? [3] And are there not those who, having
offered a gift to a Stream-Winner, Once-Returner, Never-
Returner or Arahant, make the gift effective ? How then
can you maintain your proposition ?
[4] U.—But if a gift may be sanctified by the recipient,
does not he become the agent for quite a different person?2
Does not one person work the happiness or the misery of
another ? Does not one sow, another reap ?
Th.—Now was it not said by the Exalted One: ' There
are four ways, Ananda, of sanctifying a gift. Which are the
four? A gift may he sanctified by the giver, not by the re-
cipient ; a gift may be sanctified by the recipient, not by the
giver; or it may be sanctified by both;, or, again, by neither' ?3
Hence it is surely wrong to say: 'A gift is sanctified
only by the giver, not by the recipient.'

See above, I. 1 (p. 48 f.); XYI. 1-5 ; a perverse application of the
doctrine of individual becoming and individual karma to two distinct
contemporaneous individuals. Of . Buddhism, London, 1912, p. 134.
Anno annassa karako. This question would be reasonable
if the opponent had meant that the donor's will is moved to act
(literally, be done) by the donee. But he meant that the donor's will is
sanctified, purified, in the sense of great fructification depending upon
the person of the donee. Hence the question is to no purpose.—
3 Majjhima-Nik., iii. 256; cf. Digha-Nik., iii. 231; Anguttara-Nik.,
ii. 80 f. (order of third and fourth alternatives reversed in all three).

Kathavatthu - Of the Order and the Accepting & Purifying of Gifts; Daily Life; the Fruit of Giving

Points of Controversy
Subjects of Discourse

6. Of the Order and the Accepting of Gifts.
Controverted Point.—That it ought not to be said ' The
Order accepts gifts.'
From the Commentary.—This view is how held by those of the
Vetulya[ka]s, who are known as the Mahasunnatavadins.2 They believe
that the Order, in the metaphysical sense [paramatthato] of the
word, is the Paths and the Fruits. These cannot be said to accept
[1] Th.—But is not the Order worthy of offerings of
hospitality, of gifts, of salutations, as the world's supreme
field of merit ? How then can it be wrong to say it accepts
gifts? [2] Were not its four pairs of men, its eight classes
of individuals3 declared by the Exalted One to be worthy of
gifts ? [3] And are there not they who give to it ?
[4] Finally, was it not said by the Exalted One:—
' As doth the holy flame its offering,
As doth the bounteous earth the summer rain,
So Mth the Order, in rapt thought expert,
The Gift accept'?4
Hence surely the Order accepts gifts.
[5] M.—But can a Path accept? Can Fruition ac-
cept? . . .

See XXIII. 1.
So PTS ed. Br.has 'Mahapunnavadins.'
Digha-Nik., iii. 255.
We cannot trace this passage.

7. Of the Order and the Purifying of Gifts.
Controverted Point.—That it ought not to be said that
' The Order purifies1 gifts.'
From the Commentary.—Those who hold the view just discussed,
hold as a corollary that Paths and Fruits are not able to purify gifts.
[1, 2] Similar to XVII, 6, §§ 1, 2.
[3] And are there not those who, having made a gift to
the Order, make their offering effective ?2
[4] M.—But does- a Path, does Fruition 'purify'? . . .

8. Of the Order and Daily Life.
Contr overted Point.—That it should not be said that
' The Order " enjoys," " eats," " drinks." '
The reason and the adherents as above.
[1] Th.—But you must admit that there are those who
partake of the meals of the Order, both daily and on special
occasions, both of rice-gruel and of drink.
[2] Moreover, did not the Exalted One speak of ' meals
taken in company,' 'in turn,' 'of food left over,' and 'not
left over'?3
[3] And did He not speak of eight kinds
of drinks:—'mango-syrup, jambu-syrup, plantain-syrup,
mScha-syrup, honey-syrup, grape-juice, lilyroot-syrup, and
pharusaka-syrup'?4 How then can you maintain your view?
[4] M.—But does a Path, does Fruition 'enjoy,' 'eat,'
'drink'? . . .

Visodheti—i.e., causes to fructify, makes more fruitful (in
Dakkhinang aradheti, a less obvious phrasing than the
instrumental phrase of the Sutta-Nipata, verse 488, aradhaye
dakkhineyyehi. 'They gain, they win great fruit even by a
trifling offering. . . . Little (when so offered) becomes much, much
becomes more.'—Comy. In the text the usual gifts to the Order are
then detailed. See above, p. 199 § 3.
Vinaya Texts, i. 38 f.
Ibid., ii. 132. The Commentary does not enrich our scanty know-
ledge about the less obvious kinds.

9. Of the Order and the Fruit of Giving.
Controverted Point—That it should not be said that 'a
thing given to the Order brings great reward.'
The reason and the adherents as above.'
[1, 2] Similar to XVII . 6, §§ 1, 2.
[3] And was it not said by the Exalted One : ' Give, lady
of the Gotamas, to the Order. In that giving thou shalt also
render honour to me and to the Order'?1
[4] Again, was it not said to the Exalted One by Sakka,
ruler of the gods :
'Of men who bring their offerings,
Of creatures who for merit seek,
Makers of merit for fair doom:—
Where must they give to reap reward I
The four who practise in the Paths,
The four established in the Fruits :—
Such is the Order upright, true,
By wisdom and by virtue stayed.
Of men who bring their offerings,
Of creatures who for merit seek.
Makers of merit for fair doom,
Who to the Order make their gift:—
Theirs is't to reap a rich reward.'2
' This Order sooth abounds and is grown great,
In measure as the waters of the sea,
These be the valiant students, best of men,
Light-bringers they who do the Norm proclaim.
They who because of them do give their gifts,
Oblations fair, and seemly sacrifice,
They to the Order loyal, firm in faith,
Commended by the wise, win great reward.
And mindful thenceforth of the offerings made,
Joy is their heritage3 while in this world.

Majjhima-Nik., iii. 253.
Samyutta-Nik., i. 233.
The V. V. Commentary explains vedajata by jatasoma-

Thereafter, conquerors of selfishness1
And of the root thereof free front all blame,
Lo ! to a brighter world they win their way !'2
Hence surely a thing given to the Order brings great

In the PTS edition read maccheramalang samulang.
Vimana-Vatthu, 34, 25-27

Kathavatthu - Of Ill (dukkha) and Sentient Organisms; Of 'save only the Ariyan Path'

Points of Controversy
Subjects of Discourse

4. Of Ill (dukkha) and Sentient Organisms.
Controverted Point.—That Ill is wholly bound up with
From the Commentary.—'Ill' [dukkha ] must be understood in
two ways: as bound up with and as not bound up with life
[indriya's] , According to the former, Ill is referred to the seat of

suffering; according to the latter, Ill covers liability to trouble through
the law of impermanence with its ' coming to be and passing away.'
But the Hetuvadins, for instance, do not draw this distinction. They
hold that painful sentience alone constitutes that dukkha , to under-
stand which the holy life, according to the teachings of the Exalted
One, is led.
[1] Th.—But you commit yourself to saying this: that
only that which is bound up with sentience is impermanent,
and conditioned, has arisen through a cause, is liable to
perish, to pass away, to lose desire, to cease, to change.1
But are not all these terms suitable to insentient things?2
You assent; but you refute your proposition in so doing.
[2] You mean, do you not, that what is not bound up
with sentience is impermanent, etc., and yet is not Ill.3
But if you call 'what is bound up with sentience' equally
impermanent, etc., must you not also say that 'this is not
ill.' ? If you deny, [and by your proposition you must
deny], then must you not contrariwise include ' that which
is not bound up with sentient life' under the notion of what
'is ill' ?
[3] Did not the Exalted One call whatever is imperma-
nent Ill ? And is not the insentient also impermanent ?
[4] H. — You deny the accuracy of my proposition.4

These all making up the content of the idea of Ill or sorrow or
suffering. Cf. Ledi Sadaw, JPTS, 1914, p. 133.
E.g., the earth, a hill, a rock, are insentient, and also impermanent.
Br. omits 'not.'
'Insentient objects cause both physical pain (dukkha) and
grief (domanassa ) to a sentient subject; for instance, fire in hot
weather, or air in cold weather. Again, the destruction of property,
etc., is always a source of mental pain. Hence the insentient may
be called " Ill" even without a reference to the idea of impermanence ;
but as they are not produced by karma and corruption, they cannot be
said to constitute the Ariyan fact of " Ill." Moreover, the destruction
of grass, wood, etc., and of such physical things as seed, etc., does not
constitute the Ariyan fact of the "cessation of Ill." It is the
sentient that is both Ill and also an Ariyan fact. But the insentient
is the former only, and not the latter. The Theravadin in denying
the Hetu va. din's proposition shows this difference.'—Comy.

But you are thereby committed to this: that just as the
higher life is lived under the Exalted One for understand-
ing Ill as bound up with sentient life, it is also lived for
the purpose of understanding Ill that is not bound up with
sentient life.
Th.—Nay, that cannot truly be said.
H.—And you are further committed to this : that just as
Ill that is bound up with sentient life, once it is thoroughly
understood, does not again arise, neither does it again arise
when it is not bound up with sentient life and is thoroughly
You deny1 . . . but I hold my proposition stands.
5. Of 'save only the Ariyan Path.'
Controverted Point.—That save only the Ariyan Path, all
other conditioned things may be called ' I1L'
From the Commentary.—This is held by such as the Hetuvadins,
because the Ariyan Path was stated by the Exalted One in the Four
Truths as 'a course going to the cessation of Ill.'2
[1] Th.—Then you call the Cause of Ill3 also Ill? If
you deny, you cannot maintain your proposition. If you
assent, do you mean that there are but three Truths?4 If
you deny, your proposition falls. If you assent, do you not
contradict the words of the Exalted One, that the Truths
are four—Ill, Cause of Ill , Cessation of Ill , Way going to
the Cessation of Ill ?
[2] If now you admit that the Cause of Ill is also Ill , in
what sense do you judge it to be so ?

Albeit the Theravadin makes these two denials, it is nevertheless
orthodox to include impermanent insentient things in the category
of Ill . Hence his denials must not be taken as proving the opponent's
In his first sermon, Buddhist Suttas (SBE, XI.), 148 f.; Vinaya
Texts, i. 95 ; also in the Nikayas, passim.
3 The Second Truth.
4 I.e., are the First and Second equal to each other?

H.—In the sense of impermanence.
Th.—But the Ariyan Path, is that impermanent ?
Th.—Then is not that also Ill ? . . .
You say then that the Path is impermanent but not Ill ,
while the Cause of Ill is both impermanent and Ill . [It is
impossible for you to maintain such a position]. . . .
[3] H.—But if the Path be ' a way going to the cessation
of Ill, ' I maintain that, when we speak of all other con-
ditioned things as Ill , this Ariyan Path is excepted.

Kathavatthu - Of an Arahant having Accumulating Merit; Arahants and Untimely Death; Everything as due to Karma

Points of Controversy
Subjects of Discourse


1. Of an Arahant having Accumulating Merit.
Controverted Point.—That there is accumulation of merit
in the case of an Arahant.
From the Commentary.—This is an opinion carelessly formed by
such as the Andhakas: that because an Arahant may be seen dis-
tributing gifts to the Order, saluting shrines, and so on, he is accumu-
lating merit. For him who has put away both merit and demerit, if
he were to work merit, he would be liable to work evil as well.
[1] Th.—If the Arahant have accumulation of merit, you
must allow he may also have accumulation of demerit. . . .
And [2] you must equally allow that he achieves meritorious
karma, and karma leading to the imperturbable,1 that he
does actions conducing to this or that destiny, or plane of
rebirth, actions conducing to authority, influence, riches,
adherents and retainers, celestial or human prosperity. . . .
[3] You must further admit that, in his karma, he is
heaping up or unloading, putting away or grasping, scat-
tering or binding, dispersing or collecting.2 If he does
none of these things, but having unloaded, put away,
scattered, dispersed, so abides, your proposition is untenable.
[4] A.—But may not an Arahant give gifts—clothing,
alms, food, lodging, medicaments for sickness, food, drink?
May he not salute shrines, hang garlands on them, and per-
fumes and unguents ? May he not make consummate
oblations before them ? You admit this. But these are all
merit-accumulating acts. . . .

See p. 190, n. 2.
See I. 2, § 63.

2. Of Arahants and Untimely Death.
Controverted Point.—That an Arahant cannot have an
untimely death.
From the Commentary.—From carelessly grasping the Sutta cited
below, some—to wit, the Kajagirikas and Siddhatthikas—hold that
since an Arahant is to experience the results of all his karma before he
can complete existence, therefore he cannot die out of due time.
[1] Th.—Then are there no murderers of Arahants ?
You admit there are. [2] Now when anyone takes the life
of an Arahant, does he take away the remainder of life
from a living man, or from one who is not living? If the
former, then you cannot maintain your proposition. If the
latter, there is no murder, and your admission is wrong.
[3] Again, you admit that poison, weapons, or fire may
get access to the body of - an Arahant. It is therefore clear
that an Arahant may suffer sudden death. [4] But i f you
deny, then there can be no murderer.
[5] R.S.—But was it not said by the Exalted One: 'I
declare, bhikkhus, that there cannot be destruction [of karmic
energy] ere the outcome of deeds that have been deliberately
tor ought and conserved has been experienced, whether that
destruction be under present conditions, or in the next or in
a subsequent series of conditions '
Hence there is no untimely dying for an Arahant.

Anguttara-Nik., v. 292 f., and above, p. 266. The Commentary
paraphrases this passage in detail. The following is an approximate
rendering. The commentator follows the negative form of statement
in the Pali of the Sutta, which is rendered above in positive form:
'I do not declare (na vadami) the annulment—that is, the complete
cutting of f of the recoil (parivatuma-paricchinnabhavar) )
—of deeds done by free will without their result having been ex-
perienced—i.e., obtained, partaken of. Nor do I declare that such
destruction may be realized under present conditions, but not here-
after. Nor do I declare that such destruction may be effected in the
very next rebirth, or the rebirth next to that ; nor that it may be
effected in subsequent rebirths; nor that it may be effected in one
rebirth where opportunity of maturing results arises, and not in another
where no such opportunity arises. Thus in all manner of conditions,

3. Of Everything as due to Karma.
Controverted Point.—That all this is from karma.
From the Commentary.— Because of the Sutta cited below, the
Rajagirikas and Siddhatthikas hold that all this cycle of karma,
corruptions and results is from karma.
[1] Th.—Do you then include karma itself as due to
karma?1 And do you imply that all this is simply the
result of bygone causes ?2 You are committed here to
what you must deny.
[2] Again, you imply, by your proposition, that all this
is [not so much from karma as] from the result of [still
earlier] karma. If you deny,3 you deny your first proposi-
tion. If you assent,4 you imply that one may commit
murder through [not karma, but] the result of karma.
You assent?5 Then murder, [though a result], is itself

given renewed existence and eventuation of karmic result, there is no
place on earth wherein a living being may be freed from the con-
sequences of his own evil deeds. All this the Buddha implied in the
Sutta quoted. Hence the opponents' premises for establishing his view
—that any act which has not obtained its turn of eventuation should
invariably be experienced by an Arahant as result—have not been well
For the opponents akala (untimely) meant one thing, for the
Theravadin another. To judge by the Theragatha Commentary (Pss.
of the Brethren, pp. 232, 266), the orthodox opinion was that no one,
in his last span of life, could die before attaining Arahantship.
This is rejected as fusing karma with its result.—Comy.
That the present is merely a series of effects and without initiative.
See on this erroneous opinion (stated in Angwttara-Niki. 173 ff.;
Vibhanga, 367) Ledi Sadaw, JPTS, 1913-14, p. 118.
If all is from karma, then that causal karma effected in a past life
must have been the result of karma effected in a still earlier life.—
A shoot cannot produce a shoot, but in the continuity of life a seed
is the product of another seed, and by this analogy karma is the result
of previous karma. So at first rejecting, he then assents.—Comy.
(freejy rendered).
He assents, because the murderous intent is, by his theory, the
result of previous karma.—Comy. The PTS edition ought here to
have Amanta instead of the negation.

productive of [karmic] result ? You assent ? Then the
result of karma is productive of result ? You deny ? Then
it is barren of result, and murder must a fortiori be barren
of [karmic] result. .. .
[3] This argument applies equally to other immoral acts
—to theft, to wicked speech—lying, abuse, slander, and
idle talk—to burglary, raiding, looting, highway robbery,
adultery, destroying houses in village or town. It applies
equally to moral acts : to giving gifts—e.g., giving the four
necessaries [to the religious]. If any of these is done as
the result of karma, and themselves produce karmic result,
then [you are on the horns of this dilemma: that] either
result-of-karma can itself produce effects [which is hetero-
dox], or any good or bad deed has no karmic result [which
is heterodox]. . . .
[4] R.S.—But was it not said by the Exalted One :
''Tis karma makes the world go round,
Karma rolls on the lives of men.
All beings are to karma bound
As linch-pin is to chariot-wheel.'1
' By karma praise and fame are toon.
By karma too, birth, deatji ancl bonds.
Who that this karma's divers modes discerns,
Can say "there is no karma in the world " '?2
Hence surely all this is due to karma ?

1 Sutta-Nipata, verse 654.
2 We cannot trace these four lines.

Thursday, June 23, 2011

Kathavatthu - Of Matter as a Moral Condition; and Morality; as Morally Good or Bad; Result; as in the Material and Immaterial Heavens; Desire in the Higher Heavens

Points of Controversy
Subjects of Discourse

5. Of Matter as a Moral Condition (hetu).1
Controverted Point.—That material qualities are moral
From the Commentary.—'Condition' [hetu] may signify more
specially one of the moral conditions or motives and their opposites :
appetite—disinterestedness, hate—love, dulness—intelligence; or, more
generally, any condition or causal relation whatever, Now, the IJttara-
pathakas make no such distinction, but relying on the letter of the
Word th e four primary qualities2 are conditions [of secondary
qualities'']—claim that bodily or material qualities may be [moral]
[1] Th —Your view implies that (i.) material qualities
must act as one or other of the sis motives of moral or
immoral conduct; (ii.) they have a mental object or idea,
having the properties of mental adverting, adjustment, etc.3
From both of these implications you dissent, hence you
cannot maintain your position.
[2-3] Indeed, you are ready to maintain the contrary of
(ii.), that proposition being quite true when applied to the
six moral conditions, but untrue of material qualities.
[4] U.—But are not the four primary qualities conditions
of the secondary material qualities that are derived from
them?3 Of course you assent. Hence, the four being
material, material qualities are conditions [however you
understand 'conditions'].
6. Matter and Concomitant Moral Conditions.
Controverted Point—That material qualities are accom-
panied by moral conditions.

On Buddhaghosa's analysis of hetu, see Bud. Psy. Eth., p. 274,
n. 1. The alternative meanings above are known as hetu-hetu, or
mula (root), and paccaya-hetu . On hetu, see Compendium,
p. 279.
Extended, cohesive, calorific, and mobile elements (Compendium,
p. 268, and above.

From the Commentary.—The foregoing dissertation applies here also.
[1] Th.—That is (i.) they must be accompanied by one or
more of the six motives or moral conditions, either good or
bad; (ii.) they have a mental object or idea, having the
properties of mental adverting, adjustment, etc. . . . (see
XVI. 5 [1-2]).
[2] If you admit that disinterestedness, love, and the
other four,1 as moral conditions, have a mental object and
involve mental adverting, adjustment, etc., then you must
describe material qualities in the same terms. [8] And i f
that be so, you cannot deny either attribute to material
qualities without equally denying it to the moral conditions.
[4] U.—But is not matter in causal relations ? You
agree. Then it is surely right to say material qualities are
accompanied by [moral conditions or] motives.

7. Of Matter as Morally Good or BacL
Controverted Point.—That material qualities are (i.) good
or moral, (ii.) bad or immoral.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Mahingsasakas and Sam-
initiyas, relying on the Word—'acts of body and speech are good or
bad'—and that among such acts we reckon intimations of our thought
by gesture and language,2 hold that the physical motions engaged
therein are [morally] good or bad.
[1] Th.—Do you mean to imply that material quali-
ties have a mental object, and the properties of mental
adverting, of adjustment, etc. ? Surely you agree that the
opposite is true? [2] And that, whereas you can predicate
those things of the three moral motives or conditions, and
of the five moral controlling powers, [3] they do not fit the
case of material qualities. .. .
(ii.) [4-6] The same argument holds good for material
qualities as immoral.
See XVI. 5, 'From the Commentary.'
2 Bud. Psy.Eth., p. 217; Vibhanga, p. 13.

[7] M.S.—But is not karma (moral action) of body and of
speech either good or bad ? Surely then material qualities
[engaged therein] are also either good or bad ?

8. Of Matter as Result.
Controverted Point.— That material qualities are results
[of karma].
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Andhakas and Sammitiyas,
hold that, just as consciousness and its concomitant attributes arise
because of karma that has been wrought, so also do material [i.e.,
corporeal] qualities arise as results [of karma].1
[1] Th.—Do you mean to imply that matter is of the
nature of feeling, pleasurable, painful, or neutral, that it
is conjoined with feeling, with mental reaction, and other
phases of consciousness, that it has the properties of mental
adverting, adjustment, etc. ? Is not the contrary the case?
If you assent, you cannot maintain your proposition.
[2] All those things are mental characteristics, not
material. But you wish to see in matter a 'result' of
karma, without the mental characters which are the pro-
perties of 'result.' .. .
[3] A.S.—But is not consciousness and its concomitant
attributes, which arise through actions done, 'result'?
Surely then material qualities, which arise through
actions done, are equally 'result' ?

9. Of Matter as belonging to the Material and the
Immaterial Heavens.
Controverted Point— That matter belongs to (i.) the
material heavens, (ii.) the immaterial heavens.
On 'result,' vipaka , as technically a conscious or mental phe-
nomenon, see above, VII. 7, 8.

From the Commentary.—Some, like the Andhakas, hold that since
matter, which is the product o f actions clone in the world [and heavens]
of sense-desire, belongs therefore to that world, so if it be the product
of actions done in the material or immaterial heavens, it belongs
equally to those heavens.
[1] Th.—Then you must describe matter [in terms de-
scriptive of (i.) that is to say] as seeking attainment in
Jhana, as seeking rebirth on those planes, as living happily
under present conditions, as accompanied by a mind that
seeks that attainment and that rebirth, and that lives in
that happiness ; as coexistent with such a mind, associated,
conjoined with it, one with it in genesis, in cessation, in
physical basis, as having the same objects before it . . .
[2] and you must describe matter [in terms descriptive of
(ii.) that is to say] in the same terms as we apply to (i.).
But is not the contrary true as to both (i.) and (ii.) ? . . .
[3] A.—But is not matter which is due to actions done
in the world of sense-desires called 'belonging to'1 that
world? If that is so, then matter due to actions done in
either of the other worlds of existence should surely be
called ' belonging to' either the Material Heavens or the
Immaterial Heavens.
10. Of Desire for Life in the Higher Heavens.
Controverted Point.—That lust for life in Rupa or Arupa
spheres is included among the data thereof.
From the Commentary.—Bo think the Andhakas, and by the same
analogy as they hold the previously stated opinion (XIV. 7) with regard
to celestial lustings in general. That is a view they share with the
Sammitiyas, but this is theirs alone.
[1] Th.—Similar to [1] in XVI. 9.
[2] And you cannot maintain your view without admitting
that a corresponding lust for the objects of hearing, smell-

1 'Belonging to' is in Pali simply the name of the world in question
with adjectival import. On the extension of the term 'world of sense-
desire ' (kamavacara) , see Compendium, p. 81, n. 2.

ing, taste and touch is one of the data in the sphere of
each of these respectively.1
[3] If you cannot affirm the latter, you cannot make an
exception of the former.
[4] Next with regard to (ii.) lust for life on the Arupa
[immaterial] plane as a datum thereof—my first argument
used above (XVI. 9) holds good. [5, 6]. So does my second
used above (XVI. 10, 2). If your proposition is to stand,
then a desire for each sense-object must be among the
elemental data of the sphere of that particular object. You
cannot make an exception o f the desire for life in the
immaterial sphere.
[7] A.—But is not desire for life in the plane of sense
[kamadhatu] among the elemental data of that plane?2
Then surely you cannot make an exception as to desire
for life in the Rupa and Arupa spheres ?

Rupa may refer to (i.) matter, (ii.) visible object, (iii.) a sphere
or heaven of 'celestial' matter, where sight supersedes the more
animal senses. Lust for the objects of the other senses is introduced
in the argument not so much to oppose rupa as (ii.), to other sense-
objects, as to oppose conceivable if unfamiliar parallels —'datum
included in the sphere (or heaven) of sound,' smell, etc.—to the familiar
more ambiguous : ' datum included in the sphere (or heaven) of Rupa. '
Desire, 'lower' or higher, is always an element in the Kama loka
or world of matter, terrestrial, infernal, sub-celestial, but never, in
orthodox doctrine, in the Rupa or Arupa worlds.

Kathavatthu - Of Control; Assisting Another's Mind; Making Another Happy according to his Deserts; Attending to Everything at once

Points of Controversy
Subjects of Discourse


1. Of Control
Controverted Point.—That one can control the mind of
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Mahasanghikas, hold that
the attainment of power and authority in the world is only genuine if
it include power to control the consciousness of others.
[1] Th.—Do you mean that one can bid the consciousness
of another not to lust, not to hate, not to be bewildered, not
to be corrupted ? Of course you deny. But how then can
you maintain your view ? Or do you mean that one can
bid any mental phase uprisen in another's consciousness—
reaction, feeling, perception, volition . . . understanding—
to cease ? Equally you deny. .. . [2] Or do you mean
that anyone puts away lust, hate, or any evil mental
coefficient2 on account of another? Or practises the
[Ariyan] Path, or applications in mindfulness, or any other
set of the factors of enlightenment3 because of another?
Or masters the Four Truths—understanding Ill , putting
away its Cause, realizing its Cessation, practising the Path
thereto—because of another? Or finally, do you mean
that anyone makes another the doer of his actions, that
anyone's happiness and ill are wrought by another, that
one acts while another experiences? If you deny, you
must deny your own view.

To know (or, as we say, 'read') the thoughts of another was one
of the supernormal knowledges (see above, V. 7; Compendium, p. 209),
but control or influence over another so as to prevent corruption was
not assumed for it.
See above, p. 229, n. 2.
See Compendium, p. 179.

[3] And was it not said by the Exalted One:—
''Tis thou alone dost work thine evil deeds ;
'Tis thou alone dost make thyself corrupt;
'Tis thou alone dost leave the wrong undone;
'Tis thou alone dost purify thyself
Self-torought is cleanness and impurity.
None may his brother's heart1 make undefiled'?2
Hence it is surely wrong to say that one can control the
mind o f another.
[4] M.—But have not some admittedly won power and
authority? Surely this includes control over others'

2. Of Assisting Another s Mind.
Controverted Point.—That one can help the mind of
The Commentary merely ranges this under the preceding discourse.
[1] Th.—Do you mean that one can so help another as
to bid his consciousness not to lust or to hate, or to be
bewildered, or to be corrupted ? . . . Or that one may
bring forth in the heart of another any of the moral condi-
tions, to wit, disinterestedness, love, understanding, or any
of the five 'controlling powers [of enlightenment], to wit,
faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, understanding,
etc. . . . {the remainder agrees verbatim with XVI. 1).

3. Of making Another Happy according to his Deserts.
Controverted Point.—That one can bestow happiness on

Literally, 'another.'
Dhammapada, verse 164.
One can bestow the conditions of happiness to some extent, but
not the actual state of mind.

From the Commentary.—This view is derived by its adherents,
notably the Hetuvadins, from the Sutta quoted below. But the words
of the Exalted One were spoken to show how the arising of happiness
in others is conditioned. Producing happiness in others is not like
bestowing food upon them; hence the citation is inconclusive.
[1] Th.—Your proposition implies that one can also
cause misery in others. But you deny this, while you
maintain the opposite with respect to happiness.
[2] You imply further that you can hand over your own
happiness to another; or others' happiness, or his own
happiness, to another. You deny. To whom then ?
You imply, finally, that anyone causes another to act
for him, that one's own welfare and ill are wrought by
another, that one acts while another experiences.
[3] H.—But did not the venerable Udayin say: 'Verily
of many unhappinesses doth the Exalted One rid us, many
happinesses doth he bestoiy upon us, of many bad things doth
he rid 'its, many good things doth he bestow upon us ' ?1
Hence one may hand on happiness to another.

4. Of Attending to All at Once.
Controverted Point. —That one can attend to everything
From the 'Commentary.—Attention has two aspects, according as
we consider the method Or the object of attention. To infer from the
observed transience of one or more phenomena that 'all things are im-
permanent' is attention as [inductive] method. But in attending to
past things, we cannot attend to future things. "We attend to a
certain thing in one of the time-relations. This is attention by way of
object of consciousness. Moreover, when we attend to present things,
we are not able at the present moment to attend to the conscious-
ness by which they arise. Nevertheless some, like the Pubbaseliyas
and Aparaseliyas, because of the Word, 'All things are impermanent,'
hold that in generalizing we can attend to all things at once.2 And
because they hold that in so doing we must also attend to the con-
sciousness by which we attend, the argument takes the line as stated.

Majjhima-Nik., i. 447.
Sabbe sankhare ekato manasikaroti—Comy.

[1] Th.—Do you imply that we know the consciousness
by which we so attend ? You deny.1 But I ask you again
—now you assent.2 Then do we know as consciousness the
consciousness by which we so attend ? You deny. But I
ask you again—now you assent. Then is the subject of
consciousness its own object ? You deny. But I ask you
again—now you assent. Then do we experience mental
reaction by the same mental reaction ? Do we feel a feel-
ing by that feeling? And so on for perception, volition,
cognition, applied thought, sustained thought, zest, mindful-
ness, understanding ? If you deny, you undo your previous
affirmations. . . .
[2] When we attend to the past as past, do we then attend.,
to the future as future ? You deny. But I ask you again
—now you assent. But this commits you to a collocation of
two parallel mental processes. . . . And this holds i f I sub-
stitute 'present' for 'future.' . . . And i f you claim that
we can, while attending to the past as past, attend also to
the future as such, and to the present as such, we get a
collocation of three parallel mental processes. . . . And—
[3-4] [we may ring the changes with] the same argument
on other permutations of the time relations. . . .
[5] P.A.-But was it not said by the Exalted One :
'When he by wisdom doth discern and see :
"Impermanent is everything in life !"
Then lie at all this suffering feels disgust.
Lo! herein lies the way to purity.
When he by wisdom doth discern and see,
That " Everything in life is bound to Ill! . . "
That "Everything in life is Void of Soul!"
Then he at all this suffering feels disgust
Lo ! herein lies the way to purity' ?3
Hence we can attend to all at once.

Because it cannot be subject and object at once.—Comy.
Because we are already aware of the nature of our thought in
general, or because of the thesis advanced.—Comy.
Pss. of the Brethren, verses 676-678; ascribed to Anna-Kondanna,
the first amoug the first five disciples to grasp the new gospel.