Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
6. Of the Effect of Gifts given in this Life.
Controverted Point.—That what is given here sustains
elsewhere.
From the Commentary.—It is held by some—for instance, the
Rajagiriyas and Siddhatthikas—that because of "the Word :
'By what is given here below
They share who, dead, 'mong Petas go2
gifts of robes, etc., cause life to be sustained there.
[1] Th.—Your proposition commits you to the further
statement that robes, alms-food, lodging, medical requisites
for ailments, hard food, soft food, and drink, given in this
life, are enjoyed in the after-life—which you deny. . . .
And it commits you further to this [heterodox position],
that one person is the agent for another ; that the happi-
ness or ill we feel is wrought by others; that one acts,
another experiences the consequences3 — which you
deny. . . .
2
See next page,
3
Samyutta-Nik., ii. 75 f . Judging by the Commentary on the
verses just below [§ 3], gifts to the memory of dead kinsfolk were made
to the Order, the donor specifying that he made them in the name of
[2] R. S.—You deny our proposition. But do not the
Petas thank him who gives a gift for their advantage, are not
their hearts appeased, are they not interested, do they not
obtain gladness ? [3] Was it not said by the Exalted One :
' As water rained upon high slope
Doth ever down the hillside run,
E'en so whatever on earth is given
Doth reach the hapless Peta shades.
And as the brimming livers run
To keep the mighty ocean full,
E'en so whatever, etc.
For where they dwell no husbandry
Nor tending dairy kine is there,
No merchant traffic as with us,
No goods to buy with precious coin.
By what is given here below
They share who, dead, 'mong Petas go '?1
Therefore our proposition is right.
[4] Again, was it not said by the Exalted One: 'Bhik-
khus, there are these five matters which parents, if wishing for
a child to be born to them, contemplate. Which are the five ?
Cared for (they think) he will care for us; or, he will do our
work; he will continue our family; he will inherit our
property ; he will institute offerings to the departed parent
shades (Petas).
' Wise folk who fain a child would have
Have five advantages in view :—
Us by his wages he will keep ;
His will it be our work to do ;
such, of his kin as might have been reborn as Petas. Paramattha-
jotika (PTS, I., p. 204 f.); cf. Spence Hardy, Buddhism, p. 59
(Childers, s.v. Peta), whose view is that offerings were exposed for such
ill-plighted shades, not given for the use of the Order. The argument
in the Katha-Vatthu implies that the former procedure was followed.
The merit of the gift might avail to bless the Petas, but the material
gift itself could not nourish them, as the superstitious deemed.
1
Khuddakapatha (PTS), 6 (VII.).
Our family will long endure ;
Our heritage to him we leave ;
And then again an offering
To Peta-shades he'll institute.
These matters five keep well in view
The wise who fain a child would have.
Wherefore the pious and the good,
Children who know and grateful feel,
Support their mother and their sire,
Remembering all these did for them.
Their tasks they take upon themselves,
E'en as their parents toiled for them ;
Do their behests and them maintain,
Nor suffer that their race decay.
Praise to the child of filial heart,
With piety and virtue dight'?1
Was it not so said ? Then is our proposition right.
7. Of the Earth and Karma.
Controverted Point.—That land is a result of action.
From the Commentary. —Inasmuch as there is human action directed
to gain dominion and sovereignty over the soil, some, like the
Andhakas, hold that the earth itself is a resultant of such action (or
karma). The argument goes to show that (1) land has nothing in
common with the sentient results which are caused by karma ;2
(2) that
such results are a matter of individual subjective experience, not
shared by others, myriads of whom do not even live upon the earth.
[1] Th.—As well say that the earth belongs to feeling3
pleasant, painful, or neutral, or is conjoined [as mental]
with feeling or with perception, or volition, or cognition, that
the earth has a mental object, that she can advert to, reflect
upon, consider, attend, intend, anticipate, aim. Is not just
the opposite true of her ? Hence your proposition is wrong.
1
Anguttara-Nik., iii. 43.
2
Sukha-vedaniya, etc.
3
Kamma-vipaka, or result of actions was,in its ultimate terms,
conceived as feeling experienced by the agent in this life, or by the
resultant of him in another life.
[2] Again, compare her [with something mental]—with
contact. Of contact you could say that it is both (i.) a
result of action and also that it (ii.) belongs to feeling, and
so on (as in § 1). But you cannot say both these things of
earth. Or if you affirm the former (i.) and deny the latter
predicate (ii.) of earth, you must be prepared to do no less
in the case of contact.
[3] Again, the earth undergoes expansion and contrac-
tion, cutting and breaking up. Can you say as much of
the [mental] result of action ?
Again, the earth may be bought and sold, located, collected,
explored. Can you say as much of the result of action ?
Again, the earth is common to everyone else. But is
the result of [my] action common to everyone else? 'Yes,'
you say. But was it not said by the Exalted One :
' This treasure to none else belongs,
No bandit hence may bear it.
The mortal who would fare aright
Let him work acts of merit' ?1
Hence it is wrong to say that a result of action is experi-
enced by everyone else.
[4] Again, you would admit that first the earth is es-
tablished and afterwards beings are reborn [on it]. But
does result first come to pass and afterwards people act to
insure result ? If you deny, you cannot maintain that earth
is a result of action.
[5] Again, is the earth a common result of collective
action ? Yes, you say ? Do you mean that all beings
enjoy the use of the earth? If you deny, you cannot
affirm your proposition. If you assent, I ask whether there
are any who pass utterly away without enjoying the use of
it ? You assent, of course. But are there any who pass
utterly away without exhausting the experienced result of
their actions ? Of course you deny. .. .
1
Khuddakapatha, VIII. 9. The last two lines are discrepant.
The work quoted reads ' wise man' for 'mortal,' and, for the third line :
That treasure which doth follow him—viz. merit.
[6] Once more, is the earth a result of the action of a being
who is a world-monarch ? and do other beings share in the
use of the earth ? Yes, you reply. Then do other beings
make use of the result of his actions? You deny. . . .
I ask again, and you assent. But then, do other beings
share also in his contact, feelings, perception, volition, con-
sciousness, faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, un-
derstanding ? Of course you deny. . . .
[7] A.—But if I am wrong, surely there is action to gain
dominion [over the earth],1 action to gain sovereignty [on
the earth] ? If so, surely the earth is a result of action.
1
.Literally, lordship, ' here meaning large possessions.'—Comy.
Showing posts with label Abhidhamma Pitaka. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Abhidhamma Pitaka. Show all posts
Wednesday, June 15, 2011
Kathavatthu - Of Giving and the Gift & Of Utility
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
4. Of Giving and the Gift
Controverted Point.—That dana is [not the gift but] the
mental state.
From the Commentary.—Dana is of three kinds:4 the will to
surrender [something], abstinence, the gift. In the line—
Faith, modesty, and meritorious giving,
we have the will to surrender something when opportunity occurs. In
the phrase 'he gives security,' abstinence, when opportunity occurs, is
meant. In the phrase ' he gives food and drink in charity,' a thing to
be given on a given occasion is meant. The first is dan a [in an
active sense], as that which surrenders, or [in the instrumental sense]
as that by which something is given. Abstinence is giving in the
sense of severing from, cutting off . When it is practised, one severs,
cuts of f the immoral will which we consider to be a fearful and
dangerous state. And this is a 'giving.' Finally, dan a implies that
an offering is given. This triple distinction is in reality reduced to
two : mental and material. But the view held, for instance, by the
Bajagirikas and Siddhattikas, recognizes the former only. And the
object of the discourse is to clear up the confusion (lege sankara-
bhavang)
5
between the meanings of this dual distinction.
[1] Th.—If dana be a mental state, is it possible to
give a mental state away to others? If you deny, your
4
Dana means grammatically both giving and gift and liberality.
Hence the necessity of retaining the Pali word.
5
So Br. The readings in the PTS edition are impossible.
proposition falls through. If you assent,1 you then imply
that it is possible to give any mental property to others:
contact, feeling, perception, volition, faith, energy, mind-
fulness, concentration, understanding.
[2] R. S.—If we are wrong, we ask you, is giving
attended by undesirable, disagreeable, unpleasant, barren
consequences?2 Does it induce, and result in, sorrow? Is
not rather the opposite true? Surely then dana is a
mental state.
[3] Th.—Granting that giving was pronounced by the
Exalted One to produce desirable results, is giving a robe,
or alms-food, or lodging, or materia medica and requisites
for illness dana ? You admit they are, but you cannot
assert that these directly bring about desirable, agreeable,
pleasant, felicific mental results.
[4] R. S.—If we are wrong, let us quote the words
of the Exalted One :
' Faith, modesty, and meritorious giving :
These are the things that men of zvorth pursue ;
This, say they, is the path celestial,
Hereby we pass into the deva-world.'3
[5] Again: ' Bhikkhus, these five giving s, the Great Dana's,4
are supreme, secular, hereditary; ancient [customs'], unmixed
now or in the past; they are not mixed one with the other, nor
shall be, and they am not despised by recluses or brahmins, or
by the wise. What are the five? First, there is the Ariyan
disciple who, having put away taking life, is opposed to it
Such an one gives to all beings without limit security, amity,
1
On the ground that anything mental cannot be given as if it were
food, etc., the opponent denies ; when the question is insisted upon, he
recollects the Sutta on ' giving security, etc.,' and assents.—Comy.
2
If dan a means the material gift, and this be, say, a nauseous
medicine, the giver must reap corresponding undesirable fruit.—
Comy.
3
Anguttara-Nik., iv. 286.
4
In his Commentary on Anguttara-Nik. Buddhaghosa calls these
'the gifts of the will' (cetana), deliberate, intentional giving.
benevolence. And having thus given without limit, he himself
becomes partaker in that security, amity, benevolence. Secondly,
the Ariyan disciple, having put away taking what is not given,
wrong conduct in sense-desires, lying, and occasions for indulg-
ing in strong drinks, is opposed to these. Thus renouncing,
bhikkhus, he gives to all beings ivithout limit security, amity,
goodwill. And so giving, he himself becomes partaker in that
unlimited security, amity, goodwill. These, bhikkhus, are the
five Great Dana's. . . .'1
If the Suttanta says thus, then giving is a mental state.
[6] Th.—According to you, then, dan a is not some-
thing to be given. But was it not said by the Exalted One :
'Take the case of one who gives food, drink, raiment, a carriage,
a wreath, a perfume, ointment, a couch, a dwelling, means of
lighting'?2 Surely then dan a is a thing to be given.
[7] B. S.—You say then that giving is a thing to be
given. Now you do not admit that the thing to be given
has as its direct result something desirable, agreeable,
pleasant, felicifie, a happy capacity and consequence. On
the other hand, the Exalted One said that dana had such a
result. Now you say that a robe, alms-food, and the other
requisites are dana. Hence it follows that a robe and so
on has such a result, which cannot be. Therefore it is
wrong to say that dana is a thing to be given.
5. Of Utility.
Controverted Point.—That merit increases with utility.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Rajagirikas, Siddhattikas,
and Sammitiyas, from thoughtlessly interpreting such Suttas as
'merit day and night is always growing,' and 'the robe, bhikkhus,
which a bhikkhu enjoying the use of . . .,'3 hold that there is such
a thing as merit achieved by utility.
1
Anguttara-Nik., iv. 246.
2
Op. cit., iv. 239. This is a 'stock' catalogue ; cf. op. cit., i. 107 ;
ii. 85, 203 ; Digha-Nik., iii. 259.
3
See below.
[1] Th.—By your thesis you imply [that other mental
experiences are increasing quantities :—] that contact, feel-
ing, perception, volition, cognition, faith, energy, mindful-
ness, concentration, understanding, can each keep growing1
—which you deny. . . . And that merit keeps growing
just as a creeper, a liana, a tree, grass, or brushwood
grows—which you deny. .. .
[2] Again, in affirming it, do you also admit that a giver
acquires merit when, having given his gift, he does not
consider it further ?
2
You do. But this is to imply, in
other words, that merit accrues to one who does not
consciously advert to, reflect upon, consider, attend to,
deliberate, anticipate, aim. Is not the opposite the ease ?
You assent. Then it is wrong to say that merit goes on
growing with utility.
[3] Again, in affirming your thesis, do you also admit
that a giver may acquire merit who, on giving a gift,
entertains sensual, malevolent, or cruel thoughts? ' Yes/
you reply. Then have we here a combination of two con-
tacts, feelings, perceptions, volitions, cognitions ? No ?
Think ! ' Yes,' you now reply.
3
Then you are maintaining
that good and bad, guilty and innocent, base and noble,
sinister and clear mental states, can co-exist side by side
[at the same moment]. You deny. Think again! ' Yes,'
you now reply.
4
But was it not said by the Exalted
One : 'There are four things, bhikkhus, very far away one
1
Merit (punna) is an abstract notion or human estimate of the
balance of anyone's chances of a surplus over unhappy experience in
the future in consequence of deeds done now. Thus, for both estimator
and the subject of the estimate, it is nothing else than a series of
mental phenomena, and should be considered as such, and not as some
external and mystic entity or continuum.
2
Nasamannaharati, i.e., the 'adverting,' having arrested the
subconscious life-flux, does not 'smoothly conduct' the will-to-give
(dana-cetana) along its own path.— Comy.
3
He now assents, because he includes the consciousnesses of both
donor and donee. — Comy.
4
He now assents, because by his opinion that which is derived from
sustained enjoyment is not a conscious phenomenon,-— Comy.
from the other. What are the four ? The sky and the earth,
the hither and the yonder shore of the ocean, whence the sun
rises and where he sinks, the Norm of the good and that of
the wicked.
' Far is the sky and far from it the earth lies;
Far too the further shore of ocean, say they;
And whence the radiant sun at day-dawn rises,
And where he goes, lightmaker, to his ending.
Yet further than all these asunder, say they,
The Norm of good men's lives and that of bad men.
Co-operation of the good can never perish,
True to its nature while it yet endureth.
But swift dissolves the intercourse of bad men.
Hence far is Norm of good from that of evil'?1
Therefore it is wrong to say that good and bad, etc.,
mental states, co-exist side by side in anyone.
[4] It S. S.—But, if your Rejection is right, was it not
said by the Exalted One :
'Planters of groves and shady woods,
And they who- build causeway and bridge,
And wells construct and watering sheds,
And to the homeless dwellings give :—
Of such as these by day and night
For ever doth the merit grow.
In righteousness and virtue's might
Such folk from earth to heaven go '?2
Therefore merit goes on growing with utility.
[5] Again, was it not said by the Exalted One:
' Bhikkhus, there are these four streams of merit and of
good, sources of happiness and blissful fate, resulting in
happiness, conducive to heavenly life, conducive to that which
is desirable, agreeable, and sweet, to welfare and happiness.
What are the four ? When a bhikkhu, enjoying the use of
robes, or of alms-food, or of shelter, or of medical requisites
1
Anguttara-Nik., ii. 50.
2
Samyutta-Nik., i. 33.
given him, is able to attain to and dwell in infinite concentra-
tion of mind, to the giver each of these four gifts is an infinite
stream of merit and of good . . .'?1
Therefore merit goes on growing with utility.
[6] Th.—You still affirm your proposition. Now, does a
giver who has given a gift acquire merit when the acceptor,
having accepted the gift, throws it away, abandons it?
'Yes,' you reply. But you cannot possibly say of that
giver's merit that it goes on growing.
[7] Or if, when the gift is accepted, kings, or thieves,
take it away again, or fire burns it, or water bears it away,
or hostile heirs take it back? The same holds good.
Hence merit is not dependent upon utility.
1
Anguttara-Nik., ii. 54
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
4. Of Giving and the Gift
Controverted Point.—That dana is [not the gift but] the
mental state.
From the Commentary.—Dana is of three kinds:4 the will to
surrender [something], abstinence, the gift. In the line—
Faith, modesty, and meritorious giving,
we have the will to surrender something when opportunity occurs. In
the phrase 'he gives security,' abstinence, when opportunity occurs, is
meant. In the phrase ' he gives food and drink in charity,' a thing to
be given on a given occasion is meant. The first is dan a [in an
active sense], as that which surrenders, or [in the instrumental sense]
as that by which something is given. Abstinence is giving in the
sense of severing from, cutting off . When it is practised, one severs,
cuts of f the immoral will which we consider to be a fearful and
dangerous state. And this is a 'giving.' Finally, dan a implies that
an offering is given. This triple distinction is in reality reduced to
two : mental and material. But the view held, for instance, by the
Bajagirikas and Siddhattikas, recognizes the former only. And the
object of the discourse is to clear up the confusion (lege sankara-
bhavang)
5
between the meanings of this dual distinction.
[1] Th.—If dana be a mental state, is it possible to
give a mental state away to others? If you deny, your
4
Dana means grammatically both giving and gift and liberality.
Hence the necessity of retaining the Pali word.
5
So Br. The readings in the PTS edition are impossible.
proposition falls through. If you assent,1 you then imply
that it is possible to give any mental property to others:
contact, feeling, perception, volition, faith, energy, mind-
fulness, concentration, understanding.
[2] R. S.—If we are wrong, we ask you, is giving
attended by undesirable, disagreeable, unpleasant, barren
consequences?2 Does it induce, and result in, sorrow? Is
not rather the opposite true? Surely then dana is a
mental state.
[3] Th.—Granting that giving was pronounced by the
Exalted One to produce desirable results, is giving a robe,
or alms-food, or lodging, or materia medica and requisites
for illness dana ? You admit they are, but you cannot
assert that these directly bring about desirable, agreeable,
pleasant, felicific mental results.
[4] R. S.—If we are wrong, let us quote the words
of the Exalted One :
' Faith, modesty, and meritorious giving :
These are the things that men of zvorth pursue ;
This, say they, is the path celestial,
Hereby we pass into the deva-world.'3
[5] Again: ' Bhikkhus, these five giving s, the Great Dana's,4
are supreme, secular, hereditary; ancient [customs'], unmixed
now or in the past; they are not mixed one with the other, nor
shall be, and they am not despised by recluses or brahmins, or
by the wise. What are the five? First, there is the Ariyan
disciple who, having put away taking life, is opposed to it
Such an one gives to all beings without limit security, amity,
1
On the ground that anything mental cannot be given as if it were
food, etc., the opponent denies ; when the question is insisted upon, he
recollects the Sutta on ' giving security, etc.,' and assents.—Comy.
2
If dan a means the material gift, and this be, say, a nauseous
medicine, the giver must reap corresponding undesirable fruit.—
Comy.
3
Anguttara-Nik., iv. 286.
4
In his Commentary on Anguttara-Nik. Buddhaghosa calls these
'the gifts of the will' (cetana), deliberate, intentional giving.
benevolence. And having thus given without limit, he himself
becomes partaker in that security, amity, benevolence. Secondly,
the Ariyan disciple, having put away taking what is not given,
wrong conduct in sense-desires, lying, and occasions for indulg-
ing in strong drinks, is opposed to these. Thus renouncing,
bhikkhus, he gives to all beings ivithout limit security, amity,
goodwill. And so giving, he himself becomes partaker in that
unlimited security, amity, goodwill. These, bhikkhus, are the
five Great Dana's. . . .'1
If the Suttanta says thus, then giving is a mental state.
[6] Th.—According to you, then, dan a is not some-
thing to be given. But was it not said by the Exalted One :
'Take the case of one who gives food, drink, raiment, a carriage,
a wreath, a perfume, ointment, a couch, a dwelling, means of
lighting'?2 Surely then dan a is a thing to be given.
[7] B. S.—You say then that giving is a thing to be
given. Now you do not admit that the thing to be given
has as its direct result something desirable, agreeable,
pleasant, felicifie, a happy capacity and consequence. On
the other hand, the Exalted One said that dana had such a
result. Now you say that a robe, alms-food, and the other
requisites are dana. Hence it follows that a robe and so
on has such a result, which cannot be. Therefore it is
wrong to say that dana is a thing to be given.
5. Of Utility.
Controverted Point.—That merit increases with utility.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Rajagirikas, Siddhattikas,
and Sammitiyas, from thoughtlessly interpreting such Suttas as
'merit day and night is always growing,' and 'the robe, bhikkhus,
which a bhikkhu enjoying the use of . . .,'3 hold that there is such
a thing as merit achieved by utility.
1
Anguttara-Nik., iv. 246.
2
Op. cit., iv. 239. This is a 'stock' catalogue ; cf. op. cit., i. 107 ;
ii. 85, 203 ; Digha-Nik., iii. 259.
3
See below.
[1] Th.—By your thesis you imply [that other mental
experiences are increasing quantities :—] that contact, feel-
ing, perception, volition, cognition, faith, energy, mindful-
ness, concentration, understanding, can each keep growing1
—which you deny. . . . And that merit keeps growing
just as a creeper, a liana, a tree, grass, or brushwood
grows—which you deny. .. .
[2] Again, in affirming it, do you also admit that a giver
acquires merit when, having given his gift, he does not
consider it further ?
2
You do. But this is to imply, in
other words, that merit accrues to one who does not
consciously advert to, reflect upon, consider, attend to,
deliberate, anticipate, aim. Is not the opposite the ease ?
You assent. Then it is wrong to say that merit goes on
growing with utility.
[3] Again, in affirming your thesis, do you also admit
that a giver may acquire merit who, on giving a gift,
entertains sensual, malevolent, or cruel thoughts? ' Yes/
you reply. Then have we here a combination of two con-
tacts, feelings, perceptions, volitions, cognitions ? No ?
Think ! ' Yes,' you now reply.
3
Then you are maintaining
that good and bad, guilty and innocent, base and noble,
sinister and clear mental states, can co-exist side by side
[at the same moment]. You deny. Think again! ' Yes,'
you now reply.
4
But was it not said by the Exalted
One : 'There are four things, bhikkhus, very far away one
1
Merit (punna) is an abstract notion or human estimate of the
balance of anyone's chances of a surplus over unhappy experience in
the future in consequence of deeds done now. Thus, for both estimator
and the subject of the estimate, it is nothing else than a series of
mental phenomena, and should be considered as such, and not as some
external and mystic entity or continuum.
2
Nasamannaharati, i.e., the 'adverting,' having arrested the
subconscious life-flux, does not 'smoothly conduct' the will-to-give
(dana-cetana) along its own path.— Comy.
3
He now assents, because he includes the consciousnesses of both
donor and donee. — Comy.
4
He now assents, because by his opinion that which is derived from
sustained enjoyment is not a conscious phenomenon,-— Comy.
from the other. What are the four ? The sky and the earth,
the hither and the yonder shore of the ocean, whence the sun
rises and where he sinks, the Norm of the good and that of
the wicked.
' Far is the sky and far from it the earth lies;
Far too the further shore of ocean, say they;
And whence the radiant sun at day-dawn rises,
And where he goes, lightmaker, to his ending.
Yet further than all these asunder, say they,
The Norm of good men's lives and that of bad men.
Co-operation of the good can never perish,
True to its nature while it yet endureth.
But swift dissolves the intercourse of bad men.
Hence far is Norm of good from that of evil'?1
Therefore it is wrong to say that good and bad, etc.,
mental states, co-exist side by side in anyone.
[4] It S. S.—But, if your Rejection is right, was it not
said by the Exalted One :
'Planters of groves and shady woods,
And they who- build causeway and bridge,
And wells construct and watering sheds,
And to the homeless dwellings give :—
Of such as these by day and night
For ever doth the merit grow.
In righteousness and virtue's might
Such folk from earth to heaven go '?2
Therefore merit goes on growing with utility.
[5] Again, was it not said by the Exalted One:
' Bhikkhus, there are these four streams of merit and of
good, sources of happiness and blissful fate, resulting in
happiness, conducive to heavenly life, conducive to that which
is desirable, agreeable, and sweet, to welfare and happiness.
What are the four ? When a bhikkhu, enjoying the use of
robes, or of alms-food, or of shelter, or of medical requisites
1
Anguttara-Nik., ii. 50.
2
Samyutta-Nik., i. 33.
given him, is able to attain to and dwell in infinite concentra-
tion of mind, to the giver each of these four gifts is an infinite
stream of merit and of good . . .'?1
Therefore merit goes on growing with utility.
[6] Th.—You still affirm your proposition. Now, does a
giver who has given a gift acquire merit when the acceptor,
having accepted the gift, throws it away, abandons it?
'Yes,' you reply. But you cannot possibly say of that
giver's merit that it goes on growing.
[7] Or if, when the gift is accepted, kings, or thieves,
take it away again, or fire burns it, or water bears it away,
or hostile heirs take it back? The same holds good.
Hence merit is not dependent upon utility.
1
Anguttara-Nik., ii. 54
Kathavatthu - Of the Classification of Things, Of Mental States as Mutually Connected, Of Mental Properties
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
BOOK VII
1. Of the Classification [of things].1
Controverted Point.—That things cannot be grouped
together by means of abstract ideas.
From the Commentary.—-It is a belief held, for instance, by the
Rajagirikas and the Siddhatthikas, that the orthodox classification of
particular, material qualities under one generic concept of 'matter,'
etc., is worthless, for this reason, that you cannot group things together
by means of ideas, as you can rope together bullocks, and so on.
The argument seeks to point out a different meaning in the notion of
grouping.2
[1] Th.—But you do not also deny that any things may
combine or be included with other things under a concept
of totality or universality. Hence, how can you deny that
they may be grouped together ? [2] The organs of sense
[3] and their objects are, you admit, computed under the
material aggregate [of a living individual]. [4] Pleasant,
painful, or neutral feelings are computed under the aggre-
gate of feeling. [5] Percepts on occasion of sense and idea-
tion come under the aggregate of perception. [6] Volitions
on occasion of sense and ideation come under the aggregate
of conscious concomitants. [7] Consciousness on occasion
of sense and ideation comes under the aggregate of con-
sciousness. Hence, by admitting these inclusions, you must
admit that things may be grouped by an idea.
1
The title should, in the Pali, be Sangaha-, not Sangahita-
katha.
2
Physical grouping is, of course, the bringing together a number of
individuals. But things may be grouped mentally, i.e., included under
a concept of totality involved in counting, or a general concept by
generalizing.
[8] R. S.—Then you understand 'things being grouped
, together by ideas' in the same way as two bullocks may
be grouped together by a rope or a yoke, an alms-bowl
may be held together by a suspender, a dog may be held
in by a leash ?
Th.—[Yes;1 and] hence it is not less right to say that some
things may be grouped together by other things (ideas).
2. Of Mental States as mutually connected.
Controverted Point—That mental states are not con-
nected with other mental states.
From the Commentary.—This again is a view of some, for instance,
the Rajagirikas and Siddhatthikas, namely, that the orthodox phrase
'associated with knowledge
2
is meaningless, because feeling or other
mental states do not pervade each other (anupavittha ) as oil
pervades sesamum-seeds. The argument is to show ' connected' under
another aspect.3
[1] Th.—But you do not also deny that some things are
concomitant, co-existent, compounded with other things,
arise and cease together with them, have the same physical
basis and the same object? Why then except the relation
' connected with'?
[2] One aggregate, for instance/may be co-existent with
another: feeling with perception, mental coefficients, con-
sciousness, and so on. Surely then it may be 'connected
with' that other.
R. S.—Then do,you understand that one such state
accompanies, pervades another state, just as oil pervades
sesamum, or sugar pervades cane?
Th.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .4
1 Br [rightly] omits this. The Theravadin, concludes the Com-
mentator, neither approves nor disapproves of the [material] simile,
but by his rejoinder implies that 'even as you can't deny the physical
grouping, so must you admit the mental grouping by general concepts.
2
E.g., Dhamma-sangani, § 1, etc.
3
Br reads, as in the preceding katha, annen' ev' atthena for
anne va sabb e va (PTS). The latter seems meaningless.
4
'This, namely, is not a proper parallel. "We cannot assign an
3. Of Mental Properties.
Controverted Point.—That they do not exist.
From the Commentary.—Once more, some, like the Rajagirikas and
Siddhatthikas, hold that we can no more get ' mentals' (cetasika )
from mind (citta) , than we can get 'contactals' from contact,
so that there is no such thing as a property, or concomitant, of
mind. The Theravadin contends that there would be nothing wrong
if custom permitted us to say ' contactal' for what depends on contact,
just as it is customary usage to call 'mental' that which depends on
mind (citta-nissitako).
[1] Th.—You surely do not also deny that some mental
phenomena are concomitant, co-existent, conjoined with
consciousness, have their genesis and cessation, physical
basis and object in common with it ? Why then exclude
the 'mental?' [2] Contact, for instance, is co-existent with
consciousness; hence it is a 'mental,' i.e., a property or
concomitant of mind. So are feeling, perception, volition,
faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, understanding,
lust, hate, dulness, . . . indiscretion—all the ' mentals.'
[3] R. S.—You allow then that what is co-existent with
consciousness is a 'mental.' Do you equally admit that
what is co-existent with contact is a 'contactal,' or that
what is co-existent with each of those mental phenomena
is to be analogously regarded ; for instance, that what is
co-existent with indiscretion is an ' indiscretional'?
Th.—Certainly. [4] And if you assert that there are
no mental phenomena corresponding to our term ' mentals/
was it not said by the Exalted One :
' Yea ! verily this mind and mental states
Are void of soul for one loho understands.
Whoso discerns the loiv and high in both,
The seer, he knows that neither can endure' ?1
essential difference between sesamum and its oil as we can between
feeling and perception. " Sesamum" is the customary name for
something that is kernel, husk, and oil. When the former appearance
is changed, we call it oil.'—Comy. The MSS. and Br are discrepant
in detail here, but we believe we have given the intended meaning.
1
We cannot trace these verses.
[5] Or again, was it not said by the Exalted One:
'Suppose in this case, Kevatta,
1
that a bhikkhu can make
manifest the mind, and the mental [property], and the direction
unci application of thought in other beings, other individuals,
saying : Such is your mind. This is your mind. Thus and
thus are you, conscious '?2
Hence there is such a thing as a ' mental' [that is,
a property, or concomitant, of conciousness or mind] .3
1
Or Kevaddha. The KV. MSS. read as above.
2
Digha-Nikaya, i. 213.
3
On cetasika see Compendium, 237 f.; Buddh. Psychology, 175 f.
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
BOOK VII
1. Of the Classification [of things].1
Controverted Point.—That things cannot be grouped
together by means of abstract ideas.
From the Commentary.—-It is a belief held, for instance, by the
Rajagirikas and the Siddhatthikas, that the orthodox classification of
particular, material qualities under one generic concept of 'matter,'
etc., is worthless, for this reason, that you cannot group things together
by means of ideas, as you can rope together bullocks, and so on.
The argument seeks to point out a different meaning in the notion of
grouping.2
[1] Th.—But you do not also deny that any things may
combine or be included with other things under a concept
of totality or universality. Hence, how can you deny that
they may be grouped together ? [2] The organs of sense
[3] and their objects are, you admit, computed under the
material aggregate [of a living individual]. [4] Pleasant,
painful, or neutral feelings are computed under the aggre-
gate of feeling. [5] Percepts on occasion of sense and idea-
tion come under the aggregate of perception. [6] Volitions
on occasion of sense and ideation come under the aggregate
of conscious concomitants. [7] Consciousness on occasion
of sense and ideation comes under the aggregate of con-
sciousness. Hence, by admitting these inclusions, you must
admit that things may be grouped by an idea.
1
The title should, in the Pali, be Sangaha-, not Sangahita-
katha.
2
Physical grouping is, of course, the bringing together a number of
individuals. But things may be grouped mentally, i.e., included under
a concept of totality involved in counting, or a general concept by
generalizing.
[8] R. S.—Then you understand 'things being grouped
, together by ideas' in the same way as two bullocks may
be grouped together by a rope or a yoke, an alms-bowl
may be held together by a suspender, a dog may be held
in by a leash ?
Th.—[Yes;1 and] hence it is not less right to say that some
things may be grouped together by other things (ideas).
2. Of Mental States as mutually connected.
Controverted Point—That mental states are not con-
nected with other mental states.
From the Commentary.—This again is a view of some, for instance,
the Rajagirikas and Siddhatthikas, namely, that the orthodox phrase
'associated with knowledge
2
is meaningless, because feeling or other
mental states do not pervade each other (anupavittha ) as oil
pervades sesamum-seeds. The argument is to show ' connected' under
another aspect.3
[1] Th.—But you do not also deny that some things are
concomitant, co-existent, compounded with other things,
arise and cease together with them, have the same physical
basis and the same object? Why then except the relation
' connected with'?
[2] One aggregate, for instance/may be co-existent with
another: feeling with perception, mental coefficients, con-
sciousness, and so on. Surely then it may be 'connected
with' that other.
R. S.—Then do,you understand that one such state
accompanies, pervades another state, just as oil pervades
sesamum, or sugar pervades cane?
Th.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .4
1 Br [rightly] omits this. The Theravadin, concludes the Com-
mentator, neither approves nor disapproves of the [material] simile,
but by his rejoinder implies that 'even as you can't deny the physical
grouping, so must you admit the mental grouping by general concepts.
2
E.g., Dhamma-sangani, § 1, etc.
3
Br reads, as in the preceding katha, annen' ev' atthena for
anne va sabb e va (PTS). The latter seems meaningless.
4
'This, namely, is not a proper parallel. "We cannot assign an
3. Of Mental Properties.
Controverted Point.—That they do not exist.
From the Commentary.—Once more, some, like the Rajagirikas and
Siddhatthikas, hold that we can no more get ' mentals' (cetasika )
from mind (citta) , than we can get 'contactals' from contact,
so that there is no such thing as a property, or concomitant, of
mind. The Theravadin contends that there would be nothing wrong
if custom permitted us to say ' contactal' for what depends on contact,
just as it is customary usage to call 'mental' that which depends on
mind (citta-nissitako).
[1] Th.—You surely do not also deny that some mental
phenomena are concomitant, co-existent, conjoined with
consciousness, have their genesis and cessation, physical
basis and object in common with it ? Why then exclude
the 'mental?' [2] Contact, for instance, is co-existent with
consciousness; hence it is a 'mental,' i.e., a property or
concomitant of mind. So are feeling, perception, volition,
faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, understanding,
lust, hate, dulness, . . . indiscretion—all the ' mentals.'
[3] R. S.—You allow then that what is co-existent with
consciousness is a 'mental.' Do you equally admit that
what is co-existent with contact is a 'contactal,' or that
what is co-existent with each of those mental phenomena
is to be analogously regarded ; for instance, that what is
co-existent with indiscretion is an ' indiscretional'?
Th.—Certainly. [4] And if you assert that there are
no mental phenomena corresponding to our term ' mentals/
was it not said by the Exalted One :
' Yea ! verily this mind and mental states
Are void of soul for one loho understands.
Whoso discerns the loiv and high in both,
The seer, he knows that neither can endure' ?1
essential difference between sesamum and its oil as we can between
feeling and perception. " Sesamum" is the customary name for
something that is kernel, husk, and oil. When the former appearance
is changed, we call it oil.'—Comy. The MSS. and Br are discrepant
in detail here, but we believe we have given the intended meaning.
1
We cannot trace these verses.
[5] Or again, was it not said by the Exalted One:
'Suppose in this case, Kevatta,
1
that a bhikkhu can make
manifest the mind, and the mental [property], and the direction
unci application of thought in other beings, other individuals,
saying : Such is your mind. This is your mind. Thus and
thus are you, conscious '?2
Hence there is such a thing as a ' mental' [that is,
a property, or concomitant, of conciousness or mind] .3
1
Or Kevaddha. The KV. MSS. read as above.
2
Digha-Nikaya, i. 213.
3
On cetasika see Compendium, 237 f.; Buddh. Psychology, 175 f.
Monday, June 13, 2011
Kathavatthu - Of Space as Visible & Of the Four Elements, Five Senses, Action, as Visibles
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
6. Of Space.
Controverted Point.—That space is unconditioned.
From the Commentary.—Space is of three modes: as confined or
delimited, as abstracted from object, as empty or inane. Of these the
first is conditioned; the other two are mere abstract ideas. But some,
like the Uttarapathakas and Mahingsasakas, hold that the two latter
modes also, inasmuch as [being mental fictions] they are not condi-
tioned, must therefore be unconditioned.
[1] Th.—If space is unconditioned, as you affirm, you
must class it with Nibbana, or you must affirm two [sorts
of ] unconditioned—and so two Nibbanas—all of which you
deny. . . .
[2] Can anyone make space where there has been no
space? Then one can make that which is conditioned
unconditioned—which you deny. . . . So, too, for the
reverse process. .. .
[8] Again, if you admit that birds go through space,
moon, sun, and stars go through space, supernormal move-
ment is worked in space,
1
the arm or hand is waved in
space, clods, clubs, a supernormally moved person, arrows
are projected through space, you must state as much about
movement through or in the unconditioned—which you
cannot. .. .
[4] Again, if people enclose space when they make
houses or -barns, do they enclose the unconditioned ? Or
when a well is dug, does non-space become space ? Yes ?
Then does the unconditioned become conditioned? Or,
when an empty well, or an empty barn, or an empty jar, is
filled, does ' space ' disappear ? If so, does the uncon-
ditioned disappear ?
[5] U. M.—If then it is wrong to say space is un-
conditioned, is it conditioned? You deny. Then it must
be unconditioned.2
1
Akase . . . iddhing vikubbanti.
2 On space see Bud. Psy. Eth., lviii. 194, and cf. Milinda, ii. 103,
and 316 f.
7. Of Space as visible.
Controverted Point.—That space is visible.
From the Commentary,—This is the view, among the Andhakas for
instance, namely, that because we have cognition of enclosed space,
such as keyholes, etc., therefore all void space is visible. They argue
that in that case space is rupa , that is, material visible object. In
ijhe absence of a Sutta authorizing this, the opponent rejects it, yet
insists on the testimony of pillar-interstices, etc., as visible things.
In such cases, however, what is seen are the pillars, trees, and so forth.
That what lies between is space, there being no visible objects, is an
act of ideation, not of sense-cognition.
1
This applies throughout.
Hence the opponent's argument is not conclusive.
[1] Th.—If this is so, you commit yourself to saying
that space is visible material, visible object and element,
and therefore, as such, is either blue-green, yellow, red, or
white, is cognizable by the eye, impinges on the eye or
organ of vision, enters into the avenue of sight—which you
deny. . . .
[2] Substituting 'space' for 'visible object,' you must
affirm or deny that 'because of eye and space visual con-
sciousness arises.' If not, your proposition falls through.
If you agree, you cannot quote any Suttanta to establish
this. All that the Suttanta says is: ' Because of eye and
visible object visual consciousness arises,'2 as you agree.
Hence you must either call space visible object (with its
properties), or fail to maintain your position.
[3] A.—If I am wrong, you must nevertheless admit that
you ' see' the interval between two trees or two posts, the
space in a keyhole or in a window. Surely then space is
visible.
1
Manodvaravinnanang uppajjati, na cakkhuvin-
nanang. This advance in psychological explanation is a notable trait
in Buddhaghosa's age.
2
Samyutta-Nik., ii. 72; iv. 33; Majjhima-Nik., i. 259.
8. Of the Four Elements, the Five Senses, and of Action
as Visibles.
Controverted Point.—That each of these is visible.
From the Commentary.—This opinion is also maintained by such as
the Andhakas, from the fact that we 'see ' oscillations in stones, water,,
flames, trees, as well as colours of sentient surfaces and the shapes of
hands, feet, etc., on occasion of bodily intimations. The rest may be
understood by the text.
1
[1-9] The discourse is verbatim identical with VI. 7, each
of the 'four elements/ 'the organ of sight' alone, and 'bodily
action' being substituted for' space.' The opponent's rejoinders
are severally as folloivs :
A.—But do we not see earth, a stone, a mountain ?
water? fire blazing? trees waving in the wind? The eye,
the ear, the nose, the tongue, the body? anyone advancing,
retreating, looking forward, looking backward, stretching
forth, retracting?
1
Pali-anusarena. The psychology is similar. The four 'ele-
ments ' were not the material compounds, earthy, etc., but the abstract
common qualities distinguishing the four groups so-called. Indriya
is the controlling power or faculty exercised in sense. Kamma is
the notion of ' action' in overt physical movements. All that we
actually see are changing coloured surfaces. On Dhatu, Indriya,
see Compendium: Notes s.vv.
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
6. Of Space.
Controverted Point.—That space is unconditioned.
From the Commentary.—Space is of three modes: as confined or
delimited, as abstracted from object, as empty or inane. Of these the
first is conditioned; the other two are mere abstract ideas. But some,
like the Uttarapathakas and Mahingsasakas, hold that the two latter
modes also, inasmuch as [being mental fictions] they are not condi-
tioned, must therefore be unconditioned.
[1] Th.—If space is unconditioned, as you affirm, you
must class it with Nibbana, or you must affirm two [sorts
of ] unconditioned—and so two Nibbanas—all of which you
deny. . . .
[2] Can anyone make space where there has been no
space? Then one can make that which is conditioned
unconditioned—which you deny. . . . So, too, for the
reverse process. .. .
[8] Again, if you admit that birds go through space,
moon, sun, and stars go through space, supernormal move-
ment is worked in space,
1
the arm or hand is waved in
space, clods, clubs, a supernormally moved person, arrows
are projected through space, you must state as much about
movement through or in the unconditioned—which you
cannot. .. .
[4] Again, if people enclose space when they make
houses or -barns, do they enclose the unconditioned ? Or
when a well is dug, does non-space become space ? Yes ?
Then does the unconditioned become conditioned? Or,
when an empty well, or an empty barn, or an empty jar, is
filled, does ' space ' disappear ? If so, does the uncon-
ditioned disappear ?
[5] U. M.—If then it is wrong to say space is un-
conditioned, is it conditioned? You deny. Then it must
be unconditioned.2
1
Akase . . . iddhing vikubbanti.
2 On space see Bud. Psy. Eth., lviii. 194, and cf. Milinda, ii. 103,
and 316 f.
7. Of Space as visible.
Controverted Point.—That space is visible.
From the Commentary,—This is the view, among the Andhakas for
instance, namely, that because we have cognition of enclosed space,
such as keyholes, etc., therefore all void space is visible. They argue
that in that case space is rupa , that is, material visible object. In
ijhe absence of a Sutta authorizing this, the opponent rejects it, yet
insists on the testimony of pillar-interstices, etc., as visible things.
In such cases, however, what is seen are the pillars, trees, and so forth.
That what lies between is space, there being no visible objects, is an
act of ideation, not of sense-cognition.
1
This applies throughout.
Hence the opponent's argument is not conclusive.
[1] Th.—If this is so, you commit yourself to saying
that space is visible material, visible object and element,
and therefore, as such, is either blue-green, yellow, red, or
white, is cognizable by the eye, impinges on the eye or
organ of vision, enters into the avenue of sight—which you
deny. . . .
[2] Substituting 'space' for 'visible object,' you must
affirm or deny that 'because of eye and space visual con-
sciousness arises.' If not, your proposition falls through.
If you agree, you cannot quote any Suttanta to establish
this. All that the Suttanta says is: ' Because of eye and
visible object visual consciousness arises,'2 as you agree.
Hence you must either call space visible object (with its
properties), or fail to maintain your position.
[3] A.—If I am wrong, you must nevertheless admit that
you ' see' the interval between two trees or two posts, the
space in a keyhole or in a window. Surely then space is
visible.
1
Manodvaravinnanang uppajjati, na cakkhuvin-
nanang. This advance in psychological explanation is a notable trait
in Buddhaghosa's age.
2
Samyutta-Nik., ii. 72; iv. 33; Majjhima-Nik., i. 259.
8. Of the Four Elements, the Five Senses, and of Action
as Visibles.
Controverted Point.—That each of these is visible.
From the Commentary.—This opinion is also maintained by such as
the Andhakas, from the fact that we 'see ' oscillations in stones, water,,
flames, trees, as well as colours of sentient surfaces and the shapes of
hands, feet, etc., on occasion of bodily intimations. The rest may be
understood by the text.
1
[1-9] The discourse is verbatim identical with VI. 7, each
of the 'four elements/ 'the organ of sight' alone, and 'bodily
action' being substituted for' space.' The opponent's rejoinders
are severally as folloivs :
A.—But do we not see earth, a stone, a mountain ?
water? fire blazing? trees waving in the wind? The eye,
the ear, the nose, the tongue, the body? anyone advancing,
retreating, looking forward, looking backward, stretching
forth, retracting?
1
Pali-anusarena. The psychology is similar. The four 'ele-
ments ' were not the material compounds, earthy, etc., but the abstract
common qualities distinguishing the four groups so-called. Indriya
is the controlling power or faculty exercised in sense. Kamma is
the notion of ' action' in overt physical movements. All that we
actually see are changing coloured surfaces. On Dhatu, Indriya,
see Compendium: Notes s.vv.
Kathavatthu - Of the Four Truths, Four Immaterial Spheres of Life and Thought, Attaining to Cessation (Jhana)
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
3. Of the Four Truths.
Controverted Point.—That the Four Truths are uncon-
ditioned.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Pubbaseliyas, hold this
belief, deriving it from the Sutta : ' These four, bhikkhus, are stable,
constant,' etc.
3
They draw a distinction between a 'fact' and a
'truth,' considering that the former is conditioned, the latter uncondi-
tioned. In the Third Truth they disallow the existence of any corre-
sponding fact.
4
[1] Th.—Do you then also admit [not one, but] four
Nibbanas? For i f you do, is there among these four a
boundary, division, line or interstice, different degrees as
to loftiness, excellence or sublimity ?
5
. . .
[2] You affirm, do you not, that each Truth is uncon-
ditioned. Take the first Truth on [the fact and nature of]
Ill: is Ill itself unconditioned ? You deny—that is, you
mean that bodily ill, mental ill, grief, lamentation, melan-
choly or despair is conditioned ? Or the second Truth
on the cause of Ill—is that cause unconditioned? You
deny. . . . Then you must equally deny that desires of
sense, desire for [after-] life, or desire to end life, is uncon-
ditioned? Or the fourth Truth of the Path to Cessation of
3
See below.
4
Lakkhana-saccang (Truth) is the statement of the charac-
teristics of a vatthu-saccang (fact).
5
See VI. 1, § 1; II. 11.
Ill—is the Path1
itself unconditioned? You deny. . . .
Then you do not mean that right views, right inten-
tions . . . right concentration are unconditioned ?
[3] You admit then that Ill , its Cause, the Path are con-
ditioned, and all the factors of those facts are conditioned,
but deny that the [abstract] statement of each fact as a
'Truth' is conditioned2
—which cannot be. . . .
[4] Take now the Third Truth on the Cessation of Ill—
is Cessation unconditioned? 'Yes,' you say?3 Why then,
if the First Truth is unconditioned, is not Ill uncon-
ditioned ? Or the Cause ? Or the Path ? [5] In all but
the Third Truth, you maintain that the true thing is
conditioned—why not in the Third ?
[6] P.—But if I am wrong, why was it said by the
Exalted One: 'These four things, bhikkhus, are stable, con-
stant, immutable. Which are the four I " This is Ill!"—
this, bhikkhus, is stable, constant, immutable. " This is the
cause of Ill . . . the Cessation of Ill . . . the course leading
to the Cessation of Ill!"—this, bhikkhus, is stable, constant,
immutable. These are the four ' ? 4
Surely then the Four Truths are unconditioned.5
4. Of the Four Immaterial Spheres [of Life and Thought].
Controverted Point.—That the sphere of infinite space is
unconditioned.
From the Commentary.—Because of the Word, 'the four Imma-
terial are imperturbable,' some hold they are all unconditioned.
[1] Th.—Are you implying that it is in this respect
identical with Nibbana, the Shelter, the Cave, the Refuge,
1
The Ariyan or Noble Eightfold Path, not the Four Paths. The
latter are really one, divided into four stages, each of which has eight
factors (p. 188, n. 5).
2
In the PTS edition (p. 323) the line Dukkhasaccang asan-
khatam should read . . . sankhatam.
3
'Cessation' (nirodha ) is a, synonym for Nibbana—the extinc-
tion of Ill and its Causes. Hence the opponent's view.
4
Samyutta-Nik., v. 430.
5
In the sense of being eternally, constantly, not occasionally, true.
the Goal, the Past-Decease, the Ambrosial? You deny.
. . . Then you cannot so class it. If you affirm, we may
then have two Unconditioneds, two Nibbanas. .. .
[2] You admit, do you not, that the sphere of infinite
space is a form of rebirth, a destination, an abode of
beings, a sequel in living, a matrix of birth, a station for
reborn consciousness, an acquiring o f individuality ? Then
is the unconditioned to be so described ? Of course not. . . .
Is there karma which brings us to rebirth in that
sphere ? 'Yes,' you say. Then is there karma which
brings about rebirth in the unconditioned ? Of course you
deny. . . . There are beings who for their deserts are
reborn in that sphere of infinite space, but are there any
who for their deserts are reborn in the unconditioned ? Of
course you deny. .. .
[S] Do any beings become born, decay, die, decease, and
spring up again in that sphere ? Yes ? But surely not in
the unconditioned. . . .
Does mind in its four constituents
1
exist in that sphere ?
Yes ? But hardly in the unconditioned. . . . You cannot
call the latter a plane of life with four constituents, as is
the former.
[4] Opponent— But did not the Exalted One say that
the four Immaterial spheres are imperturbable?2 Surely
then we may call them unconditioned.
5. Of the attaining to Cessation.
Controverted Point—That the attainment of Cessation is
unconditioned.
From the Commentary.—By the attainment of Cessation is here
meant the suspension of conscious procedure in Jhana. As something
1
Of the five 'aggregates' of being, only 'body' is absent.
2
Aneja , ananja ; Anguttara-Nik., ii, 184: he who has
entered into the Jhanas so called is said to have won the Imper-
turbable.
done., attained, it is called ' completed,' but it cannot be spoken of as
conditioned or unconditioned, since the features of one state or the
other are absent. But some, as the Andhakas and Uttarapathakas,
hold that, because it is not conditioned, it is therefore unconditioned.
[1] Th.—Does this mean that this state is Nibbana,
the Shelter, etc. ? You deny. Then are both similarly
described as unconditioned ? You affirm ? Then are there
two unconditioneds . . . two Nibbanas ? . . .
[2] Are there any who attain to Cessation, acquire it,
cause it to rise, to keep rising, set up, induce, produce,
bring to pass, make to be born, to happen ? If so, can you
so speak of the unconditioned ? Of course not. . . .
[8] Is there apparent such a thing as a purging through,
emerging from,
1
Cessation ? If so, is there the same from
the unconditioned ? Of course not. .. .
In attaining Cessation, first speech, then action, then
consciousness ceases. Can you so speak of attaining the
unconditioned ?
In emerging from Cessation, first consciousness, then
action, then speech occurs. Can you so speak of emerging
from the unconditioned ?
[4] After emerging from Cessation, one is in touch with
three contacts : that of the void, of the signless, of the
unhankered-after.
2
Can you so speak of emerging from
the unconditioned ? Or that, when one emerges from
Cessation, consciousness is inclined for, tends to, takes
shelter in solitude?
[5] A. U.—If we are wrong, we would just ask you, Is
Cessation conditioned? No, you say; then it must be
unconditioned.3
1
These two terms refer to the attainment of Fruition after
emergence.—Comy.
2
See above, pp. 142, n. 4, 143, n. 1.
3
Indian logic recognizes four alternatives to our two: is, is not,
is and is not, neither is nor is not. The reply here would be in terms
of the last. The state is outside that 'universe of thought' which com-
prises conditioned and its opposite, as much, as green is outside music.
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
3. Of the Four Truths.
Controverted Point.—That the Four Truths are uncon-
ditioned.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Pubbaseliyas, hold this
belief, deriving it from the Sutta : ' These four, bhikkhus, are stable,
constant,' etc.
3
They draw a distinction between a 'fact' and a
'truth,' considering that the former is conditioned, the latter uncondi-
tioned. In the Third Truth they disallow the existence of any corre-
sponding fact.
4
[1] Th.—Do you then also admit [not one, but] four
Nibbanas? For i f you do, is there among these four a
boundary, division, line or interstice, different degrees as
to loftiness, excellence or sublimity ?
5
. . .
[2] You affirm, do you not, that each Truth is uncon-
ditioned. Take the first Truth on [the fact and nature of]
Ill: is Ill itself unconditioned ? You deny—that is, you
mean that bodily ill, mental ill, grief, lamentation, melan-
choly or despair is conditioned ? Or the second Truth
on the cause of Ill—is that cause unconditioned? You
deny. . . . Then you must equally deny that desires of
sense, desire for [after-] life, or desire to end life, is uncon-
ditioned? Or the fourth Truth of the Path to Cessation of
3
See below.
4
Lakkhana-saccang (Truth) is the statement of the charac-
teristics of a vatthu-saccang (fact).
5
See VI. 1, § 1; II. 11.
Ill—is the Path1
itself unconditioned? You deny. . . .
Then you do not mean that right views, right inten-
tions . . . right concentration are unconditioned ?
[3] You admit then that Ill , its Cause, the Path are con-
ditioned, and all the factors of those facts are conditioned,
but deny that the [abstract] statement of each fact as a
'Truth' is conditioned2
—which cannot be. . . .
[4] Take now the Third Truth on the Cessation of Ill—
is Cessation unconditioned? 'Yes,' you say?3 Why then,
if the First Truth is unconditioned, is not Ill uncon-
ditioned ? Or the Cause ? Or the Path ? [5] In all but
the Third Truth, you maintain that the true thing is
conditioned—why not in the Third ?
[6] P.—But if I am wrong, why was it said by the
Exalted One: 'These four things, bhikkhus, are stable, con-
stant, immutable. Which are the four I " This is Ill!"—
this, bhikkhus, is stable, constant, immutable. " This is the
cause of Ill . . . the Cessation of Ill . . . the course leading
to the Cessation of Ill!"—this, bhikkhus, is stable, constant,
immutable. These are the four ' ? 4
Surely then the Four Truths are unconditioned.5
4. Of the Four Immaterial Spheres [of Life and Thought].
Controverted Point.—That the sphere of infinite space is
unconditioned.
From the Commentary.—Because of the Word, 'the four Imma-
terial are imperturbable,' some hold they are all unconditioned.
[1] Th.—Are you implying that it is in this respect
identical with Nibbana, the Shelter, the Cave, the Refuge,
1
The Ariyan or Noble Eightfold Path, not the Four Paths. The
latter are really one, divided into four stages, each of which has eight
factors (p. 188, n. 5).
2
In the PTS edition (p. 323) the line Dukkhasaccang asan-
khatam should read . . . sankhatam.
3
'Cessation' (nirodha ) is a, synonym for Nibbana—the extinc-
tion of Ill and its Causes. Hence the opponent's view.
4
Samyutta-Nik., v. 430.
5
In the sense of being eternally, constantly, not occasionally, true.
the Goal, the Past-Decease, the Ambrosial? You deny.
. . . Then you cannot so class it. If you affirm, we may
then have two Unconditioneds, two Nibbanas. .. .
[2] You admit, do you not, that the sphere of infinite
space is a form of rebirth, a destination, an abode of
beings, a sequel in living, a matrix of birth, a station for
reborn consciousness, an acquiring o f individuality ? Then
is the unconditioned to be so described ? Of course not. . . .
Is there karma which brings us to rebirth in that
sphere ? 'Yes,' you say. Then is there karma which
brings about rebirth in the unconditioned ? Of course you
deny. . . . There are beings who for their deserts are
reborn in that sphere of infinite space, but are there any
who for their deserts are reborn in the unconditioned ? Of
course you deny. .. .
[S] Do any beings become born, decay, die, decease, and
spring up again in that sphere ? Yes ? But surely not in
the unconditioned. . . .
Does mind in its four constituents
1
exist in that sphere ?
Yes ? But hardly in the unconditioned. . . . You cannot
call the latter a plane of life with four constituents, as is
the former.
[4] Opponent— But did not the Exalted One say that
the four Immaterial spheres are imperturbable?2 Surely
then we may call them unconditioned.
5. Of the attaining to Cessation.
Controverted Point—That the attainment of Cessation is
unconditioned.
From the Commentary.—By the attainment of Cessation is here
meant the suspension of conscious procedure in Jhana. As something
1
Of the five 'aggregates' of being, only 'body' is absent.
2
Aneja , ananja ; Anguttara-Nik., ii, 184: he who has
entered into the Jhanas so called is said to have won the Imper-
turbable.
done., attained, it is called ' completed,' but it cannot be spoken of as
conditioned or unconditioned, since the features of one state or the
other are absent. But some, as the Andhakas and Uttarapathakas,
hold that, because it is not conditioned, it is therefore unconditioned.
[1] Th.—Does this mean that this state is Nibbana,
the Shelter, etc. ? You deny. Then are both similarly
described as unconditioned ? You affirm ? Then are there
two unconditioneds . . . two Nibbanas ? . . .
[2] Are there any who attain to Cessation, acquire it,
cause it to rise, to keep rising, set up, induce, produce,
bring to pass, make to be born, to happen ? If so, can you
so speak of the unconditioned ? Of course not. . . .
[8] Is there apparent such a thing as a purging through,
emerging from,
1
Cessation ? If so, is there the same from
the unconditioned ? Of course not. .. .
In attaining Cessation, first speech, then action, then
consciousness ceases. Can you so speak of attaining the
unconditioned ?
In emerging from Cessation, first consciousness, then
action, then speech occurs. Can you so speak of emerging
from the unconditioned ?
[4] After emerging from Cessation, one is in touch with
three contacts : that of the void, of the signless, of the
unhankered-after.
2
Can you so speak of emerging from
the unconditioned ? Or that, when one emerges from
Cessation, consciousness is inclined for, tends to, takes
shelter in solitude?
[5] A. U.—If we are wrong, we would just ask you, Is
Cessation conditioned? No, you say; then it must be
unconditioned.3
1
These two terms refer to the attainment of Fruition after
emergence.—Comy.
2
See above, pp. 142, n. 4, 143, n. 1.
3
Indian logic recognizes four alternatives to our two: is, is not,
is and is not, neither is nor is not. The reply here would be in terms
of the last. The state is outside that 'universe of thought' which com-
prises conditioned and its opposite, as much, as green is outside music.
Kathavatthu - Of Assurance of Salvation & Of Causal Genesis
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
BOOK VI
1. Of Assurance [of salvation].1
Controverted Point.—That 'Assurance' is unconditioned.
From the Commentary.—In the Word: ' Capable of entering into
Assurance, the culmination in things that are good,'
2
the Ariyan Path
is meant. But inasmuch as a person therein would not forfeit salvation
even if that Path which [for him] had arisen were to pass away,
therefore there is an opinion, among Andhakas for instance, that this
Assurance is unconditioned in the sense of being eternal.
3
[1] Th.—Then is Assurance [that other unconditioned
called] Nibbana, or the Shelter, the Cave, the Befuge, the
Goal, the Past-Decease, the Ambrosial ? You deny. Yet
you would call both alike unconditioned. Are there then
two kinds of unconditioned? If you deny, you cannot
affirm; if you assent, then [for all we know] there are two
Shelters . . . two Goals . . . two Nibbanas. If you deny,
you cannot affirm your proposition; if you assent, then do #
you allow that of the two Nibbanas one is higher than the
other, sublimer than the. other, exalted more than the
other ? Is there a boundary, or a division, or a line, or an
interstice
4
between them? Of course you deny. . . .
[2] Again, are there any who enter into and attain
Assurance, cause it to arise, to keep arising, set it up,
continue to set it up, bring it to pass, to come into being,
produce it, continue to produce it? 'Of course,' you say.
1
Niyamo , as before (V. 4).
2
Anguttara-Nik., i. 122. Cf. Samyutta-Nik, iii. 225.
3
Or permanent, nicca.
4
See above, II, 11
But are these terms that you can apply to what is uncon-
ditioned ? Of course not. . . .
[8] Again, is the Path (the Fourfold) 'unconditioned ?
' Nay,' you say, ' conditioned.'
1
Yet you would make Assur-
ance unconditioned; the Path of Stream-Winning, Once-
Returning, Never-Returning, Arahantship, conditioned; but
Assurance of Stream-Winning, etc., unconditioned! . . .
[4] If then these four stages of Assurance be uncon-
ditioned, and Nibbana be unconditioned, are there five kinds
of the unconditioned ? If you assent, you are in the same
difficulty as before (§1).
[5] Finally, is false Assurance
2
unconditioned ? ' No,
conditioned,' you say. But has true Assurance the same
quality ? Here you must deny. .. .
[6] A.—If I am wrong, would you say that, if Assurance
having arisen for anyone and ceased, his work of making
sure [his salvation] would be cancelled ?
Th.—No.
A.—Then Assurance must be unconditioned [that is, it
cannot begin and cease].
Th. — But your argument can be applied to false
Assurance. You would not therefore call that uncon-
ditioned !
2. Of Causal Genesis.
Controverted Point.—That the causal elements in the
law of causal genesis are unconditioned.
From the Commentary.—Because of the Word in the chapter on
causation—' whether Tathagatas arise or do not arise, this elemental
datum which remains fixed,' etc., some, as the Pubbaseliyas and the
Mahiijsasakas, have arrived at the view here affirmed.
[1] This is exactly similar to the opening argument in
VI. 1, § 1;
1 'Since it is something that has a genesis and a cessation.'—Comy.
2
Micchatta-niyama, assurance • in the wrong direction,
applied to the five heinous crimes (p. 71, n. 4) which entail retribution
in the next existence.
[2, 3] Th.—Would you say that any single term in
each clause of the formula of causal genesis refers to some-
thing unconditioned, for instance, 'ignorance,' or 'karma,'
in the clause 'because of ignorance, karma,' etc.? No?
Then how can you maintain your thesis ?
[4] P. M.—If we are wrong, why did the Exalted One
say as follows: '"Because of birth, bhikkhus, comes decay
and death":—whether Tathagatas arise or not, this element
stands as the establishing of things as effects, as the marking
out of things as effects, as the cause of this or that. Con-
cerning this element a Tathagata becomes enlightened, and
penetrates it. Thus enlightened and penetrating, he declares,
teaches, makes known, lays it down, reveals, dispenses, makes
manifest, and behold! he saith: " Because of birth, bhikkhus,
comes decay and death." " Because of the tendency to
become1 comes birth. Because of . . . and so on, back to."
" Because of ignorance comes karma." Thus, bhikkhus, this
element, stable, constant, immutable, is called a causal term
[in the law of causal genesis]' ?2
Surely then the causal element in that law is uncondi-
tioned.
[5] Th.—In the clause 'Because of ignorance karma,'
the former is that which establishes, which marks out the
latter as its effect . And Nibbana is unconditioned-—you
affirm both of these ? Yes ? Then are there two uncondi-
tioneds ? . . . two shelters .. . (as in § 1) ?
[6] And if in the next clause: ' Because of karma, con-
1
Or ' be reborn.'
2
Samyutta-Nik., II. 25. 'The sense in which each term (anga)
of the law of causal genesis is termed Paticca-samuppada is stated
in the Vibhanga on the Paticca-samuppada/—Corny . See
Vibhangcbi ' Paccayakara-vibhanga,' pp. 135-192. It is interesting
that this term for the Paticca-samuppada , peculiar, it may
be, to the Vibhanga, is not used by our Commentary. Causes by
which dhamma's (things as effects) are established, are marked
out, are called the thitata, the niyamata , of dhamma's .
These terms, with idappaccayata , are synonymous with
paticca-samuppada , and signify, not the abstract statement
of the law, but the concrete causal element.
sciousness,' you affirm that karma is unconditioned,1 are
there then three unconditioneds ? . . .
[7] And so on, affirming that each of the remaining
nine terms and Nibbana are unconditioned:—are there
then twelve unconditioneds? . . . twelve shelters, twelve
refuges, etc. ?
Of course ypu deny, hence you cannot affirm that the
causal term in the law of causal genesis is unconditioned.2
1
The PTS edition gives erroneously a negative reply. Cf. Br.
edition, and §§ 5, 7.
2
The point is that only Nibbana is unconditioned.
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
BOOK VI
1. Of Assurance [of salvation].1
Controverted Point.—That 'Assurance' is unconditioned.
From the Commentary.—In the Word: ' Capable of entering into
Assurance, the culmination in things that are good,'
2
the Ariyan Path
is meant. But inasmuch as a person therein would not forfeit salvation
even if that Path which [for him] had arisen were to pass away,
therefore there is an opinion, among Andhakas for instance, that this
Assurance is unconditioned in the sense of being eternal.
3
[1] Th.—Then is Assurance [that other unconditioned
called] Nibbana, or the Shelter, the Cave, the Befuge, the
Goal, the Past-Decease, the Ambrosial ? You deny. Yet
you would call both alike unconditioned. Are there then
two kinds of unconditioned? If you deny, you cannot
affirm; if you assent, then [for all we know] there are two
Shelters . . . two Goals . . . two Nibbanas. If you deny,
you cannot affirm your proposition; if you assent, then do #
you allow that of the two Nibbanas one is higher than the
other, sublimer than the. other, exalted more than the
other ? Is there a boundary, or a division, or a line, or an
interstice
4
between them? Of course you deny. . . .
[2] Again, are there any who enter into and attain
Assurance, cause it to arise, to keep arising, set it up,
continue to set it up, bring it to pass, to come into being,
produce it, continue to produce it? 'Of course,' you say.
1
Niyamo , as before (V. 4).
2
Anguttara-Nik., i. 122. Cf. Samyutta-Nik, iii. 225.
3
Or permanent, nicca.
4
See above, II, 11
But are these terms that you can apply to what is uncon-
ditioned ? Of course not. . . .
[8] Again, is the Path (the Fourfold) 'unconditioned ?
' Nay,' you say, ' conditioned.'
1
Yet you would make Assur-
ance unconditioned; the Path of Stream-Winning, Once-
Returning, Never-Returning, Arahantship, conditioned; but
Assurance of Stream-Winning, etc., unconditioned! . . .
[4] If then these four stages of Assurance be uncon-
ditioned, and Nibbana be unconditioned, are there five kinds
of the unconditioned ? If you assent, you are in the same
difficulty as before (§1).
[5] Finally, is false Assurance
2
unconditioned ? ' No,
conditioned,' you say. But has true Assurance the same
quality ? Here you must deny. .. .
[6] A.—If I am wrong, would you say that, if Assurance
having arisen for anyone and ceased, his work of making
sure [his salvation] would be cancelled ?
Th.—No.
A.—Then Assurance must be unconditioned [that is, it
cannot begin and cease].
Th. — But your argument can be applied to false
Assurance. You would not therefore call that uncon-
ditioned !
2. Of Causal Genesis.
Controverted Point.—That the causal elements in the
law of causal genesis are unconditioned.
From the Commentary.—Because of the Word in the chapter on
causation—' whether Tathagatas arise or do not arise, this elemental
datum which remains fixed,' etc., some, as the Pubbaseliyas and the
Mahiijsasakas, have arrived at the view here affirmed.
[1] This is exactly similar to the opening argument in
VI. 1, § 1;
1 'Since it is something that has a genesis and a cessation.'—Comy.
2
Micchatta-niyama, assurance • in the wrong direction,
applied to the five heinous crimes (p. 71, n. 4) which entail retribution
in the next existence.
[2, 3] Th.—Would you say that any single term in
each clause of the formula of causal genesis refers to some-
thing unconditioned, for instance, 'ignorance,' or 'karma,'
in the clause 'because of ignorance, karma,' etc.? No?
Then how can you maintain your thesis ?
[4] P. M.—If we are wrong, why did the Exalted One
say as follows: '"Because of birth, bhikkhus, comes decay
and death":—whether Tathagatas arise or not, this element
stands as the establishing of things as effects, as the marking
out of things as effects, as the cause of this or that. Con-
cerning this element a Tathagata becomes enlightened, and
penetrates it. Thus enlightened and penetrating, he declares,
teaches, makes known, lays it down, reveals, dispenses, makes
manifest, and behold! he saith: " Because of birth, bhikkhus,
comes decay and death." " Because of the tendency to
become1 comes birth. Because of . . . and so on, back to."
" Because of ignorance comes karma." Thus, bhikkhus, this
element, stable, constant, immutable, is called a causal term
[in the law of causal genesis]' ?2
Surely then the causal element in that law is uncondi-
tioned.
[5] Th.—In the clause 'Because of ignorance karma,'
the former is that which establishes, which marks out the
latter as its effect . And Nibbana is unconditioned-—you
affirm both of these ? Yes ? Then are there two uncondi-
tioneds ? . . . two shelters .. . (as in § 1) ?
[6] And if in the next clause: ' Because of karma, con-
1
Or ' be reborn.'
2
Samyutta-Nik., II. 25. 'The sense in which each term (anga)
of the law of causal genesis is termed Paticca-samuppada is stated
in the Vibhanga on the Paticca-samuppada/—Corny . See
Vibhangcbi ' Paccayakara-vibhanga,' pp. 135-192. It is interesting
that this term for the Paticca-samuppada , peculiar, it may
be, to the Vibhanga, is not used by our Commentary. Causes by
which dhamma's (things as effects) are established, are marked
out, are called the thitata, the niyamata , of dhamma's .
These terms, with idappaccayata , are synonymous with
paticca-samuppada , and signify, not the abstract statement
of the law, but the concrete causal element.
sciousness,' you affirm that karma is unconditioned,1 are
there then three unconditioneds ? . . .
[7] And so on, affirming that each of the remaining
nine terms and Nibbana are unconditioned:—are there
then twelve unconditioneds? . . . twelve shelters, twelve
refuges, etc. ?
Of course ypu deny, hence you cannot affirm that the
causal term in the law of causal genesis is unconditioned.2
1
The PTS edition gives erroneously a negative reply. Cf. Br.
edition, and §§ 5, 7.
2
The point is that only Nibbana is unconditioned.
Kathavatthu - Of Insight into the Future, Of Knowledge of the Present, Of Knowing Others' Fruition
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
8. Of Insight into the Future.
Controverted Point.—That there is knowledge of the
future.
From the Commentary.—The future includes both what will happen
proximately and what is not just proximate. Concerning the former
there is absolutely no knowledge, any more than there is of what is in-
cluded in a single track or moment of cognition. But some, like the
Andhakas, incline to a belief that knowledge concerning any part of
the future is possible.
[1] Th.—If we can know about the future [in general],
it must be [as in other knowledge] through knowing its
root, condition, cause, source, origin, upspringing, support,
1
basis, correlation, genesis. But you deny that we know
the future thus. . . .
2
[2] And it must be [as in other knowledge] through
knowing how it will be correlated by condition, base, pre-
dominance, contiguity, and immediate contiguity.3 But
you deny here again. .. .
[8] Again, i f you are right, one in the stage o f adoption
has insight into the First Path, one in the First Path has
insight into the First Fruition, and so on. But you deny
here again. . . .
[4] A.—If I am wrong, is there not a Suttanta in which
the Exalted One said : ' To Patna, Ananda, three disasters
will happen: by fire or by water or by rupture of friend-
ship ' ?4 Surely then the future may be known.
1
Literally, 'food.'
2
Presumably, the belief was in an intuitive vision, and not in a
process of inference. The ten terms are the 'root ' and its nine
synonyms of the First Book in the Yamaka, I, p. 13.
3
These are the time-relations assigned in the doctrine of Relations
detailed in the Patthana, or last book of the Abhidhamma-Pitaha.
4
Dialogues, ii. 92. The orthodox position seems to have been, that
whereas events indefinitely future may be foretold through a super-
man's intuition, the exact nature of molecular, or psychical, vital
change at any given moment is unpredictable. Cf. M. Bergson on this
point; Creative Evolution, ch. i., p. 6 passim.
9. Of Knowledge of the Present
Controverted Point— That the present may be known.
From the Commentary.—Because of the Word: When all pheno-
mena are seen to be impermanent, the insight itself, as a phenomenon,
is also seen to be impermanent, some, as the Andhakas, have the
opinion that there is knowledge of the entire present, without distinc-
tion. Now if there be such knowledge, it [as present] must take place
at the present instant through itself. But because two knowledges
cannot be simultaneous in the one self-conscious subject, knowledge
of the present cannot be known by the same act of knowledge.
1
[1] Th.—If there be a knowledge of the present, does
one know that knowledge by the same act o f knowledge ?
If you deny, your proposition must fall. If you assent, I
ask: Does one know that he knows the present by that
same act of knowledge ? You deny, and your previous
assertion falls. If you assent, I ask : Is the conscious act
of knowing the object of the knowledge? You deny, and
your previous assertion falls. If you assent, then you
imply that one touches contact by the contact, feels feeling
by that feeling, wills volition by that volition. So for the
initial and the sustained application of thought. So for
zest, for mindfulness, for understanding. You imply that
one cuts a sword with that sword; an axe with that axe;
a knife with that knife; an adze with that adze; that one
sews a needle with that needle; handles the tip of a finger
with that finger; kisses the tip of the nose with that nose;
handles the head with that head; washes of f impurity with
that impurity.
[2] A.—I am wrong then? But when all things are
seen as impermanent, is not that knowledge also seen as
impermanent ? Surely then I am right.
1
In other words, self-consciousness is really an act of retrospection,
and its object is not present, but past.
10. Of Knowing Others' Fruition.
Controverted Point.—That a disciple can have knowledge
concerning fruition.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Andhakas, have held that,
since it was said that both the Bnddhas and their disciples teach beings
the doctrine of the attainment of Ariyan fruition, disciples can, like
the Buddhas, state that this or that being has won some Fruit. Now
if that were so, they could also, by their insight, give details concerning
that attainment. But they cannot.
[1] Th.—This implies that a disciple can make known
the property of each fruit;
1
that he possesses a knowledge
of the different degrees of development in fruitions, control-
ling powers, personalities; [2] that he possesses a concep-
tion of aggregates, sense-fields, elements, truths, controlling
powers, personality ; [8] that he is a Conqueror, a Teacher,
a Buddha Supreme, omniscient, all-seeing, Master of the
Norm, the Norm-Judge of appeal; [4] that he is one who
causes a "Way to spring up where no Way was, one who
engenders a Way not engendered; proclaims a Path not
proclaimed, knows the Path, is conversant with the Path, is
expert in the Path. All of which of course you deny. . . .
[5] A.—Yet you deny that the disciple lacks insight.
Surely then he may have insight into others' fruition.
1
Read phala-ssakatang . In line 5, for pannapetiti read
the atthiti of the controverted proposition.
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
8. Of Insight into the Future.
Controverted Point.—That there is knowledge of the
future.
From the Commentary.—The future includes both what will happen
proximately and what is not just proximate. Concerning the former
there is absolutely no knowledge, any more than there is of what is in-
cluded in a single track or moment of cognition. But some, like the
Andhakas, incline to a belief that knowledge concerning any part of
the future is possible.
[1] Th.—If we can know about the future [in general],
it must be [as in other knowledge] through knowing its
root, condition, cause, source, origin, upspringing, support,
1
basis, correlation, genesis. But you deny that we know
the future thus. . . .
2
[2] And it must be [as in other knowledge] through
knowing how it will be correlated by condition, base, pre-
dominance, contiguity, and immediate contiguity.3 But
you deny here again. .. .
[8] Again, i f you are right, one in the stage o f adoption
has insight into the First Path, one in the First Path has
insight into the First Fruition, and so on. But you deny
here again. . . .
[4] A.—If I am wrong, is there not a Suttanta in which
the Exalted One said : ' To Patna, Ananda, three disasters
will happen: by fire or by water or by rupture of friend-
ship ' ?4 Surely then the future may be known.
1
Literally, 'food.'
2
Presumably, the belief was in an intuitive vision, and not in a
process of inference. The ten terms are the 'root ' and its nine
synonyms of the First Book in the Yamaka, I, p. 13.
3
These are the time-relations assigned in the doctrine of Relations
detailed in the Patthana, or last book of the Abhidhamma-Pitaha.
4
Dialogues, ii. 92. The orthodox position seems to have been, that
whereas events indefinitely future may be foretold through a super-
man's intuition, the exact nature of molecular, or psychical, vital
change at any given moment is unpredictable. Cf. M. Bergson on this
point; Creative Evolution, ch. i., p. 6 passim.
9. Of Knowledge of the Present
Controverted Point— That the present may be known.
From the Commentary.—Because of the Word: When all pheno-
mena are seen to be impermanent, the insight itself, as a phenomenon,
is also seen to be impermanent, some, as the Andhakas, have the
opinion that there is knowledge of the entire present, without distinc-
tion. Now if there be such knowledge, it [as present] must take place
at the present instant through itself. But because two knowledges
cannot be simultaneous in the one self-conscious subject, knowledge
of the present cannot be known by the same act of knowledge.
1
[1] Th.—If there be a knowledge of the present, does
one know that knowledge by the same act o f knowledge ?
If you deny, your proposition must fall. If you assent, I
ask: Does one know that he knows the present by that
same act of knowledge ? You deny, and your previous
assertion falls. If you assent, I ask : Is the conscious act
of knowing the object of the knowledge? You deny, and
your previous assertion falls. If you assent, then you
imply that one touches contact by the contact, feels feeling
by that feeling, wills volition by that volition. So for the
initial and the sustained application of thought. So for
zest, for mindfulness, for understanding. You imply that
one cuts a sword with that sword; an axe with that axe;
a knife with that knife; an adze with that adze; that one
sews a needle with that needle; handles the tip of a finger
with that finger; kisses the tip of the nose with that nose;
handles the head with that head; washes of f impurity with
that impurity.
[2] A.—I am wrong then? But when all things are
seen as impermanent, is not that knowledge also seen as
impermanent ? Surely then I am right.
1
In other words, self-consciousness is really an act of retrospection,
and its object is not present, but past.
10. Of Knowing Others' Fruition.
Controverted Point.—That a disciple can have knowledge
concerning fruition.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Andhakas, have held that,
since it was said that both the Bnddhas and their disciples teach beings
the doctrine of the attainment of Ariyan fruition, disciples can, like
the Buddhas, state that this or that being has won some Fruit. Now
if that were so, they could also, by their insight, give details concerning
that attainment. But they cannot.
[1] Th.—This implies that a disciple can make known
the property of each fruit;
1
that he possesses a knowledge
of the different degrees of development in fruitions, control-
ling powers, personalities; [2] that he possesses a concep-
tion of aggregates, sense-fields, elements, truths, controlling
powers, personality ; [8] that he is a Conqueror, a Teacher,
a Buddha Supreme, omniscient, all-seeing, Master of the
Norm, the Norm-Judge of appeal; [4] that he is one who
causes a "Way to spring up where no Way was, one who
engenders a Way not engendered; proclaims a Path not
proclaimed, knows the Path, is conversant with the Path, is
expert in the Path. All of which of course you deny. . . .
[5] A.—Yet you deny that the disciple lacks insight.
Surely then he may have insight into others' fruition.
1
Read phala-ssakatang . In line 5, for pannapetiti read
the atthiti of the controverted proposition.
Sunday, June 12, 2011
Kathavatthu - Of Popular Knowledge & Of the Mental Object in Telepathy
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
6. Of Popular Knowledge.
Controverted Point.—That it is wrong to say: Popular
knowledge has only truth as its object and nothing else.
From the Commentary.—This discourse is to purge the incorrect
tenet held by the Andhakas, that the word ' truth3
is to be applied
without any distinction being drawn between popular and philo-
sophical truth.
1
[1] Andhaka.—You admit, do you not, that one who
attains Jhana by way of the earth-artifice, has knowledge ?
Does not that earth-artifice come under popular truth ?
Th.—Yes.
A.—Then why exempt popular knowledge from the search
for truth?
[2] The same argument applies to the other artifices,
and to gifts as stated above (V. 5).
[3] Th.—Then according to you, popular knowledge has
only Truth as its object. But is it the object of popular
knowledge to understand the fact and nature of Ill , to put
away the Cause, to realize the Cessation, to develop the
Path thereto? You must deny. (Hence the need for a
distinction between truths.)
7. Of the Mental Object in Telepathy.
Controverted Point.—That insight into the thoughts of
another has no object beyond bare other-consciousness as
such.2
1
Literally, truth in the highest or ultimate sense. On this ancient
Buddhist distinction, see above, p. 63, n. 2 ; also Ledi Sadaw's exposi-
tion, JPTS, 1914, 129 f., and note : Paramattha .
2 'Of another' is filled in, the supernormal power in question being
one of the six so-called abnormal knowledges, chal-abhinna,
attainable by gifted disciples. The Buddha is frequently shown, in
the Suttas, exercising it. See also Psalms of the Brethren, passim;
Compendium, 68, 209. The psychological point can only be followed
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Andhakas at present, have
held this view, deriving it from just the [technical] expression 'insight
into a limited portion of the consciousness of another].'
1
But this is
untenable, since in knowing consciousness as lustful and so on, the
object becomes essentially complex.
[1] Th.—You admit, do you not, that one may discern
a 'lust-ridden consciousness,' and so on2
as such? Then
this disposes of your proposition.
[2] Again, you cannot deny that, in thought-discerning,
insight can have as its object contact, feeling, etc. [or any
of the concomitants of consciousness]. Where then is bare
consciousness as sole object ?
[3] Or do you dispute the statement that insight having
contact, or feeling, or the rest as its object, comes into
thought-discerning? 'Yes' you say?
3
But does not
thought-discerning include discerning the course of con-
tact, feeling, etc. ? This you now deny.
4
[4] A.—You say my proposition is wrong. But is not
this thought-discerning insight limited to a portion o f the
course of thought [in others] ? Then surely I am right.
if the Buddhist distinction between (a) a bare continuum of conscious
moments, (6) various concomitants or coefficients of that bare con-
sciousness be kept in mind. See Compendium, 13. Thus the dispute
is really on the meaning or context of the term citta: bare fact of
consciousness, or the concrete, complex psychic unit as understood
in European psychology. The discussion is therefore of more than
antiquarian interest. See Buddhist Psychology, 6 f. , 175.
1
Ceto pariyaye nanang is usually so rendered, in this con-
nection, by Burmese translators. The opponent misconstrues 'limited,'
holding that thought-reading is limited to the bare flux of conscious-
ness, without its facfcors.
2
The quoted phrase heads the list usually given in the Nikayas
when the thought-reading power is stated—e.g., Dialogues, i. 89 f .
3
Because, he holds, one cannot make a mental object of more than
one factor [at once].—Comy.
4
'Because there is no Sutta-passage about it.'—Comy.
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
6. Of Popular Knowledge.
Controverted Point.—That it is wrong to say: Popular
knowledge has only truth as its object and nothing else.
From the Commentary.—This discourse is to purge the incorrect
tenet held by the Andhakas, that the word ' truth3
is to be applied
without any distinction being drawn between popular and philo-
sophical truth.
1
[1] Andhaka.—You admit, do you not, that one who
attains Jhana by way of the earth-artifice, has knowledge ?
Does not that earth-artifice come under popular truth ?
Th.—Yes.
A.—Then why exempt popular knowledge from the search
for truth?
[2] The same argument applies to the other artifices,
and to gifts as stated above (V. 5).
[3] Th.—Then according to you, popular knowledge has
only Truth as its object. But is it the object of popular
knowledge to understand the fact and nature of Ill , to put
away the Cause, to realize the Cessation, to develop the
Path thereto? You must deny. (Hence the need for a
distinction between truths.)
7. Of the Mental Object in Telepathy.
Controverted Point.—That insight into the thoughts of
another has no object beyond bare other-consciousness as
such.2
1
Literally, truth in the highest or ultimate sense. On this ancient
Buddhist distinction, see above, p. 63, n. 2 ; also Ledi Sadaw's exposi-
tion, JPTS, 1914, 129 f., and note : Paramattha .
2 'Of another' is filled in, the supernormal power in question being
one of the six so-called abnormal knowledges, chal-abhinna,
attainable by gifted disciples. The Buddha is frequently shown, in
the Suttas, exercising it. See also Psalms of the Brethren, passim;
Compendium, 68, 209. The psychological point can only be followed
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Andhakas at present, have
held this view, deriving it from just the [technical] expression 'insight
into a limited portion of the consciousness of another].'
1
But this is
untenable, since in knowing consciousness as lustful and so on, the
object becomes essentially complex.
[1] Th.—You admit, do you not, that one may discern
a 'lust-ridden consciousness,' and so on2
as such? Then
this disposes of your proposition.
[2] Again, you cannot deny that, in thought-discerning,
insight can have as its object contact, feeling, etc. [or any
of the concomitants of consciousness]. Where then is bare
consciousness as sole object ?
[3] Or do you dispute the statement that insight having
contact, or feeling, or the rest as its object, comes into
thought-discerning? 'Yes' you say?
3
But does not
thought-discerning include discerning the course of con-
tact, feeling, etc. ? This you now deny.
4
[4] A.—You say my proposition is wrong. But is not
this thought-discerning insight limited to a portion o f the
course of thought [in others] ? Then surely I am right.
if the Buddhist distinction between (a) a bare continuum of conscious
moments, (6) various concomitants or coefficients of that bare con-
sciousness be kept in mind. See Compendium, 13. Thus the dispute
is really on the meaning or context of the term citta: bare fact of
consciousness, or the concrete, complex psychic unit as understood
in European psychology. The discussion is therefore of more than
antiquarian interest. See Buddhist Psychology, 6 f. , 175.
1
Ceto pariyaye nanang is usually so rendered, in this con-
nection, by Burmese translators. The opponent misconstrues 'limited,'
holding that thought-reading is limited to the bare flux of conscious-
ness, without its facfcors.
2
The quoted phrase heads the list usually given in the Nikayas
when the thought-reading power is stated—e.g., Dialogues, i. 89 f .
3
Because, he holds, one cannot make a mental object of more than
one factor [at once].—Comy.
4
'Because there is no Sutta-passage about it.'—Comy.
Kathavatthu - Of Assurance & Of Analytic Insight
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
4. Of Assurance.
Controverted Point.—That one who has not made sure
has the insight for entering the Path of Assurance.
1
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Uttarapathakas, at present
hold this view on these grounds : The Exalted One judged that 'anyone
who will enter on the right Path of Assurance
2
is capable of pene-
trating the Truths.' Therefore only the average worldling who has
not made sure has the religious insight requisite for entering.
[1] Th.—If one who has not made sure has the insight
for entering the Path of Assurance, then his opposite—one
who has made sure—must have the insight for not entering
it.
3
If you deny, your proposition falls through. If, by it,
you maintain that one who has made sure has not the in-
sight for not entering that Path, then you imply that one
who has not made sure has not the insight for entering
iihereon. Which, by your proposition, is wrong.
[2] Again, if one who has not made sure has the insight
for entering the Path of Assurance, do you then admit that
one who has made sure is in the same intellectual stage?
4
You deny. And if you admit, on the contrary, that one
who has made sure has not [i.e., no longer] the insight
1
' Assurance (niyama) is a synonym of the Path ' [to Arahant-
ship].—Comy. The expression 'made sure,' niyato , is applied to
those who have entered on it, and are ' assured of' eventual attainment.
2
Sammatta-niyama . Cf . Samyutta-Nik, iii. 225 (the last
•clause is different) ; and Anguttara-Nik., i. 121.
3
Literally, for entering the opposite path of non-assurance.
4
'Inasmuch as for the initial purpose of the Path he no longer
.needs the requisite insight.'—Comy.
T.S. V.
for entering, then you must surely deny that insight also
to one who has not made sure.
[3] Again, in affirming that one who has not made sure
has the insight for entering the Path of Assurance, do you
admit that he has also the insight for not entering it?
You deny, that is, you affirm he has not the insight for
not entering it. Do you equally admit then that he has not
the insight for entering it ? You deny. . . 1
[4] Does your proposition mean that there is a Path of
Assurance for one who has not made sure of entering?
2
You deny. Yet you admit that there is insight for enter-
ing upon it! Does this insight consist in applications of
mindfulness and all the other factors of Enlightenment ?
You must deny, and [5] affirm that there is no such
Assurance. How then can your proposition stand ?
[6] You do not grant to one who is only in the prior
stage of adoption3
the insight of the First Path? Or to
one who is practising for the insight of the First . . .
Fourth Fruition the insight of that Fruition ? How then
can you allow the insight of entering on the Path of
Assurance to one who has not made sure ?
[7] U.—If I am wrong, you must on the other hand
admit that the Exalted One knows that a person, M or N,
will enter the true Path of Assurance, and is capable of
penetrating the Truths.
1
We have given a full, if slightly free, rendering of this curious,
bout of ancient dialectic. At the end of each section the sectary is
brought up against the same rejoinder, compelling him either to.
contradict his proposition or to withdraw it, This may be shown
diagrammatically, A=one-who-has-made-sure ; B, entering-on-the-
'Path'; C, insight-for; a, b, c standing for the respective contradictories.
We then get,
§1: aBC (thesis), AbC, Abc, aBc
§2: aBC, ABC, ABc, aBc
§3: aBC, abC, abc, aBc
2
The Path proper being reserved for one who has made sure.
3
Gotrabhu puggalo . See V. 1, § 1.
5. Of Analytic Insight
1
Controverted Point.—That all knowledge is analytic.
From the Commentary.—It is a belief of the Andhakas that in an
Ariyan (that is, one who has 'made sure,'
is in some Stage of the Path or
Way) all 'knowledge' whatsoever is supramundane or transcendental.
2
Hence they conclude that it is also analytic.
[1] Th.—Then you must admit that popular knowledge
is analytic—which you deny. For if you assent, then all who
have popular, conventional knowledge, have also acquired
analytic insight—which you deny. The same argument
holds good i f 'knowledge in discerning the thought of
another' be substituted for 'popular . . . knowledge.'
3
[2] Again, if all knowledge is analytic, then a fortiori
all discernment is analytic. Or, if you can assent to that,
you must therewith admit that the discernment of one
who attains Jhana by any of the elemental, or colour
'artifices,' who attains any of the four more abstract
Jhanas, who gives donations, who gives to the Order any
of the four necessaries of life, is analytic. But this you
deny.
[3] A.—If I am wrong, you admit that there is such
a thing as [spiritual or] supramundane discernment;
is that not analytic ?
Th.—That I do not deny.
4
A.—Then my proposition is true.5
1
Patisambhida , or analysis; literally, 'resolving, continued
breaking-up.' On the four branches in this organon, see Appendix:
Patisambhida .
2
See p. 134, n. 4.
3
See pp. 180, 181.
4
The Theravadin does not of course mean that all 'supramundane'
knowledge is analytic. There is analytic, and there is intuitive supra-
mundane knowledge.
5
Namely, for Ariyans. This is another little joust of logomachy :
What is the extension of the term nana, knowledge (see II . 2) ? And
what is the nature of an 'Ariyan' ?
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
4. Of Assurance.
Controverted Point.—That one who has not made sure
has the insight for entering the Path of Assurance.
1
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Uttarapathakas, at present
hold this view on these grounds : The Exalted One judged that 'anyone
who will enter on the right Path of Assurance
2
is capable of pene-
trating the Truths.' Therefore only the average worldling who has
not made sure has the religious insight requisite for entering.
[1] Th.—If one who has not made sure has the insight
for entering the Path of Assurance, then his opposite—one
who has made sure—must have the insight for not entering
it.
3
If you deny, your proposition falls through. If, by it,
you maintain that one who has made sure has not the in-
sight for not entering that Path, then you imply that one
who has not made sure has not the insight for entering
iihereon. Which, by your proposition, is wrong.
[2] Again, if one who has not made sure has the insight
for entering the Path of Assurance, do you then admit that
one who has made sure is in the same intellectual stage?
4
You deny. And if you admit, on the contrary, that one
who has made sure has not [i.e., no longer] the insight
1
' Assurance (niyama) is a synonym of the Path ' [to Arahant-
ship].—Comy. The expression 'made sure,' niyato , is applied to
those who have entered on it, and are ' assured of' eventual attainment.
2
Sammatta-niyama . Cf . Samyutta-Nik, iii. 225 (the last
•clause is different) ; and Anguttara-Nik., i. 121.
3
Literally, for entering the opposite path of non-assurance.
4
'Inasmuch as for the initial purpose of the Path he no longer
.needs the requisite insight.'—Comy.
T.S. V.
for entering, then you must surely deny that insight also
to one who has not made sure.
[3] Again, in affirming that one who has not made sure
has the insight for entering the Path of Assurance, do you
admit that he has also the insight for not entering it?
You deny, that is, you affirm he has not the insight for
not entering it. Do you equally admit then that he has not
the insight for entering it ? You deny. . . 1
[4] Does your proposition mean that there is a Path of
Assurance for one who has not made sure of entering?
2
You deny. Yet you admit that there is insight for enter-
ing upon it! Does this insight consist in applications of
mindfulness and all the other factors of Enlightenment ?
You must deny, and [5] affirm that there is no such
Assurance. How then can your proposition stand ?
[6] You do not grant to one who is only in the prior
stage of adoption3
the insight of the First Path? Or to
one who is practising for the insight of the First . . .
Fourth Fruition the insight of that Fruition ? How then
can you allow the insight of entering on the Path of
Assurance to one who has not made sure ?
[7] U.—If I am wrong, you must on the other hand
admit that the Exalted One knows that a person, M or N,
will enter the true Path of Assurance, and is capable of
penetrating the Truths.
1
We have given a full, if slightly free, rendering of this curious,
bout of ancient dialectic. At the end of each section the sectary is
brought up against the same rejoinder, compelling him either to.
contradict his proposition or to withdraw it, This may be shown
diagrammatically, A=one-who-has-made-sure ; B, entering-on-the-
'Path'; C, insight-for; a, b, c standing for the respective contradictories.
We then get,
§1: aBC (thesis), AbC, Abc, aBc
§2: aBC, ABC, ABc, aBc
§3: aBC, abC, abc, aBc
2
The Path proper being reserved for one who has made sure.
3
Gotrabhu puggalo . See V. 1, § 1.
5. Of Analytic Insight
1
Controverted Point.—That all knowledge is analytic.
From the Commentary.—It is a belief of the Andhakas that in an
Ariyan (that is, one who has 'made sure,'
is in some Stage of the Path or
Way) all 'knowledge' whatsoever is supramundane or transcendental.
2
Hence they conclude that it is also analytic.
[1] Th.—Then you must admit that popular knowledge
is analytic—which you deny. For if you assent, then all who
have popular, conventional knowledge, have also acquired
analytic insight—which you deny. The same argument
holds good i f 'knowledge in discerning the thought of
another' be substituted for 'popular . . . knowledge.'
3
[2] Again, if all knowledge is analytic, then a fortiori
all discernment is analytic. Or, if you can assent to that,
you must therewith admit that the discernment of one
who attains Jhana by any of the elemental, or colour
'artifices,' who attains any of the four more abstract
Jhanas, who gives donations, who gives to the Order any
of the four necessaries of life, is analytic. But this you
deny.
[3] A.—If I am wrong, you admit that there is such
a thing as [spiritual or] supramundane discernment;
is that not analytic ?
Th.—That I do not deny.
4
A.—Then my proposition is true.5
1
Patisambhida , or analysis; literally, 'resolving, continued
breaking-up.' On the four branches in this organon, see Appendix:
Patisambhida .
2
See p. 134, n. 4.
3
See pp. 180, 181.
4
The Theravadin does not of course mean that all 'supramundane'
knowledge is analytic. There is analytic, and there is intuitive supra-
mundane knowledge.
5
Namely, for Ariyans. This is another little joust of logomachy :
What is the extension of the term nana, knowledge (see II . 2) ? And
what is the nature of an 'Ariyan' ?
Kathavatthu - Of Perverted Perception or Hallucination (in Jhana)
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
3. Of Perverted Perception or Hallucination (in Jhana).
Controverted Point.—That in one who has attained
Jhana through the earth-artifice, etc.,
3
knowledge [of what
is seen] is perverted.
From the Commentary.—It is a belief among the Andhakas, that
when anyone has induced Jhana by the [self-hypnotizing] process of
gazing on [a portion of ] earth and being conscious of earth, the content
of consciousness becoming other than earth [though his gaze is still
fixed thereon], his cognition may be called perverted, seeing one thing,
namely, the physical earth, and being conscious of something else,
to wit, the percept, or concept.
4
The Theravadin's position is the
3
This, as heading the list of 'artifices' (kasina) for self-hypnosis,
is always cited as representing artifice in general. See p. 121 ; also
Bud. Psy. Eth., p. 43, and passim ; Vibhanga, 171,173.
4
The opponent's position is that the subject is really conscious of an
idea, which is never the original object, the mind being referred to
that by a process of hallucination.
specialization of the meaning of 'earth.' It may mean the ultimate
quality of extension, physical (literally, structural) earth, a percept
or concept, a [nature-] deva. The only real perversion of cognition is
to see permanence, persistence in the impermanent. There is no
hallucination or illusion, etc., properly so called, in Jhana.
1
[1] Th.—If your proposition is right, then do you imply
that this 'perversion' is the same as that involved in seeing
the permanent in the impermanent, happiness in Ill , a soul
in what is not soul, the beautiful in the ugly ? Of course
you deny.
[2] Again, you imply that such a person's knowledge
during Jhana is not proficient. But you do not wish to
imply this, but the opposite.
[3] You admit that the reversal of judgment which sees
permanence in impermanence is a bad judgment, and
those other judgments above-stated also. Yet you will not
admit that cognition during Jhana is badly accomplished.
[4] You hold on the contrary that it is well accomplished.
Yet a similar perversion in the case of those other four
judgments you consider bad.
[5] If it were an Arahant who so accomplished Jhana,
would you claim a perverted cognition for him? You
could not. [6] Or, if you could, you would have to make
him liable to reversals of perception, consciousness, and
views in general.
2
[7] A.—But if my proposition is wrong, do you hold
that, when any one attains Jhana by earth-cognition,
everything becomes earth to him ?
3
No, you reply. Then
surely his judgment is upset.
1
Because, when the subject is conscious of the percept or concept of
earth, the content of his consciousness is just that percept or concept.
2
Cf . Compendium, pi 216, n. 4; 67. Vipariyesa , viparita
here used are tantamount to the term [preferred in later idiom]
'vipallasa. '
3
There is even now a tendency among Burmese Buddhists, if not
well trained, to believe that Jhanic practice by any given ' artifice'—
say earth-gazing—is only successful when every external thing seems
to become earth. This would be true hallucination. But here the
opponent thinks that the mind of the Jhanic subject is upset, because
the Theravadin's denial in general includes the specific denial that the
content of consciousness becomes 'earth.'
[8] Th.—But you will admit that the earth is there,
and that the subject enters Jhana by regarding earth as
earth ? Where then is the perversion of cognition ?
You say that the earth is actually there, and that
in entering Jhana by the consciousness of earth as earth,
perception is perverted. Substitute for earth Nibbana:
•would you still say that perception was perverted ? . . .
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
3. Of Perverted Perception or Hallucination (in Jhana).
Controverted Point.—That in one who has attained
Jhana through the earth-artifice, etc.,
3
knowledge [of what
is seen] is perverted.
From the Commentary.—It is a belief among the Andhakas, that
when anyone has induced Jhana by the [self-hypnotizing] process of
gazing on [a portion of ] earth and being conscious of earth, the content
of consciousness becoming other than earth [though his gaze is still
fixed thereon], his cognition may be called perverted, seeing one thing,
namely, the physical earth, and being conscious of something else,
to wit, the percept, or concept.
4
The Theravadin's position is the
3
This, as heading the list of 'artifices' (kasina) for self-hypnosis,
is always cited as representing artifice in general. See p. 121 ; also
Bud. Psy. Eth., p. 43, and passim ; Vibhanga, 171,173.
4
The opponent's position is that the subject is really conscious of an
idea, which is never the original object, the mind being referred to
that by a process of hallucination.
specialization of the meaning of 'earth.' It may mean the ultimate
quality of extension, physical (literally, structural) earth, a percept
or concept, a [nature-] deva. The only real perversion of cognition is
to see permanence, persistence in the impermanent. There is no
hallucination or illusion, etc., properly so called, in Jhana.
1
[1] Th.—If your proposition is right, then do you imply
that this 'perversion' is the same as that involved in seeing
the permanent in the impermanent, happiness in Ill , a soul
in what is not soul, the beautiful in the ugly ? Of course
you deny.
[2] Again, you imply that such a person's knowledge
during Jhana is not proficient. But you do not wish to
imply this, but the opposite.
[3] You admit that the reversal of judgment which sees
permanence in impermanence is a bad judgment, and
those other judgments above-stated also. Yet you will not
admit that cognition during Jhana is badly accomplished.
[4] You hold on the contrary that it is well accomplished.
Yet a similar perversion in the case of those other four
judgments you consider bad.
[5] If it were an Arahant who so accomplished Jhana,
would you claim a perverted cognition for him? You
could not. [6] Or, if you could, you would have to make
him liable to reversals of perception, consciousness, and
views in general.
2
[7] A.—But if my proposition is wrong, do you hold
that, when any one attains Jhana by earth-cognition,
everything becomes earth to him ?
3
No, you reply. Then
surely his judgment is upset.
1
Because, when the subject is conscious of the percept or concept of
earth, the content of his consciousness is just that percept or concept.
2
Cf . Compendium, pi 216, n. 4; 67. Vipariyesa , viparita
here used are tantamount to the term [preferred in later idiom]
'vipallasa. '
3
There is even now a tendency among Burmese Buddhists, if not
well trained, to believe that Jhanic practice by any given ' artifice'—
say earth-gazing—is only successful when every external thing seems
to become earth. This would be true hallucination. But here the
opponent thinks that the mind of the Jhanic subject is upset, because
the Theravadin's denial in general includes the specific denial that the
content of consciousness becomes 'earth.'
[8] Th.—But you will admit that the earth is there,
and that the subject enters Jhana by regarding earth as
earth ? Where then is the perversion of cognition ?
You say that the earth is actually there, and that
in entering Jhana by the consciousness of earth as earth,
perception is perverted. Substitute for earth Nibbana:
•would you still say that perception was perverted ? . . .
Kathavatthu - Of Emancipation & Of the Knowledge of the Adept
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
BOOK V
1. Of Emancipation.
Controverted Point.—That the knowledge of emancipation
has itself the quality of emancipation.
From the Commentary.—Four sorts of knowledge (or insight, nana )
are grouped under knowledge of emancipation, to wit, insight or intui-
tion, path-knowledge, fruit-knowledge, reflective knowledge. In other
words, emancipation considered as (1) freedom from perceiving things
as permanent or persisting, or through perceiving the opposite ; (2) the
severance and renunciation effected by the Paths; (3) the peace of
fruition1
; (4) contemplation of emancipation as such. Now only the
peace of fruition is abstract, unqualified emancipation. The rest
cannot be called emancipated things. But the Andhakas say that all
four are such.
[1] Th.—Does not your proposition imply that any
knowledge of emancipation whatever has the quality of
emancipation? For instance, has reflective knowledge
2
that quality? Is such knowledge of emancipation as is
possessed by one who has attained to the stage of Ariyan
adoption3 of that quality? You deny both. [Then your
proposition is too general.]
[2] Again, it includes that knowledge of emancipation
possessed by one who is practising in order to realize the
Fruit of the First, Second, Third, Fourth Paths.4 But
do you mean to convey that the knowledge of one in the
1
Phalang patipassaddhi-vimutti .
2 Or retrospective. Cf . Compendium, 58, 69 ; 132, n. 6; 207, n. 7.
3 Gotrabhu puggalo ; cf. Anguttara-Nik., iv. 373; v. 23;
Compendium, 55, 215, n. 5 ; the preparatory stage to the First Path.
4
On this wider extension of the term cf. III. 3 and 4.
First Path is equal to the knowledge of one who has won,
acquired, arrived at, realized the Fruit of that Path, and so
for the Second, Third, and Fourth ? Of course you deny.
[3] Conversely, do you mean to convey that, if the
knowledge of emancipation belonging to one who possesses
the Fruition of a Path has the quality of emancipation, the
knowledge of emancipation of one who is only practising
in order to realize that Fruition has the same quality ? Of
course you deny.
[4] Or in other words, let us assume, as you say, that
when a person has realized the fruition of any of the Four
Paths his knowledge of emancipation has itself the quality
or nature of emancipation. Now you admit that the
knowledge in question is the knowledge of one who has
won the Fruit, do you not ?
But do you maintain as much, if the person has not yet
realized, but is only practising to realize a given fruition ?
Of course you deny. . . .
2. Of the Knowledge of an Adept.1
Controverted Point.—That a learner has the insight o f
an adept.
From the Commentary.—This is an opinion of the Uttarapathakas,
namely, that learners, as Ananda and others were, showed by their
confessions about the Exalted One, etc., that they knew who were
adepts, [and therefore understood that knowledge, the possession of
which made them adepts].
[1] Th.—Then you imply that the learner knows, sees
2
the ideas of the adept, lives in the attainment of having
seen, known, realized them, lives in personal contact there-
with. If not—and you do deny this—then you cannot
maintain your proposition.
[2] We grant of course that the adept knows, sees the
ideas of the adept, lives in the attainment . . . and so on.
1
A-sekha, literally, non-learner, proficient, expert; in this case,
an Arahant. Sekha is one who is being 'trained.'
2
This idiom applies to those who arrive at their knowledge joy
themselves.—Comy.
But, as you have admitted, you cannot impute this know-
ledge to the learner.
1
Your position then is, that you credit the learner with
the insight of an adept, yet you deny that the learner
knows, sees the ideas of the adept, etc. But, the adept
having also of course the insight of the adept, if he be as
to insight on a level only with the learner, you must add
of the adept also that he knows not, sees not the ideas of
the adept, does not live in the attainment of having seen,
known, realized them, does not live in personal contact
therewith. Which is absurd, as you by your denial admit.
[3] You are ready to deny that a person in a lower Stage
of the Path has the insight as yet of the next higher Stage,
or that one who is adopted2
has yet the insight of even the
First Stage. How then can you ascribe the insight of those
who have finally attained to those who as yet have not ?
[4] U.—If my proposition is wrong, then how is it that
a learner, as Ananda was, knew the sublimity of the Exalted
One, or of the Elder Sariputta, or of the Elder Moggallana
the Great?
1
The PTS edition should read a negative reply here and at the
end of this section.
2
Gotrabhu , V. 1, § 1.
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
BOOK V
1. Of Emancipation.
Controverted Point.—That the knowledge of emancipation
has itself the quality of emancipation.
From the Commentary.—Four sorts of knowledge (or insight, nana )
are grouped under knowledge of emancipation, to wit, insight or intui-
tion, path-knowledge, fruit-knowledge, reflective knowledge. In other
words, emancipation considered as (1) freedom from perceiving things
as permanent or persisting, or through perceiving the opposite ; (2) the
severance and renunciation effected by the Paths; (3) the peace of
fruition1
; (4) contemplation of emancipation as such. Now only the
peace of fruition is abstract, unqualified emancipation. The rest
cannot be called emancipated things. But the Andhakas say that all
four are such.
[1] Th.—Does not your proposition imply that any
knowledge of emancipation whatever has the quality of
emancipation? For instance, has reflective knowledge
2
that quality? Is such knowledge of emancipation as is
possessed by one who has attained to the stage of Ariyan
adoption3 of that quality? You deny both. [Then your
proposition is too general.]
[2] Again, it includes that knowledge of emancipation
possessed by one who is practising in order to realize the
Fruit of the First, Second, Third, Fourth Paths.4 But
do you mean to convey that the knowledge of one in the
1
Phalang patipassaddhi-vimutti .
2 Or retrospective. Cf . Compendium, 58, 69 ; 132, n. 6; 207, n. 7.
3 Gotrabhu puggalo ; cf. Anguttara-Nik., iv. 373; v. 23;
Compendium, 55, 215, n. 5 ; the preparatory stage to the First Path.
4
On this wider extension of the term cf. III. 3 and 4.
First Path is equal to the knowledge of one who has won,
acquired, arrived at, realized the Fruit of that Path, and so
for the Second, Third, and Fourth ? Of course you deny.
[3] Conversely, do you mean to convey that, if the
knowledge of emancipation belonging to one who possesses
the Fruition of a Path has the quality of emancipation, the
knowledge of emancipation of one who is only practising
in order to realize that Fruition has the same quality ? Of
course you deny.
[4] Or in other words, let us assume, as you say, that
when a person has realized the fruition of any of the Four
Paths his knowledge of emancipation has itself the quality
or nature of emancipation. Now you admit that the
knowledge in question is the knowledge of one who has
won the Fruit, do you not ?
But do you maintain as much, if the person has not yet
realized, but is only practising to realize a given fruition ?
Of course you deny. . . .
2. Of the Knowledge of an Adept.1
Controverted Point.—That a learner has the insight o f
an adept.
From the Commentary.—This is an opinion of the Uttarapathakas,
namely, that learners, as Ananda and others were, showed by their
confessions about the Exalted One, etc., that they knew who were
adepts, [and therefore understood that knowledge, the possession of
which made them adepts].
[1] Th.—Then you imply that the learner knows, sees
2
the ideas of the adept, lives in the attainment of having
seen, known, realized them, lives in personal contact there-
with. If not—and you do deny this—then you cannot
maintain your proposition.
[2] We grant of course that the adept knows, sees the
ideas of the adept, lives in the attainment . . . and so on.
1
A-sekha, literally, non-learner, proficient, expert; in this case,
an Arahant. Sekha is one who is being 'trained.'
2
This idiom applies to those who arrive at their knowledge joy
themselves.—Comy.
But, as you have admitted, you cannot impute this know-
ledge to the learner.
1
Your position then is, that you credit the learner with
the insight of an adept, yet you deny that the learner
knows, sees the ideas of the adept, etc. But, the adept
having also of course the insight of the adept, if he be as
to insight on a level only with the learner, you must add
of the adept also that he knows not, sees not the ideas of
the adept, does not live in the attainment of having seen,
known, realized them, does not live in personal contact
therewith. Which is absurd, as you by your denial admit.
[3] You are ready to deny that a person in a lower Stage
of the Path has the insight as yet of the next higher Stage,
or that one who is adopted2
has yet the insight of even the
First Stage. How then can you ascribe the insight of those
who have finally attained to those who as yet have not ?
[4] U.—If my proposition is wrong, then how is it that
a learner, as Ananda was, knew the sublimity of the Exalted
One, or of the Elder Sariputta, or of the Elder Moggallana
the Great?
1
The PTS edition should read a negative reply here and at the
end of this section.
2
Gotrabhu , V. 1, § 1.
Kathavatthu - More about Endowment & Of putting off the Fetters
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
9. More about Endowment.2
Controverted Point.—That a person who is practising in
order to realize Arahantship possesses [as a persistent
distinct endowment] the preceding three fruitions.
From the Commentary.—This discourse deals with the belief, shared
by the Andhakas,
3
that a person as described holds the three Fruitions
as an acquired quality (patta-dhamma-vasena) . It is to be
understood as like that on ' the four Fruits.'
[1] Th.—You say, in fact, that such a person is endowed
with, or possesses four contacts, four feelings, four percep-
tions, volitions, thoughts, four faiths, energies, mindful-
nesses, concentrations, understandings
4
—which cannot be.
[2] Do you make an analogous assertion as to one who
is practising for the Third or Second Paths? An analo-
2
This discourse is practically the same as IV. 4.
3
See Commentary on IV. 7.
4
The five spiritual-sense controls. See above, p. 148, n. 1.
gous parados will apply in that case; and yon must [3, 4]
be able to describe such persons in terms of lower stages,
e.g. one practising for the topmost stage in terms of one
who has only got to the first—which is anomalous.
1
[5] But can a person who is a proximate candidate for
Arahantship be described in terms of a Stream-Winner ?
Can he be both at the same time? Even if he be a Never-
Returner, is he rightly so described when he is in process
of becoming Arahant?
2
[6] Similarly for a candidate for
the Third and Second Fruitions.
[7] Would you not rather maintain that a person prac-
tising in order to realize Arahantship had evolved past
3
the fruition of Stream-Winning ?
[8] Or do you maintain that one so evolved was still
holding that first Fruit [as a distinctive quality] ? For
then you must also hold that he also remains possessed of
those evil qualities which as Stream-Winner he has evolved
out of—which is absurd.
[9-18] A similar argument applies to a proximate'candi-
date for Arahantship (Fourth Fruit) and the Second Path
and Fruit; to such a candidate and the Third Path and
Fruit; to a proximate candidate for the Third Fruit and
the First and Second Paths and Fruits; and to a proximate
candidate for the Second Fruit, and the First Path and Fruit.
[19] U. A.—If our proposition is wrong, surely you would
nevertheless say that a person who is a proximate candi-
date for realizing Arahantship had both won the preceding
three Fruits, and had not fallen away from them?
Th.—Yes, that is true.
U. A.—Surely then he is still possessed of them. [20-21]
And so for candidates in the Third, Second and First Paths.
[22] Th.—Assuming that he is still possessed of the
three Fruits, do you also admit that, having attained to all
four Paths, he is still possessed of all the Paths? Of
course you do not; [there at least you see my point]
1
Cf. above, I. 2, I. 6, and subsequently.
2
I.e., in the Fourth Path, striving to realize its Fruit.
3 See IV..4, 8.
[23, 24], neither do you admit a similar possession in
other candidates.
10. Of putting off the Fetters.
Controverted Point.—That the putting off of all the
Fetters is Arahantship.
From the Commentary. — This is an opinion of the Andhakas—
namely, that Arahantship means the [simultaneous], unlimited putting
off of all the fetters.
1
[1] Th.—By your proposition you must admit that all
the Fetters are put of f by the Path of Arahantship (the
Fourth)—which is not correct, you allow. The proximate
candidate for the Fruit of that Path is not occupied in
again getting rid of the theory o f individuality, doubt, or the
infection of mere rule and ritual, already rejected in the
First Path. Nor [2] in getting rid of the grosser sensuality
and enmity conquered already in the Second Path; nor
[8] of the residual sensuality put away without remainder
in the Third Path. [4] Was not his work pronounced by
the Exalted One to be the putting of f without remainder
of lust for corporeal, and for incorporeal rebirth, conceit,
distraction and ignorance?
2
[5] A.—But if my proposition is wrong, do you not
nevertheless admit that for an Arahant all Fetters are put
off? Surely then I may say that Arahantship is a putting
off all the Fetters ?
1
These were ten vicious states or qualities, to be put away gradually
by progress in the ' four paths,' and not all at' once. See Compen-
dium, 172 f.; Bud. Psy. Eth., pp. 297-303. In the thesis there is no
copula, much less an emphatic one. But the two substantival clauses
are in apposition as equivalents.
2
Dialogues, ii. 98 f .
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
9. More about Endowment.2
Controverted Point.—That a person who is practising in
order to realize Arahantship possesses [as a persistent
distinct endowment] the preceding three fruitions.
From the Commentary.—This discourse deals with the belief, shared
by the Andhakas,
3
that a person as described holds the three Fruitions
as an acquired quality (patta-dhamma-vasena) . It is to be
understood as like that on ' the four Fruits.'
[1] Th.—You say, in fact, that such a person is endowed
with, or possesses four contacts, four feelings, four percep-
tions, volitions, thoughts, four faiths, energies, mindful-
nesses, concentrations, understandings
4
—which cannot be.
[2] Do you make an analogous assertion as to one who
is practising for the Third or Second Paths? An analo-
2
This discourse is practically the same as IV. 4.
3
See Commentary on IV. 7.
4
The five spiritual-sense controls. See above, p. 148, n. 1.
gous parados will apply in that case; and yon must [3, 4]
be able to describe such persons in terms of lower stages,
e.g. one practising for the topmost stage in terms of one
who has only got to the first—which is anomalous.
1
[5] But can a person who is a proximate candidate for
Arahantship be described in terms of a Stream-Winner ?
Can he be both at the same time? Even if he be a Never-
Returner, is he rightly so described when he is in process
of becoming Arahant?
2
[6] Similarly for a candidate for
the Third and Second Fruitions.
[7] Would you not rather maintain that a person prac-
tising in order to realize Arahantship had evolved past
3
the fruition of Stream-Winning ?
[8] Or do you maintain that one so evolved was still
holding that first Fruit [as a distinctive quality] ? For
then you must also hold that he also remains possessed of
those evil qualities which as Stream-Winner he has evolved
out of—which is absurd.
[9-18] A similar argument applies to a proximate'candi-
date for Arahantship (Fourth Fruit) and the Second Path
and Fruit; to such a candidate and the Third Path and
Fruit; to a proximate candidate for the Third Fruit and
the First and Second Paths and Fruits; and to a proximate
candidate for the Second Fruit, and the First Path and Fruit.
[19] U. A.—If our proposition is wrong, surely you would
nevertheless say that a person who is a proximate candi-
date for realizing Arahantship had both won the preceding
three Fruits, and had not fallen away from them?
Th.—Yes, that is true.
U. A.—Surely then he is still possessed of them. [20-21]
And so for candidates in the Third, Second and First Paths.
[22] Th.—Assuming that he is still possessed of the
three Fruits, do you also admit that, having attained to all
four Paths, he is still possessed of all the Paths? Of
course you do not; [there at least you see my point]
1
Cf. above, I. 2, I. 6, and subsequently.
2
I.e., in the Fourth Path, striving to realize its Fruit.
3 See IV..4, 8.
[23, 24], neither do you admit a similar possession in
other candidates.
10. Of putting off the Fetters.
Controverted Point.—That the putting off of all the
Fetters is Arahantship.
From the Commentary. — This is an opinion of the Andhakas—
namely, that Arahantship means the [simultaneous], unlimited putting
off of all the fetters.
1
[1] Th.—By your proposition you must admit that all
the Fetters are put of f by the Path of Arahantship (the
Fourth)—which is not correct, you allow. The proximate
candidate for the Fruit of that Path is not occupied in
again getting rid of the theory o f individuality, doubt, or the
infection of mere rule and ritual, already rejected in the
First Path. Nor [2] in getting rid of the grosser sensuality
and enmity conquered already in the Second Path; nor
[8] of the residual sensuality put away without remainder
in the Third Path. [4] Was not his work pronounced by
the Exalted One to be the putting of f without remainder
of lust for corporeal, and for incorporeal rebirth, conceit,
distraction and ignorance?
2
[5] A.—But if my proposition is wrong, do you not
nevertheless admit that for an Arahant all Fetters are put
off? Surely then I may say that Arahantship is a putting
off all the Fetters ?
1
These were ten vicious states or qualities, to be put away gradually
by progress in the ' four paths,' and not all at' once. See Compen-
dium, 172 f.; Bud. Psy. Eth., pp. 297-303. In the thesis there is no
copula, much less an emphatic one. But the two substantival clauses
are in apposition as equivalents.
2
Dialogues, ii. 98 f .
Saturday, June 11, 2011
Kathavatthu - Of one gifted with the Marks & Of entering on the Path of Assurance
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
7. Of One gifted with the Marks.
Controverted Point.—That one who is gifted with the
Marks is a Bodhisat.
From the Commentary.—This and the two following discourses are
about Uttarapathaka views. This one deals with a belief derived from
a careless interpretation of the Sutta : 'for one endowed as a superman
there are two careers.'
1
[1] Th.—By your proposition you must also admit [a
fortiori] (a) that anyone who is gifted with the Marks to a
limited extent,
2
with one-third, or one-half of them, is a
limited, one-third, or half Bodhisat, respectively—which
you deny.
[2] And (b) that a universal emperor
3
—who is also
gifted with the Marks—is a Bodhisat, and that the previous
study and conduct, declaring and teaching the Norm4 in
the Bodhisat's career, are the*same as those in the uni-
versal emperor's career; that (c) when a universal emperor
is born, devas receive him first, and then humans, as they
do the new-born Bodhisat; [8] that (d) four sons of the
devas receiving the new-born imperial babe place it before
the mother, saying: ' Rejoice, 0 queen! to thee is bom a
mighty son!' even as they do for the new-born Bodhisat;
that (e) two rain-showers, cold and warm, come from the
sky, wherewith both babe and mother may be washed,
even as happens at the birth of a Bodhisat; [4] that (/) a
new-born imperial babe, standing on even feet, and facing
north, walks seven paces, a white canopy being held over
him, and looking round on all sides speaks the trumpet
5
notes: ' I am the foremost, I am chief, I am the highest
in the world. This is my last birth; now is there no more
coming again to be!' [5] that (g) there is manifested at
1
See below. On the thirty-two Marks and the Bodhisat—i.e.,
Bodhisatta,' enlightenment-being,' or one who in the same life becomes
a Buddha, i.e., a Samma-sambuddha—see Dialogues, ii. 14 f .
2
Padesa. See above, III. 1, n. 3.
3
Literally, a Wheel-Turner, disposer of the symbol of empire.
Dialogues, ii. 11 f .
4 Cf. above, III. 1, § 1.
5
Literally, bull-speech.
the birth of the one as of the other a mighty light, a
mighty radiance, a mighty earthquake; that (h) the natural
body of the one as of the other lights up a fathom's space
around it ; that (i) one and the other see a great dream1
—•
all of which you deny.
[6] U— But if you reject my proposition, tell me: is
there not a Suttanta in which the Exalted One said :
'Bhikkhus, to one endowed with the thirty-two marks of a
Superman, two careers lie open, and none other. If he live
the life of the house, he becomes Lord of the Wheel, a righteous
Lord of the Right, Ruler of the four quarters, conqueror,
guardian of the people's good, owner of the Seven Treasures;
his do those seven treasures become, to wit, the Wheel treasure,
the Elephant, the Horse, the Jeivel, the Woman, the Steward,
the Heir Apparent. More than a thousand sons are his,
heroes, vigorous of frame, crushers of the hosts of the enemy.
He, ivhen he has conquered this earth to * its ocean bounds, is
established not by the scourge, not by the sword, but by
righteousness. But if he go forth from his home to the home-
less, he becomes an Arahant Buddha Supreme, rolling back
the veil from the world' ?2
Is not therefore my proposition true ?
8. Of entering on the Path of Assurance.
Controverted Point.—That the Bodhisat had entered on
the Path of Assurance and conformed to the life therein
during the dispensation3
of Kassapa Buddha.
4
From the Commentary.—This discourse deals with a belief, shared
by the Andhakas,
5
with reference to the account in the Ghatikara Sutta
of Jotipala joining the Order,6 that [our] Bodhisat had entered the
1
On the five 'great dreams' see Anguttara-Nik, iii. 240 f .
2
Digha-Nik., iii. p. 145. Cf . Dialogues, ii. 13.
3
Literally, teaching or doctrine (pavacana).
4
This was the Buddha next before 'our' Buddha. See Dialogues,
ii., p. 6. On 'Assurance,' see V. 4, and Appendix:
4
Assurance.' ,
5
See preceding extract.
6
Majjhima-Nik., ii. p. 46 f. Jotipala was a Brahmin youth who,
Path of Assurance under Kassapa Buddha. Now Assurance (niyama )
and the ' higher life therein' (brahmacariya) are equivalents for
the Ariyan [Fourfold] Path. And there is no other entering upon that
Path for Bodhisats save when they are fulfilling the Perfections;1 other-
wise our Bodhisat would have been a disciple when Stream-Winner,
etc. The Buddhas prophesy ' he will become a Buddha' (as Kassapa
is said to have prophesied concerning Gotama Buddha, then alive as
this Jotipala) simply by the might of their insight.
[1] Th.—If so, [our] Bodhisat must have been a disciple
—i.e., one in the Ariyan Way—of Kassapa Buddha. You
deny. For if you assent, you must admit that he became
Buddha after his career as disciple. Moreover, a ' disciple '
is one who learns through information from others, while
a Buddha is self-developed.
2
[2] Further, if the Bodhisat became Kassapa's disciple,
[entering on the first Path and Fruit], it follows that there
were only three .stages of fruition for him to know
thoroughly when under the Bodhi Tree. But we believe
that all four were then realized.
3
[3] Further, would one who had entered on the Path of
Assurance [as a disciple] have undergone the austerities
practised by the Bodhisat [in his own last life]? And would
such an one point to others as his teachers and practise
their austerities, as did the Bodhisat in his last life ?
4
[4] Do we learn that, as the Venerable Ananda, and the
householder Citta and Hatthaka the Alavakan entered into
Assurance and lived its higher life as disciples under the
Exalted One, so the Exalted One himself, as Bodhisat,
acted under Kassapa Buddha? You deny, of course.
[5] If they did so enter, under the Exalted One, as" his
disciples, you cannot affirm that the Bodhisat entered on
the Path of Assurance, and lived its higher life under
Kassapa Buddha without being his disciple. Or can a
against his will, was brought by Ghatikara, the potter, to hear Kas-
sapa Buddha, and became a bhikkhu. Gotama Buddha affirmed that
Jotipala was a former impersonation of himself.
1 Cf . Buddhist Birth Stories, p. 18 f .
2 Sayam-bhu.
3 Op. cit, 109.
4 Majjhima-Nik., i. 80, 245.
disciple who has evolved past one birth become a non-
disciple afterwards ? You deny, o f course.
[6] A. U.—But if our proposition is wrong, is there not
a Suttanta in which the Exalted One said: 'Under the
Exalted One Kassapa, An an da, I lived the higher life for
supreme enlightenment in the future ' ?1
[7] Th.—But is there not a Suttanta in which the
Exalted One said:
' All have I overcome. All things I know,
'Mid all things undefiled. Renouncing all,
In death of craving wholly free. My own
The deeper vieiv. Whom shoidd I name to thee
2
For me no teacher lives. I stand alone
On earth, in lieav'n rival to me there's none.
Yea, I am Arahant as to this world,
A Teacher I above whom there is none.
Supreme enlightenment is mine alone.
In holy Coolness I, all fires extinct.
Noiv go I on seeking Benares totvn,
To start the Wheel, to set on foot the Norm.
Amid a ivorld in gloom and very blind,
I strike the alarm upon Ambrosia's Drum' ?
'According to what thou declarest, brother, thou art indeed
Arahant, ["worthy" to be]2
conqueror world without end.'
' Like unto me indeed are conquerors
Who every poisonous canker have cast out.
Conquered by me is every evil thing,
And therefore am I conqueror, Upaka ' ? 3
[8] And is there not a Suttanta in which the Exalted
One said : " O bhikkhus, it was concerning things unlearnt
before that vision, insight, understanding, wisdom, light arose
in me at the thought of the Ariyan Truth of the nature and
1
We cannot trace this, but cf. Majjhima-Nik, ii., p. 54 ; Buddha-
vangsa, xxv. 10.
2
Br. and PTS editions read araha'si; Majjhima-Nik. (Trenckner)
has arahasi.
3
Vinaya Texts, i. 91; Majjhima-Nik., i. 171; Pss. Sisters, 129.
fact of Ill, and that this Truth was to be understood, and was
understood by me. It was concerning things unlearnt before
that vision, insight, understanding, wisdom, light arose in me
at the thought of the Ariyan Truth as to the Cause of Ill, and
that this Truth was concerning something to be put away, and
was put away by me. It was concerning things unlearnt before
that vision, insight, understanding, wisdom, light arose in me
at the thought of the Ariyan Truth as to the Cessation of Ill,
and that this Truth was concerning something to be realized,
and ivas realized by me. It was concerning things unlearnt
before that vision, insight, 'understanding, wisdom, light arose
in me at the thought of the A riyan Truth as to the Course
leading to the cessation of Ill, and that this truth was to be
developed, and was developed by me ' ?1
How then can you say that the Bodhisat entered on the
Path of Assurance and lived the higher life thereof [as far
back as] the age of Kassapa Buddha ?
1
Samyutta-Nik., v. 422.
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
7. Of One gifted with the Marks.
Controverted Point.—That one who is gifted with the
Marks is a Bodhisat.
From the Commentary.—This and the two following discourses are
about Uttarapathaka views. This one deals with a belief derived from
a careless interpretation of the Sutta : 'for one endowed as a superman
there are two careers.'
1
[1] Th.—By your proposition you must also admit [a
fortiori] (a) that anyone who is gifted with the Marks to a
limited extent,
2
with one-third, or one-half of them, is a
limited, one-third, or half Bodhisat, respectively—which
you deny.
[2] And (b) that a universal emperor
3
—who is also
gifted with the Marks—is a Bodhisat, and that the previous
study and conduct, declaring and teaching the Norm4 in
the Bodhisat's career, are the*same as those in the uni-
versal emperor's career; that (c) when a universal emperor
is born, devas receive him first, and then humans, as they
do the new-born Bodhisat; [8] that (d) four sons of the
devas receiving the new-born imperial babe place it before
the mother, saying: ' Rejoice, 0 queen! to thee is bom a
mighty son!' even as they do for the new-born Bodhisat;
that (e) two rain-showers, cold and warm, come from the
sky, wherewith both babe and mother may be washed,
even as happens at the birth of a Bodhisat; [4] that (/) a
new-born imperial babe, standing on even feet, and facing
north, walks seven paces, a white canopy being held over
him, and looking round on all sides speaks the trumpet
5
notes: ' I am the foremost, I am chief, I am the highest
in the world. This is my last birth; now is there no more
coming again to be!' [5] that (g) there is manifested at
1
See below. On the thirty-two Marks and the Bodhisat—i.e.,
Bodhisatta,' enlightenment-being,' or one who in the same life becomes
a Buddha, i.e., a Samma-sambuddha—see Dialogues, ii. 14 f .
2
Padesa. See above, III. 1, n. 3.
3
Literally, a Wheel-Turner, disposer of the symbol of empire.
Dialogues, ii. 11 f .
4 Cf. above, III. 1, § 1.
5
Literally, bull-speech.
the birth of the one as of the other a mighty light, a
mighty radiance, a mighty earthquake; that (h) the natural
body of the one as of the other lights up a fathom's space
around it ; that (i) one and the other see a great dream1
—•
all of which you deny.
[6] U— But if you reject my proposition, tell me: is
there not a Suttanta in which the Exalted One said :
'Bhikkhus, to one endowed with the thirty-two marks of a
Superman, two careers lie open, and none other. If he live
the life of the house, he becomes Lord of the Wheel, a righteous
Lord of the Right, Ruler of the four quarters, conqueror,
guardian of the people's good, owner of the Seven Treasures;
his do those seven treasures become, to wit, the Wheel treasure,
the Elephant, the Horse, the Jeivel, the Woman, the Steward,
the Heir Apparent. More than a thousand sons are his,
heroes, vigorous of frame, crushers of the hosts of the enemy.
He, ivhen he has conquered this earth to * its ocean bounds, is
established not by the scourge, not by the sword, but by
righteousness. But if he go forth from his home to the home-
less, he becomes an Arahant Buddha Supreme, rolling back
the veil from the world' ?2
Is not therefore my proposition true ?
8. Of entering on the Path of Assurance.
Controverted Point.—That the Bodhisat had entered on
the Path of Assurance and conformed to the life therein
during the dispensation3
of Kassapa Buddha.
4
From the Commentary.—This discourse deals with a belief, shared
by the Andhakas,
5
with reference to the account in the Ghatikara Sutta
of Jotipala joining the Order,6 that [our] Bodhisat had entered the
1
On the five 'great dreams' see Anguttara-Nik, iii. 240 f .
2
Digha-Nik., iii. p. 145. Cf . Dialogues, ii. 13.
3
Literally, teaching or doctrine (pavacana).
4
This was the Buddha next before 'our' Buddha. See Dialogues,
ii., p. 6. On 'Assurance,' see V. 4, and Appendix:
4
Assurance.' ,
5
See preceding extract.
6
Majjhima-Nik., ii. p. 46 f. Jotipala was a Brahmin youth who,
Path of Assurance under Kassapa Buddha. Now Assurance (niyama )
and the ' higher life therein' (brahmacariya) are equivalents for
the Ariyan [Fourfold] Path. And there is no other entering upon that
Path for Bodhisats save when they are fulfilling the Perfections;1 other-
wise our Bodhisat would have been a disciple when Stream-Winner,
etc. The Buddhas prophesy ' he will become a Buddha' (as Kassapa
is said to have prophesied concerning Gotama Buddha, then alive as
this Jotipala) simply by the might of their insight.
[1] Th.—If so, [our] Bodhisat must have been a disciple
—i.e., one in the Ariyan Way—of Kassapa Buddha. You
deny. For if you assent, you must admit that he became
Buddha after his career as disciple. Moreover, a ' disciple '
is one who learns through information from others, while
a Buddha is self-developed.
2
[2] Further, if the Bodhisat became Kassapa's disciple,
[entering on the first Path and Fruit], it follows that there
were only three .stages of fruition for him to know
thoroughly when under the Bodhi Tree. But we believe
that all four were then realized.
3
[3] Further, would one who had entered on the Path of
Assurance [as a disciple] have undergone the austerities
practised by the Bodhisat [in his own last life]? And would
such an one point to others as his teachers and practise
their austerities, as did the Bodhisat in his last life ?
4
[4] Do we learn that, as the Venerable Ananda, and the
householder Citta and Hatthaka the Alavakan entered into
Assurance and lived its higher life as disciples under the
Exalted One, so the Exalted One himself, as Bodhisat,
acted under Kassapa Buddha? You deny, of course.
[5] If they did so enter, under the Exalted One, as" his
disciples, you cannot affirm that the Bodhisat entered on
the Path of Assurance, and lived its higher life under
Kassapa Buddha without being his disciple. Or can a
against his will, was brought by Ghatikara, the potter, to hear Kas-
sapa Buddha, and became a bhikkhu. Gotama Buddha affirmed that
Jotipala was a former impersonation of himself.
1 Cf . Buddhist Birth Stories, p. 18 f .
2 Sayam-bhu.
3 Op. cit, 109.
4 Majjhima-Nik., i. 80, 245.
disciple who has evolved past one birth become a non-
disciple afterwards ? You deny, o f course.
[6] A. U.—But if our proposition is wrong, is there not
a Suttanta in which the Exalted One said: 'Under the
Exalted One Kassapa, An an da, I lived the higher life for
supreme enlightenment in the future ' ?1
[7] Th.—But is there not a Suttanta in which the
Exalted One said:
' All have I overcome. All things I know,
'Mid all things undefiled. Renouncing all,
In death of craving wholly free. My own
The deeper vieiv. Whom shoidd I name to thee
2
For me no teacher lives. I stand alone
On earth, in lieav'n rival to me there's none.
Yea, I am Arahant as to this world,
A Teacher I above whom there is none.
Supreme enlightenment is mine alone.
In holy Coolness I, all fires extinct.
Noiv go I on seeking Benares totvn,
To start the Wheel, to set on foot the Norm.
Amid a ivorld in gloom and very blind,
I strike the alarm upon Ambrosia's Drum' ?
'According to what thou declarest, brother, thou art indeed
Arahant, ["worthy" to be]2
conqueror world without end.'
' Like unto me indeed are conquerors
Who every poisonous canker have cast out.
Conquered by me is every evil thing,
And therefore am I conqueror, Upaka ' ? 3
[8] And is there not a Suttanta in which the Exalted
One said : " O bhikkhus, it was concerning things unlearnt
before that vision, insight, understanding, wisdom, light arose
in me at the thought of the Ariyan Truth of the nature and
1
We cannot trace this, but cf. Majjhima-Nik, ii., p. 54 ; Buddha-
vangsa, xxv. 10.
2
Br. and PTS editions read araha'si; Majjhima-Nik. (Trenckner)
has arahasi.
3
Vinaya Texts, i. 91; Majjhima-Nik., i. 171; Pss. Sisters, 129.
fact of Ill, and that this Truth was to be understood, and was
understood by me. It was concerning things unlearnt before
that vision, insight, understanding, wisdom, light arose in me
at the thought of the Ariyan Truth as to the Cause of Ill, and
that this Truth was concerning something to be put away, and
was put away by me. It was concerning things unlearnt before
that vision, insight, understanding, wisdom, light arose in me
at the thought of the Ariyan Truth as to the Cessation of Ill,
and that this Truth was concerning something to be realized,
and ivas realized by me. It was concerning things unlearnt
before that vision, insight, 'understanding, wisdom, light arose
in me at the thought of the A riyan Truth as to the Course
leading to the cessation of Ill, and that this truth was to be
developed, and was developed by me ' ?1
How then can you say that the Bodhisat entered on the
Path of Assurance and lived the higher life thereof [as far
back as] the age of Kassapa Buddha ?
1
Samyutta-Nik., v. 422.
Kathavatthu - Of the Arahant's Indifference in Sense-Cognition & Of becoming 'the Enlightened One' through Enlightenment
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
5. Of the Arahant's Indifference in Sense-Cognition.
Controverted Point.—That an Arahant is endowed with
six indifferences.
From the Commentary.—The Arahant is said to be able to call up
indifference with respect to each of the six gates of sense-knowledge.
But he is not in a state of calling up indifference with respect to all
six at the same moment.
1
[1] Th.—In affirming this proposition, you imply that
the Arahant experiences [simultaneously] six contacts
[between sense-organ (and sense-mind) and their objects],
six feelings, perceptions, volitions, . , . insights—which you
deny; that [2] he is using his five senses and mental co-
ordination at [the same instant]; that [3] he, being con-
tinually, constantly, uninterruptedly in possession of , and
made intent with six indifferences, six indifferences are
present to him2
—both of which you deny.
[4] Opponent.—Yet you admit that an Arahant is gifted
with sixfold indifference.3 Is this not admitting my propo-
sition ?
1
In Theravada, sensations, however swift in succession, are never
simultaneous.
2
Literally, 'recur to him?
(paccupatthita).
3
Chalupekkho , a phrase we have not yet traced in the Pitakas.
The six, however, are mentioned in Digha-Nik., iii. 245; Majjhima-
Nik, iii. 219.
6. Of becoming 'The Enlightened' (Buddha) through
Enlightenment (bodhi).
Controverted Point.—That through Enlightenment one
becomes ' The Enlightened.'
1
' From Commentary.—Bodhi is an equivalent for (1) insight
into the Four Paths; (2) insight into all things, or the omniscience of a
Buddha. And some, like the Uttarapathakas at present, [do not dis-
tinguish, but] hold that, as a thing is called white by white-coloured
surface, black by black-coloured surface, so a person is called' Buddha'
because of this or that aspect of bodhi.
2
[1] Th.—If it is in virtue of ' enlightenment' that one
becomes 'The Enlightened,' then it follows that, in virtue
of the cessation, suspension, subsidence of enlightenment,
he ceases to be The Enlightened—this you deny, but you
imply it.
[2] Or is one The Enlightened only in virtue of past en-
lightenment ? Of course you deny this
3
—[then my previous
point holds]. If "you assent, do you mean that one who is
The Enlightened exercises the work of enlightenment by that
past enlightenment only ? If you assent, you imply that
he understands Ill , puts away its cause, realizes its cessa-
tion, develops the Eightfold Path thereto, by that past
enlightenment—which is absurd.
1
It is difficult for those who are not readers of Pali to follow the
intentional ambiguity of the terms in the argument. To the noun
bodh i corresponds the deponent verb bujjhati, to awake, to be
enlightened, to be wise, to know. And buddh o is the past par-
ticiple, One who is buddh o is graduating, or has graduated in the
Fourfold Path. If he become s a mm a sambuddho , supremely
and continually (or generally) enlightened, or sabbannu-buddho ,
omnisciently enlightened, he is then a world-Buddha, saviour of
men. To keep this double sense in view, we have not used ' Buddha'
for this latter meaning.
2
Here (1) and (2) are applied indiscriminately to one and the same
person; again, there is still a sect in Burma who identify the Buddha
with bodhi itself, ignoring his distinctive personality. The Thera-
vadin takes account of both views.
3
'Because of the absence now of that past moment [of enlighten-
ment.']— Comy.
[3] Substitute for 'past,' ' future ' enlightenment, and
the same argument applies.
[4] Let us assume that one is called The Enlightened
through present enlightenment : if you assert that he
exercises the work of enlightenment through present en-
lightenment, you must also affirm [by analogy] that if he
is called The Enlightened through past, or [5] through
future enlightenment, it is by that that he understands Ill,
puts away its cause, and so on—which you deny.
[6] For if an enlightened person, so-called in virtue of
past, or [7] of future enlightenment, does not exercise the
work of enlightenment, through one or the other respec-
tively, then [by analogy] one who is enlightened by present'
enlightenment does not exercise enlightenment through
that present enlightenment—which is absurd.
[8] Do you then affirm that one is called The Enlightened
through past, present, and tuture enlightenment?1 Then
are there three enlightenments-? If you deny, your affirma-
tion [by the foregoing] cannot stand. If you assent,,
you imply that he, being continually, constantly, uninter-
ruptedly gifted with and intent through three enlighten-
ments, these three are simultaneously present to him—-
which you of course deny.
2
[9] U.—But surely one who is called The Enlightened,
is one who has acquired enlightenment ? How is. my pro-
position wrong?
3
[10] Th.—You assume that one is,called The Enlightened
from having acquired enlightenment, or by enlightenment
—is enlightenment the same as the acquiring of enlighten-
ment?
4
1
' This is assented to as being the proper thing to say.'—Comy.
2
Cf. IV. 5, § 3.
3
In that it would mean: a Buddha, in the absence of Bodhi ,
would no longer be a Buddha, a distinct personality. The person is
merged in the concept of Bodhi.—Cf. Comy.
4
The opponent denying, the argument finishes according to. the
stereotyped procedure.
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
5. Of the Arahant's Indifference in Sense-Cognition.
Controverted Point.—That an Arahant is endowed with
six indifferences.
From the Commentary.—The Arahant is said to be able to call up
indifference with respect to each of the six gates of sense-knowledge.
But he is not in a state of calling up indifference with respect to all
six at the same moment.
1
[1] Th.—In affirming this proposition, you imply that
the Arahant experiences [simultaneously] six contacts
[between sense-organ (and sense-mind) and their objects],
six feelings, perceptions, volitions, . , . insights—which you
deny; that [2] he is using his five senses and mental co-
ordination at [the same instant]; that [3] he, being con-
tinually, constantly, uninterruptedly in possession of , and
made intent with six indifferences, six indifferences are
present to him2
—both of which you deny.
[4] Opponent.—Yet you admit that an Arahant is gifted
with sixfold indifference.3 Is this not admitting my propo-
sition ?
1
In Theravada, sensations, however swift in succession, are never
simultaneous.
2
Literally, 'recur to him?
(paccupatthita).
3
Chalupekkho , a phrase we have not yet traced in the Pitakas.
The six, however, are mentioned in Digha-Nik., iii. 245; Majjhima-
Nik, iii. 219.
6. Of becoming 'The Enlightened' (Buddha) through
Enlightenment (bodhi).
Controverted Point.—That through Enlightenment one
becomes ' The Enlightened.'
1
' From Commentary.—Bodhi is an equivalent for (1) insight
into the Four Paths; (2) insight into all things, or the omniscience of a
Buddha. And some, like the Uttarapathakas at present, [do not dis-
tinguish, but] hold that, as a thing is called white by white-coloured
surface, black by black-coloured surface, so a person is called' Buddha'
because of this or that aspect of bodhi.
2
[1] Th.—If it is in virtue of ' enlightenment' that one
becomes 'The Enlightened,' then it follows that, in virtue
of the cessation, suspension, subsidence of enlightenment,
he ceases to be The Enlightened—this you deny, but you
imply it.
[2] Or is one The Enlightened only in virtue of past en-
lightenment ? Of course you deny this
3
—[then my previous
point holds]. If "you assent, do you mean that one who is
The Enlightened exercises the work of enlightenment by that
past enlightenment only ? If you assent, you imply that
he understands Ill , puts away its cause, realizes its cessa-
tion, develops the Eightfold Path thereto, by that past
enlightenment—which is absurd.
1
It is difficult for those who are not readers of Pali to follow the
intentional ambiguity of the terms in the argument. To the noun
bodh i corresponds the deponent verb bujjhati, to awake, to be
enlightened, to be wise, to know. And buddh o is the past par-
ticiple, One who is buddh o is graduating, or has graduated in the
Fourfold Path. If he become s a mm a sambuddho , supremely
and continually (or generally) enlightened, or sabbannu-buddho ,
omnisciently enlightened, he is then a world-Buddha, saviour of
men. To keep this double sense in view, we have not used ' Buddha'
for this latter meaning.
2
Here (1) and (2) are applied indiscriminately to one and the same
person; again, there is still a sect in Burma who identify the Buddha
with bodhi itself, ignoring his distinctive personality. The Thera-
vadin takes account of both views.
3
'Because of the absence now of that past moment [of enlighten-
ment.']— Comy.
[3] Substitute for 'past,' ' future ' enlightenment, and
the same argument applies.
[4] Let us assume that one is called The Enlightened
through present enlightenment : if you assert that he
exercises the work of enlightenment through present en-
lightenment, you must also affirm [by analogy] that if he
is called The Enlightened through past, or [5] through
future enlightenment, it is by that that he understands Ill,
puts away its cause, and so on—which you deny.
[6] For if an enlightened person, so-called in virtue of
past, or [7] of future enlightenment, does not exercise the
work of enlightenment, through one or the other respec-
tively, then [by analogy] one who is enlightened by present'
enlightenment does not exercise enlightenment through
that present enlightenment—which is absurd.
[8] Do you then affirm that one is called The Enlightened
through past, present, and tuture enlightenment?1 Then
are there three enlightenments-? If you deny, your affirma-
tion [by the foregoing] cannot stand. If you assent,,
you imply that he, being continually, constantly, uninter-
ruptedly gifted with and intent through three enlighten-
ments, these three are simultaneously present to him—-
which you of course deny.
2
[9] U.—But surely one who is called The Enlightened,
is one who has acquired enlightenment ? How is. my pro-
position wrong?
3
[10] Th.—You assume that one is,called The Enlightened
from having acquired enlightenment, or by enlightenment
—is enlightenment the same as the acquiring of enlighten-
ment?
4
1
' This is assented to as being the proper thing to say.'—Comy.
2
Cf. IV. 5, § 3.
3
In that it would mean: a Buddha, in the absence of Bodhi ,
would no longer be a Buddha, a distinct personality. The person is
merged in the concept of Bodhi.—Cf. Comy.
4
The opponent denying, the argument finishes according to. the
stereotyped procedure.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)