Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
9. Of Growth through Observance.
Controverted Point. — That virtue grows through [the
mere fact of] being undertaken.
From the Commentary.--Here, from a careless interpretation of the
verse in the Word, beginning—
'By planting pleasant parks and woods,'
wherein it is said—
'Merit doth grow continually,'
some, like the Mahasanghikas, hold that virtue grows naturally when
once the virtuous life has been undertaken, accumulating indepen-
dently of the mind's action. The argument is similar to a previous
discourse.
[1-4] The argument is exactly similar to VII. 5 (p. 200),
'virtue grows through being undertaken ' replacing 'merit
derived from a gift . . . enjoyed keeps growing,' § 2 being
omitted, and in § 3, ' the giver of a gift' being replaced by
' one who has undertaken a life of virtue.'
10. Are Acts of Intimation Virtue ?
Controverted Point.—That acts of intimation are moral
acts,
From the Commentary. — Some, like the Mahasanghikas and
Sammitiyas, thinking that ' bodily intimation is karma of deed, vocal
intimation is karma of speech,' believe that such acts have a moral
quality. But intimation (as gesture or speech) is a material matter,
while morality or virtuous conduct is not so, but is a deliberate (i.e.,
mental) act of abstinence.
[1] Th.—But the conduct called moral — abstaining
from taking life, from stealing, from fornication, lying, and
strong drink—do you affirm that these are so many modes
of intimation ? You do not. .. .
[Acts intimating minor courtesies such as] salutation,
rising to welcome, presenting clasped hands, acts of pro-
priety, offering a seat, a couch, water for the feet, a towel1
for the feet, rubbing the back in the bath2—are these
morality? Yes, you say. But you would not affirm they
1
Padakathaliya . See Vin. Texts, i. 92 n. Of Buddhagho-
sa's alternative renderings, there given, the Burmese translator of
the Kathd Vatthu uses the latter. The 'footstool (padapitha) for
the washed feet' included in the Vinaya is here omitted.
2
The,same translator renders this word, nhane, by 'with powder.'
are the five abstinences just named. Those are moral—
are these ?
[2] M. S.—But if acts of intimation are not moral, are
they immoral ? If not, then they are moral.
11. Of Non-Intimation as Immoral
Controverted Point.—That acts not intimating [a moral
purpose] are immoral.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Mahasanghikas, hold this
view, based on the idea of a possible accumulation of demerit [in the
past], and on the fact that moral precepts may be broken at the
dictates of another.
[1] Th.—But the conduct that is immoral—taking life,
theft, fornication, lying, intemperance—do you affirm that
these are so many modes of wow-intimation ? You deny.
(Then they are intimative, and some immoral acts are
therefore intimative [of moral purpose].)
[2] If anyone giving in charity has resolved on some
evil deed, do his merit and his demerit both grow thereby ?
If you assent, you are involved in two sets of mental pro-
cedure.1 And if you assent to this anomaly, you have
good and bad, low and excellent, sinister and radiant states
of mind simultaneously present, when, in fact, as the
Exalted One said, they are as far apart as earth and sky,
etc.2 [3] Similarly for all courtesies shown by one who has
resolved on some evil deed.
[4] M.—But an evil deed, you admit, had been resolved
upon, hence it is right to say that acts non-intimative of
a 'moral thought behind them are immoral.
1 As in X. 1.
2 As in VII. 5.
Showing posts with label Abhidhamma Pitaka. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Abhidhamma Pitaka. Show all posts
Tuesday, June 21, 2011
Monday, June 20, 2011
Kathavatthu - Of Two Codes of Moral, Of Virtue or Morality as Automatic & as conforming to Thought
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
6. Of Two Codes of Morals.
Controverted Point.—That one who is engaged in the
Path is practising a double morality.
From, the Commentary,—From such passages in the "Word as
'When a man is established in virtue he is gifted with wisdom,'1 some,
like the Mahasanghikas, hold that, inasmuch as the virtuous person is
developing the Path which is not of the world, with a morality that is
of the world, he must, at the moment of realization, be possessed
simultaneously of both a worldly an$ an unworldly morality. The
argument begins by showing; that each morality would involve two
separate sets of mental processes.
[1] Th.—You must then be prepared to affirm that he
is possessed of his dual morality with a dual mental con-
tact, dual feeling, dual perception, dual volition, dual
thought, dual faith, dual energy, dual mindfulness, dual
concentration, dual understanding. .. . [2] If his moral
code be worldly, these processes will be worldly. [3] If
his moral code be both, they will be double. The mental
contact, the fueling, etc., that he experiences, will be both
worldly as well as unworldly [or supramundane]—which you
of course deny. .. .
And if you say that one actually engaged on the Path is
possessed of a worldly code of morals, you are calling such
an one in effect an average person or worldling—which you
of course Refuse, to do. .
[4-6] Your position, you say, is this: (1) one actually -
engaged on the Path practises a worldly morality in the
three factors relating to conduct—right speech, right action,
right livelihood—but not in the five factors relating to
mental life.2
(2) In those three factors his morals are
both worldly and supramundane, but they are only the latter
In the other five factors. My position is that you must
affirm one and the same higher morality for all the eight.3
1
Samyutta-Nik., i. 13,165; quoted in Milindapanha, 34.
2
See X. 2.
3
Implied, not stated in so many words.
[7] M.—:Well, but does the Path come to be1 when
worldly morality has ceased ?
Th.—Yes.
M.—What! can anyone without morals—his virtue
defective, imperfect, cut off—develop the Path ?
Th.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. .. .
7. Of Virtue or Morality as Automatic.2
Controverted Point.—That virtuous conduct is automatic
(and not a property of consciousness).
From the Commentary.is held by some, like the Mahasangh-
ikas, that when there has been moral conduct, even though it has
ceased, there is an accretion of virtue, and hence the doer becomes
virtuous. The argument is analogous to that on giving as not mental
(VII. 4).
[1] Th.—But is virtue either material qualities, or
Nibbana, or an organ or object of sense [since these are
the opposites of properties of mind] ? .. . [2] You would
not call mental contact, feeling, perception, volition, faith,
energy, mindfulness, concentration, understanding, un-
mental. But if virtue cannot be identified with anything
that is not mental, it must be a property of mind. .. .
[3-5] If virtue be no property of consciousness, you must
affirm that it has not a result consciously sought after.
Is not the opposite true? But if it has a .result to be
desired, it is also something mental. . . . The mental
properties just enumerated—they have boih consciously
desired results and are mental. In admitting this, you
must also admit that virtue is of the same dual c^racter.
But you contend that virtue, on the contrary, is so
anomalous as to have a consciously desired result, yet to
be not mental. .. .
[6-8] Again, if virtue be not a thing of the mind, you
must admit that it has not a result, not an effect [in
1
Literally, 'arise.'
2
A-cetasikang .
future consciousness]1; yet is it not precisely something
having such a result and effect? You would surely not
say that it is non-mental and not productive of effect , as
you would admit in the case of an organ or object of
sense ? Again, you would not consider that these non-
mentals have such a result; yet this is what you say of
virtue:—that it is both non-mental and yet fruitful of
results in consciousness.
[9-10] With reference to the Path-factors, you would
call the three factors relating to virtuous conduct non-
mental, while calling the other five mental [which you are
not justified in doing].
[11] M.—But if I am wrong, you must then admit that
when virtuous acts have ceased, the doer becomes immoral.
You deny this? Then I am right to say that virtue is
[i.e., goes on] without mind, mechanically.
8. Of Virtue as conforming to Thought.
Controverted Point.—That virtue does not proceed in
adaptation to2 thought.
From the Commentary.—This is merely a pendant to the previous
discourse.
[1-5] The argument is exactly similar to X. 7, 'does not
proceed in adaptation to thought' being substituted for 'is
automatic (or a property of consciousness),' and the middle
sections [3-8] on ' result' and ' effect' being omitted.
1
See pp. 205, n. 3, 207, n. 2.
2
Literally, roll along after, in accordance with (anu-parivat -
tati) . Cf. Bud. Psy. Eth., §§ 671, 772.
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
6. Of Two Codes of Morals.
Controverted Point.—That one who is engaged in the
Path is practising a double morality.
From, the Commentary,—From such passages in the "Word as
'When a man is established in virtue he is gifted with wisdom,'1 some,
like the Mahasanghikas, hold that, inasmuch as the virtuous person is
developing the Path which is not of the world, with a morality that is
of the world, he must, at the moment of realization, be possessed
simultaneously of both a worldly an$ an unworldly morality. The
argument begins by showing; that each morality would involve two
separate sets of mental processes.
[1] Th.—You must then be prepared to affirm that he
is possessed of his dual morality with a dual mental con-
tact, dual feeling, dual perception, dual volition, dual
thought, dual faith, dual energy, dual mindfulness, dual
concentration, dual understanding. .. . [2] If his moral
code be worldly, these processes will be worldly. [3] If
his moral code be both, they will be double. The mental
contact, the fueling, etc., that he experiences, will be both
worldly as well as unworldly [or supramundane]—which you
of course deny. .. .
And if you say that one actually engaged on the Path is
possessed of a worldly code of morals, you are calling such
an one in effect an average person or worldling—which you
of course Refuse, to do. .
[4-6] Your position, you say, is this: (1) one actually -
engaged on the Path practises a worldly morality in the
three factors relating to conduct—right speech, right action,
right livelihood—but not in the five factors relating to
mental life.2
(2) In those three factors his morals are
both worldly and supramundane, but they are only the latter
In the other five factors. My position is that you must
affirm one and the same higher morality for all the eight.3
1
Samyutta-Nik., i. 13,165; quoted in Milindapanha, 34.
2
See X. 2.
3
Implied, not stated in so many words.
[7] M.—:Well, but does the Path come to be1 when
worldly morality has ceased ?
Th.—Yes.
M.—What! can anyone without morals—his virtue
defective, imperfect, cut off—develop the Path ?
Th.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. .. .
7. Of Virtue or Morality as Automatic.2
Controverted Point.—That virtuous conduct is automatic
(and not a property of consciousness).
From the Commentary.is held by some, like the Mahasangh-
ikas, that when there has been moral conduct, even though it has
ceased, there is an accretion of virtue, and hence the doer becomes
virtuous. The argument is analogous to that on giving as not mental
(VII. 4).
[1] Th.—But is virtue either material qualities, or
Nibbana, or an organ or object of sense [since these are
the opposites of properties of mind] ? .. . [2] You would
not call mental contact, feeling, perception, volition, faith,
energy, mindfulness, concentration, understanding, un-
mental. But if virtue cannot be identified with anything
that is not mental, it must be a property of mind. .. .
[3-5] If virtue be no property of consciousness, you must
affirm that it has not a result consciously sought after.
Is not the opposite true? But if it has a .result to be
desired, it is also something mental. . . . The mental
properties just enumerated—they have boih consciously
desired results and are mental. In admitting this, you
must also admit that virtue is of the same dual c^racter.
But you contend that virtue, on the contrary, is so
anomalous as to have a consciously desired result, yet to
be not mental. .. .
[6-8] Again, if virtue be not a thing of the mind, you
must admit that it has not a result, not an effect [in
1
Literally, 'arise.'
2
A-cetasikang .
future consciousness]1; yet is it not precisely something
having such a result and effect? You would surely not
say that it is non-mental and not productive of effect , as
you would admit in the case of an organ or object of
sense ? Again, you would not consider that these non-
mentals have such a result; yet this is what you say of
virtue:—that it is both non-mental and yet fruitful of
results in consciousness.
[9-10] With reference to the Path-factors, you would
call the three factors relating to virtuous conduct non-
mental, while calling the other five mental [which you are
not justified in doing].
[11] M.—But if I am wrong, you must then admit that
when virtuous acts have ceased, the doer becomes immoral.
You deny this? Then I am right to say that virtue is
[i.e., goes on] without mind, mechanically.
8. Of Virtue as conforming to Thought.
Controverted Point.—That virtue does not proceed in
adaptation to2 thought.
From the Commentary.—This is merely a pendant to the previous
discourse.
[1-5] The argument is exactly similar to X. 7, 'does not
proceed in adaptation to thought' being substituted for 'is
automatic (or a property of consciousness),' and the middle
sections [3-8] on ' result' and ' effect' being omitted.
1
See pp. 205, n. 3, 207, n. 2.
2
Literally, roll along after, in accordance with (anu-parivat -
tati) . Cf. Bud. Psy. Eth., §§ 671, 772.
Kathavatthu - Of Path-Culture and the Senses, Of Sensations as Moral, Immoral and Ideation
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
3. Of Path-Culture and the Senses.
Controverted Point.—That one may develop the Path
while enjoying the fivefold cognitions of sense.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Mahasanghikas, with
reference to the Sutta : ' When he sees an object with the eye, he does
not grasp at it in idea'
3
hold to the view stated above. The Thera-
vadin's argument is that, if this be so, either the Path developed is of
a worldly nature, or the developer's sense-experience must be of the
nature of the Path. But neither is possible, because seose-cognition
is worldly, and has not Nibbana as its object.2
[1] Th.—But you will admit—(i.) that the five kinds of
sense-consciousness have a seat and an object that have
already sprung up; (ii.) that their seat and object are
antecedent; (iii.) that their seat is o f the subject whi|e
their object is external, that seat and object are not yet"
broken up while operative; (iv.) that seat and object are
of different varieties ; (v.) that they do not enjoy mutually
their respective ranges and fields; (vi.) that they come to
pass not without co-ordinated application or attention3;
(vii.) that they are not unmixed; (viii.) are not without
order in time; (ix.) are without order of contiguity; and
(x.) without any ideation?
4
Now if all this be true, your
proposition cannot be true.
2
The Path is a concern of mano, not of the five senses ; again, i.—x.
are not predictable of the Path.—Comy.
3
By the mind adverting to external object.—Comy.
4
Quoted from Vibhanga, 307. 'Leaving aside the automatic fall
(incidence in a presented object), there is not even the semblance of
minding about it [in sense].'—Comy.
[2] Consider visual consciousness and one of the Path-
subjects— Emptiness1— does the former come to pass
concerning the latter ? If you deny,2 you are opposing
your thesis. If you assent, I ask whether it is right doc-
trine to say not only :
'Because of the eye and the visible object visual con-
sciousness arises
but also:
Because of the eye and Emptiness visual consciousness
arises ?
Is the Suttanta thus? [Of course not.]
[3] Again, if your proposition be true, you must also
affirm that visual consciousness arises concerning the past
and the future. Also that it arises [not solely because of
visible object, but also] concerning mental contact, feeling,
perception, volition, thought, the organs of sight, hearing,
smell, taste, touch, and the objects of hearing, smell,
taste, touch—impossible affirmations.
Now you can admit that representative (ideational)
consciousness does arise concerning Emptiness, concerning
the past and the future, concerning phases of mind, factors
of experience, as stated just now.
And one may develop a Path while enjoying representa-
tive cognition concerning any one of those matters, but not
during the enjoyment of sense-consciousness, which as
such is not concerned with them.
[4] M.—Well, but was it not said by the Exalted One :
' Here, bhikkhus, when a bhikkhu sees an object with the eye,
he does not grasp at the general characters nor at the details
of it, . . . or hears a sound, . . . or smells, . . . tastes, . . .
touches a tangible . . . '?3
Surely here there is Path-practice by one who is enjoying
the five sorts of sense-consciousness ? . . .
1
Compendium, 67, 216, and above, iii. 2.
2
Because of the orthodox formula below. See Majjhima-Nik.,
i. 259; Samyutta-Nik., iv. 87.
3
Anguttara-Nik., i. 113; cf. Dialogues i. 80, n. on the terms
rendered by 'characters,' 'details,' and their being generally taken to
refer to sex-attraction. See also Appendix : Nimitta.
4. Of Sensations as Moral and Immoral.
Controverted Point— That the five kinds of sense-con-
sciousness are good and bad (have positive moral quality).
The Commentary contributes no discussion.
[1-3]1 Th.—{Verbatim similar to X, 3, §§ 1-3.) The
argument being here, too, that the senses are limited to sense-
objects, ethical and intellectual matters being the concerns of
intellect, will, etc.
[4] M.—Well, but was it not taid by the Exalted One:
'Here, bhikkhus, when a bhikkhu sees an object with the eye,
he grasps, .. . or again, does not grasp, at the general
characters, or the details of it,...or hears a sound, etc. . . '?
Surely then the five sorts of sense-consciousness are good
and bad.
5. Of Sensations and Ideation.
Controverted Point.—That the five kinds of sense-con-
sciousness as such are co-ideational.2
From the Commentary. — Here again the Mahasanghikas, for
instance, carelessly interpret the Teacher's words, quoted in the fore-
going. They hold them to mean that the five kinds of Sensations as
such are accompanied by ideation, because sexual ideas ai^ generated
by immoral thoughts.
(The argument is verbatim similar to the preceding, the
authority appealed to being that in X. 2.)
1 The Commentary refers also to the preceding discourse.
2 Sabhoga. See VIII. 9, § 1, note.
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
3. Of Path-Culture and the Senses.
Controverted Point.—That one may develop the Path
while enjoying the fivefold cognitions of sense.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Mahasanghikas, with
reference to the Sutta : ' When he sees an object with the eye, he does
not grasp at it in idea'
3
hold to the view stated above. The Thera-
vadin's argument is that, if this be so, either the Path developed is of
a worldly nature, or the developer's sense-experience must be of the
nature of the Path. But neither is possible, because seose-cognition
is worldly, and has not Nibbana as its object.2
[1] Th.—But you will admit—(i.) that the five kinds of
sense-consciousness have a seat and an object that have
already sprung up; (ii.) that their seat and object are
antecedent; (iii.) that their seat is o f the subject whi|e
their object is external, that seat and object are not yet"
broken up while operative; (iv.) that seat and object are
of different varieties ; (v.) that they do not enjoy mutually
their respective ranges and fields; (vi.) that they come to
pass not without co-ordinated application or attention3;
(vii.) that they are not unmixed; (viii.) are not without
order in time; (ix.) are without order of contiguity; and
(x.) without any ideation?
4
Now if all this be true, your
proposition cannot be true.
2
The Path is a concern of mano, not of the five senses ; again, i.—x.
are not predictable of the Path.—Comy.
3
By the mind adverting to external object.—Comy.
4
Quoted from Vibhanga, 307. 'Leaving aside the automatic fall
(incidence in a presented object), there is not even the semblance of
minding about it [in sense].'—Comy.
[2] Consider visual consciousness and one of the Path-
subjects— Emptiness1— does the former come to pass
concerning the latter ? If you deny,2 you are opposing
your thesis. If you assent, I ask whether it is right doc-
trine to say not only :
'Because of the eye and the visible object visual con-
sciousness arises
but also:
Because of the eye and Emptiness visual consciousness
arises ?
Is the Suttanta thus? [Of course not.]
[3] Again, if your proposition be true, you must also
affirm that visual consciousness arises concerning the past
and the future. Also that it arises [not solely because of
visible object, but also] concerning mental contact, feeling,
perception, volition, thought, the organs of sight, hearing,
smell, taste, touch, and the objects of hearing, smell,
taste, touch—impossible affirmations.
Now you can admit that representative (ideational)
consciousness does arise concerning Emptiness, concerning
the past and the future, concerning phases of mind, factors
of experience, as stated just now.
And one may develop a Path while enjoying representa-
tive cognition concerning any one of those matters, but not
during the enjoyment of sense-consciousness, which as
such is not concerned with them.
[4] M.—Well, but was it not said by the Exalted One :
' Here, bhikkhus, when a bhikkhu sees an object with the eye,
he does not grasp at the general characters nor at the details
of it, . . . or hears a sound, . . . or smells, . . . tastes, . . .
touches a tangible . . . '?3
Surely here there is Path-practice by one who is enjoying
the five sorts of sense-consciousness ? . . .
1
Compendium, 67, 216, and above, iii. 2.
2
Because of the orthodox formula below. See Majjhima-Nik.,
i. 259; Samyutta-Nik., iv. 87.
3
Anguttara-Nik., i. 113; cf. Dialogues i. 80, n. on the terms
rendered by 'characters,' 'details,' and their being generally taken to
refer to sex-attraction. See also Appendix : Nimitta.
4. Of Sensations as Moral and Immoral.
Controverted Point— That the five kinds of sense-con-
sciousness are good and bad (have positive moral quality).
The Commentary contributes no discussion.
[1-3]1 Th.—{Verbatim similar to X, 3, §§ 1-3.) The
argument being here, too, that the senses are limited to sense-
objects, ethical and intellectual matters being the concerns of
intellect, will, etc.
[4] M.—Well, but was it not taid by the Exalted One:
'Here, bhikkhus, when a bhikkhu sees an object with the eye,
he grasps, .. . or again, does not grasp, at the general
characters, or the details of it,...or hears a sound, etc. . . '?
Surely then the five sorts of sense-consciousness are good
and bad.
5. Of Sensations and Ideation.
Controverted Point.—That the five kinds of sense-con-
sciousness as such are co-ideational.2
From the Commentary. — Here again the Mahasanghikas, for
instance, carelessly interpret the Teacher's words, quoted in the fore-
going. They hold them to mean that the five kinds of Sensations as
such are accompanied by ideation, because sexual ideas ai^ generated
by immoral thoughts.
(The argument is verbatim similar to the preceding, the
authority appealed to being that in X. 2.)
1 The Commentary refers also to the preceding discourse.
2 Sabhoga. See VIII. 9, § 1, note.
Kathavatthu - Of Cessation & Of the Path and Bodily Form
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
BOOK X
1. Of Cessation.
Controverted Point.—That before five aggregates seeking
rebirth have ceased, five operative1 aggregates arise.
From the Commentary.—Some—for instance, the Andhakas—hold
that if, before a unit of snb-consciousness lapses, another unit of con-
sciousness, with its [operative] fourfold aggregate and the material
aggregate sprung from it, has not arisen, the living continuum must
be cut off.2
[1] Th.—Is there then a congeries of ten aggregates?
Do ten aggregates arrive at actuality? If you deny, where
is your proposition? If you assent, you must answer for
two copies of each aggregate [which is unorthodox].
[2] The same argument holds if you maintain that only
four operative aggregates
3
may arise, substituting 'nine'
for ' ten' [i.e., five plus four].
[3] And the same argument holds if you maintain that
only operative insight
4
arises, substituting 'six' for 'nine '
[i.e., five plus one].
[4] A.—When the five aggregates seeking rebirth cease,
does the Path then arise ?
1
Kiriya, here meaning that which induces action, such as bodily
movement, etc. It is not specialized, as in Compendium, pp, 19,
235 f.; and may therefore be consciousness entailing merit or demerit.
The aggregates (khandha's) must be conceived as series of life-
moments.
2
Cf. op. cit., 126.
3
Excluding the material aggregate.
4
I.e., insight understood as in IX. 5.—Comy.
Th—Yes.
A.—What! do the dead, does one who has ended his
days, develop the Path?1
2. Of the Path and Bodily Form.
Controverted Point.—That the physical frame of one who
is practising the Eightfold Path is included in that Path.
From the Commentary.—Those who, like the Mahingsasakas, Sam-
mitiyas and Mahasanghikas, hold that the three factors of the Path :
—supremely right speech, action, and livelihood—are material, are
confronted with the contradiction that, since the factors of the Path
are subjective, they imply mental attributes lacking in matter.
[1] Th.—You must then be prepared to affirm also that
bodily form is [like the Path-factors] subjective, having
the mental attributes of adverting, ideating, co-ordinated
application, attending, volition, anticipating, aiming. You
deny this and rightly, for surely the opposite is true.
[2, 3] The three factors of the Path [in which you deem
things corporeal to be included]—supremely right speech,
action, livelihood—these, you affirm, are not subjective, not
having the mental attributes above-named. [4-5] But the
other five factors of the Path—supremely right views,
aspiration, endeavour, mindfulness, concentration—these,
you admit, are subjective, and have the mental attributes
above-named.
[6, 7] If you affirm the absence of these mental charac-
teristics from those three factors of the Path, you must
also affirm their absence from all these five factors of the
Path.
[8] M. S. M.—But you admit that supremely right
1
'By sophistry' (chalavada , Comy.), he has shifted from
psychological to religious ground, then skips back again, drawing a
false analogy between the final death of any one life and momentary
death. The aggregates typify the life of worldly desires, which for
the convert is superseded by the higher life of the Path. Psycho-
logically and physically, the cessation of their continuity means death.
Cf. below, X. 3.
speech, action, and livelihood are factors of the Path, [and
these are manifestations of corporeality]. Surely then
the practiser's physical frame is included in the Path.1
1
I.e., in part of it. The opponents regard those three factors as
physical, the Theravadin as psychical. For instance, according to the
latter's doctrine, sammavac a is not so much the right utterance
itself as that factor in the religious character by which right speech is
engendered.
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
BOOK X
1. Of Cessation.
Controverted Point.—That before five aggregates seeking
rebirth have ceased, five operative1 aggregates arise.
From the Commentary.—Some—for instance, the Andhakas—hold
that if, before a unit of snb-consciousness lapses, another unit of con-
sciousness, with its [operative] fourfold aggregate and the material
aggregate sprung from it, has not arisen, the living continuum must
be cut off.2
[1] Th.—Is there then a congeries of ten aggregates?
Do ten aggregates arrive at actuality? If you deny, where
is your proposition? If you assent, you must answer for
two copies of each aggregate [which is unorthodox].
[2] The same argument holds if you maintain that only
four operative aggregates
3
may arise, substituting 'nine'
for ' ten' [i.e., five plus four].
[3] And the same argument holds if you maintain that
only operative insight
4
arises, substituting 'six' for 'nine '
[i.e., five plus one].
[4] A.—When the five aggregates seeking rebirth cease,
does the Path then arise ?
1
Kiriya, here meaning that which induces action, such as bodily
movement, etc. It is not specialized, as in Compendium, pp, 19,
235 f.; and may therefore be consciousness entailing merit or demerit.
The aggregates (khandha's) must be conceived as series of life-
moments.
2
Cf. op. cit., 126.
3
Excluding the material aggregate.
4
I.e., insight understood as in IX. 5.—Comy.
Th—Yes.
A.—What! do the dead, does one who has ended his
days, develop the Path?1
2. Of the Path and Bodily Form.
Controverted Point.—That the physical frame of one who
is practising the Eightfold Path is included in that Path.
From the Commentary.—Those who, like the Mahingsasakas, Sam-
mitiyas and Mahasanghikas, hold that the three factors of the Path :
—supremely right speech, action, and livelihood—are material, are
confronted with the contradiction that, since the factors of the Path
are subjective, they imply mental attributes lacking in matter.
[1] Th.—You must then be prepared to affirm also that
bodily form is [like the Path-factors] subjective, having
the mental attributes of adverting, ideating, co-ordinated
application, attending, volition, anticipating, aiming. You
deny this and rightly, for surely the opposite is true.
[2, 3] The three factors of the Path [in which you deem
things corporeal to be included]—supremely right speech,
action, livelihood—these, you affirm, are not subjective, not
having the mental attributes above-named. [4-5] But the
other five factors of the Path—supremely right views,
aspiration, endeavour, mindfulness, concentration—these,
you admit, are subjective, and have the mental attributes
above-named.
[6, 7] If you affirm the absence of these mental charac-
teristics from those three factors of the Path, you must
also affirm their absence from all these five factors of the
Path.
[8] M. S. M.—But you admit that supremely right
1
'By sophistry' (chalavada , Comy.), he has shifted from
psychological to religious ground, then skips back again, drawing a
false analogy between the final death of any one life and momentary
death. The aggregates typify the life of worldly desires, which for
the convert is superseded by the higher life of the Path. Psycho-
logically and physically, the cessation of their continuity means death.
Cf. below, X. 3.
speech, action, and livelihood are factors of the Path, [and
these are manifestations of corporeality]. Surely then
the practiser's physical frame is included in the Path.1
1
I.e., in part of it. The opponents regard those three factors as
physical, the Theravadin as psychical. For instance, according to the
latter's doctrine, sammavac a is not so much the right utterance
itself as that factor in the religious character by which right speech is
engendered.
Kathavatthu - Of Speech & Action Conforming to Thought, Of Past, Future and Present
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
10. Of Speech conforming to Thought.
Controverted Point.—That speech does not accord with
thought.
From the Commentary.—Inasmuch as anyone can decide [to think
about one thing and] talk about another, therefore there is no accord,
no sequence, no conformity between thought and speech. Speech can
proceed even without thought. Such is the view of some—for instance,
the Pubbaseliyas.
[1J Th.—If this be so, then a fortiori neither does
speech accord with mental contact, feeing, perception,
volition, nor with any property of consciousness. But
surely, as you agree, the opposite is the case.3
3
I.e., speech occurs to, or proceeds from, one who has ' mental
contact,' etc.
[2] You must, again, deny that speech accords with
adverting, ideating, co-ordinated application, willing, in-
tending, aiming—which you will not, the opposite being
true.
[3] You admit that speech which is provoked by thought
is co-existent, and one in its origin, with the thought. Yet
this is in contradiction to your proposition.
[4] Again, you commit yourself to this, that one speaks
of what one does not wish to speak, discourses, addresses
[others], converses about what one does not wish. Surely
the opposite is the case.
[5] P.—You say I am wrong, but you must admit that
people can speak, discourse, address [others], converse
.about something different [from that which is occupying
their minds].
1
Hence my proposition is tenable.
11. Of Action conforming to Thought.
Controverted Point.—That action does not accord with
thought.
From the Commentary.—Inasmuch as anyone, when proposing to
go in one direction, can go elsewhere, some—for instance, the Pubbase-
liyas—hold that action is not in accord or conformity with, or consequent
upon, thought.
[1-3] Th.—(The argument is exactly similar to that in
IX. 10, §§ 1-3.)
[4] Again, you commit yourself to this, that one moves
forward and backward, or looks ahead and back, or bends or
extends, when not wishing to perform these respective acts.
Surely the opposite is the case.
[5] P.—You say, I am wrong, but does it not happen
that some one, thinking 'I shall go in one direction,' goes
in another, or . . . thinking ' I shall hold forth something,'
holds forth another ? Hence my proposition is tenable.
1
The illustration given in the Comy, is that of one intending to
say civarang (robe) and saying cirang (fibre), as if we were to say
'coming' for 'comforting.' Speech not conforming to mental action,
'no blame attaches to the speaker.'
T.S. V.
12. Of Past, Future, and Present.
Controverted Point.—That a past or future experience is
actually possessed.
From the Commentary.—In this connection we must distinguish
between actual and potential possession.
1
The former is of the present
moment. But for a man who has acquired the Eight Attainments in
Jhana, the possession of them is potentially persistent, though not of
all at once. But some, not discerning this distinction—for instance,
the Andhakas—speak of past and future Jhanas as something actually
and presently possessed.
- [1] Th.—But is not the past extinct, departed, changed,
come to an end, finished? [2] And is not the future-
unborn, not yet become, not come into being, not produced,,
not brought to pass, not manifested ? How then can you
call either something that is actually possessed ?
[3] Is one who possesses a present material or bodily
aggregate also in possession of a past and a future bodily
aggregate ? Then must you admit three bodily aggregates.
Similarly, if he is actually in possession of five past and.
five future, as well as five present [bodily and mental]
aggregates, you must admit fifteen aggregates. . . .
[4-6] A similar argument applies to the organs and
objects of sense, to the eighteen elements, to the twenty-
two controlling powers.
[7] A.—But are there not those who, meditating on the
eight stages of emancipation, can induce the four Jhanas
at their pleasure, can acquire the four serial grades ?2
Surely then it is right to say that one can have actual
present possession of past and future things ?
1
More literally, 'the notion of being in possession of (saman-
nagata), and that of having acquired (patilabha) Comy,
2
Anguttara-Nik., iv. 410, 448. Buddhist Suttas (SBE XI.), 212,.
§§ 9,10; Pss. of the Brethren, ver. 916, 917, 1172.
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
10. Of Speech conforming to Thought.
Controverted Point.—That speech does not accord with
thought.
From the Commentary.—Inasmuch as anyone can decide [to think
about one thing and] talk about another, therefore there is no accord,
no sequence, no conformity between thought and speech. Speech can
proceed even without thought. Such is the view of some—for instance,
the Pubbaseliyas.
[1J Th.—If this be so, then a fortiori neither does
speech accord with mental contact, feeing, perception,
volition, nor with any property of consciousness. But
surely, as you agree, the opposite is the case.3
3
I.e., speech occurs to, or proceeds from, one who has ' mental
contact,' etc.
[2] You must, again, deny that speech accords with
adverting, ideating, co-ordinated application, willing, in-
tending, aiming—which you will not, the opposite being
true.
[3] You admit that speech which is provoked by thought
is co-existent, and one in its origin, with the thought. Yet
this is in contradiction to your proposition.
[4] Again, you commit yourself to this, that one speaks
of what one does not wish to speak, discourses, addresses
[others], converses about what one does not wish. Surely
the opposite is the case.
[5] P.—You say I am wrong, but you must admit that
people can speak, discourse, address [others], converse
.about something different [from that which is occupying
their minds].
1
Hence my proposition is tenable.
11. Of Action conforming to Thought.
Controverted Point.—That action does not accord with
thought.
From the Commentary.—Inasmuch as anyone, when proposing to
go in one direction, can go elsewhere, some—for instance, the Pubbase-
liyas—hold that action is not in accord or conformity with, or consequent
upon, thought.
[1-3] Th.—(The argument is exactly similar to that in
IX. 10, §§ 1-3.)
[4] Again, you commit yourself to this, that one moves
forward and backward, or looks ahead and back, or bends or
extends, when not wishing to perform these respective acts.
Surely the opposite is the case.
[5] P.—You say, I am wrong, but does it not happen
that some one, thinking 'I shall go in one direction,' goes
in another, or . . . thinking ' I shall hold forth something,'
holds forth another ? Hence my proposition is tenable.
1
The illustration given in the Comy, is that of one intending to
say civarang (robe) and saying cirang (fibre), as if we were to say
'coming' for 'comforting.' Speech not conforming to mental action,
'no blame attaches to the speaker.'
T.S. V.
12. Of Past, Future, and Present.
Controverted Point.—That a past or future experience is
actually possessed.
From the Commentary.—In this connection we must distinguish
between actual and potential possession.
1
The former is of the present
moment. But for a man who has acquired the Eight Attainments in
Jhana, the possession of them is potentially persistent, though not of
all at once. But some, not discerning this distinction—for instance,
the Andhakas—speak of past and future Jhanas as something actually
and presently possessed.
- [1] Th.—But is not the past extinct, departed, changed,
come to an end, finished? [2] And is not the future-
unborn, not yet become, not come into being, not produced,,
not brought to pass, not manifested ? How then can you
call either something that is actually possessed ?
[3] Is one who possesses a present material or bodily
aggregate also in possession of a past and a future bodily
aggregate ? Then must you admit three bodily aggregates.
Similarly, if he is actually in possession of five past and.
five future, as well as five present [bodily and mental]
aggregates, you must admit fifteen aggregates. . . .
[4-6] A similar argument applies to the organs and
objects of sense, to the eighteen elements, to the twenty-
two controlling powers.
[7] A.—But are there not those who, meditating on the
eight stages of emancipation, can induce the four Jhanas
at their pleasure, can acquire the four serial grades ?2
Surely then it is right to say that one can have actual
present possession of past and future things ?
1
More literally, 'the notion of being in possession of (saman-
nagata), and that of having acquired (patilabha) Comy,
2
Anguttara-Nik., iv. 410, 448. Buddhist Suttas (SBE XI.), 212,.
§§ 9,10; Pss. of the Brethren, ver. 916, 917, 1172.
Kathavatthu - Of Past & Future Ideas, Of Initial Application of Mind, Of Sound as purely Mental
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
6. Of Past Ideas.
Controverted Point.—That consciousness of a past object
is without object.
From the Commentary.—Some—for instance, the Uttarapathakas—
hold that, since past and future mental objects are not actually
existing, therefore mind recalling a past object is mind without object.
[1] Th.—But you admit that there is such a thing as a
mental object that is past ? Then how can you make such
a self-contradictory statement? [2] Again, is there not
adverting of mind, ideation, co-ordinated application, atten-
tion, volition, anticipation, aim, concerning that which is
past? . . .
7. Of Future Ideas.
Controverted Point.—That a consciousness, having an idea
that is future, is without object.
The Commentary makes no separate comment.
[1, 2] are verbatim as in 6, 'future' substituted for ' past.
[3] Th. continues. — You admit of course concerning
what is present, that there can be adverting of mind,
ideation, and so on (6, § 2), so that consciousness of a
present idea has its mental object. And you admit that
there can be adverting of mind and the rest about the past
and also about the future. Yet in both these cases mind,
you say, is without mental object. [4] Why not also say
then that, while there can be adverting of mind, etc., about
the present, mind occupied about a present object is mind
without object ?
[5] A.—But you admit that a ' past object' does not
exist [at the present moment] ? Surely then a mind occu-
pied with past object is occupied with no (that is, with a
non-existent) object. . . .
8. Of Initial Application of Mind and its Field of
Operation}
Controverted Point. — That initial mental application
'falls' on all consciousness.
From the Commentary.—This may happen in two ways : by way
of falling on consciousness as object, and by way of association,2 as a
concomitant of the consciousness in which it operates. In the absence
of any rule3 by which we can say, that such and such a consciousness
1
Vitakka is the distinguishable sense, or nuance, in a given state
of mental activity, of a ' directing-on-to an object.' In Buddhist
psychology it is an occasional or particular, not a constant, factor of
consciousness. See Compendium, 94 f., 238 f., 282. On the rather
unusual term anupatita , cf. Dhammapada, verse 302. Burmese
translators adopt two alternative renderings of vitakkanupatita :
(a) Those things which constantly accompany the initial application
or direction of the mind; (b) those things on which this vitakk a
constantly falls. The first alternative suggests the question : Does
vitakk a operate in all consciousness? The second suggests: Does
it operate on all consciousness ? While it may operate on all con-
sciousness as its object, it does not operate in all consciousness, since
it is absent in some, as in avitakka-citta.
2
Sampayogato.
3
Niyama .
cannot become an object of initial application, we might say that the
thesis is true. But since some consciousness is brought to pass inde-
pendently of any initial application, this does not fall on (i.e., operate
in) all consciousness. [Hence the contradictory of the thesis is true.]
Those who maintain the thesis—for instance, the Uttarapathakas—
fail to draw this distinction.
[1] Th.—If that is true, you must also be prepared to
admit in detail that [other mental properties1] sustained
application, zest, pleasure, pain, gladness, melancholy,
indifference, faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration,
understanding, lust, hate . . . indiscretion fall on (or
operate in) all consciousness. - But you are not so pre-
pared. . . .
[2-4] Contrariwise, is there not concentration with sus-
tained application only, not initial application; also con-
centration wherein there is neither kind of application ?
Were not, in fact, three kinds of concentrative exercise
distinguished by the Exalted One: (1) With both modes o f
.application; (2) with the sustained mode only; (3) with
neither?2
Hence your proposition is wrong.
9. Of Sound as purely Mental,
Controverted Point.—That sound is nothing more than a
diffusion of initial and sustained mental application.
3
From the Commentary.—Because it was said, ' Applied and dis-
cursive thinking is productive of speech,'4
therefore some — for
instance, the Pubbaseliyas—hold that sounds may occur even when
cognition is proceeding without work of sense, because they consist
merely in 'thrillings' [or irradiation] of initial and sustained applica-
1
Cetasika . Cf . vii. 3.
2
Digha-Nik., iii. 219; Majjhima-Nik., iii. 162; Samyutta-Nik.,
iv. 363; Anguttara-Nik., iv. 300.
3
In other words, that sounds are psychical 'thrillings' (vipphara,
or reverberations, or vibrations).
4
Majjhima-Nik., i. 301, where it is said that speech is an activity
or co-efficient of mind, because there is first thought, then speech.
tion of mind.
1
The Theravadin submits that if sound can be so
specialized, each mental property would send forth its own peculiar
sounds. If,not, then we cannot speak of auditory cognition of a sound
that is merely a matter of intellect, and not an object of sense. But
the Word : 'Hearing a sound, an irradiation of initial application
of mind, he reveals'
2
. . . shows there is auditory consciousness also.
[1] Th.—If this be true, you must affirm no less that
sounds from mental contact are solely an irradiation of
mental contact; that such as are from feeling are solely
an irradiation of feeling. So also for such as are from
perception, volition, thought in general, mindfulness, un-
derstanding. This you will not do.
[2] Must you not also affirm of a sound that is an irra-
diation of mental application, that it is [none the less] to
be cognized by hearing, impinges on the ear, comes into
the auditory avenue? This you deny; you affirm that
such a sound is not cognizable by hearing, etc. How then
can you speak of it as sound ?
1
A phrase from Digha-Nik., iii. 104, and Anguttara-Nik., i. 170.
Digha-Nik., i. 213, in the same context, omits -vippharasaddang
sutva and uses slightly different inflexions.
2
See preceding references.
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
6. Of Past Ideas.
Controverted Point.—That consciousness of a past object
is without object.
From the Commentary.—Some—for instance, the Uttarapathakas—
hold that, since past and future mental objects are not actually
existing, therefore mind recalling a past object is mind without object.
[1] Th.—But you admit that there is such a thing as a
mental object that is past ? Then how can you make such
a self-contradictory statement? [2] Again, is there not
adverting of mind, ideation, co-ordinated application, atten-
tion, volition, anticipation, aim, concerning that which is
past? . . .
7. Of Future Ideas.
Controverted Point.—That a consciousness, having an idea
that is future, is without object.
The Commentary makes no separate comment.
[1, 2] are verbatim as in 6, 'future' substituted for ' past.
[3] Th. continues. — You admit of course concerning
what is present, that there can be adverting of mind,
ideation, and so on (6, § 2), so that consciousness of a
present idea has its mental object. And you admit that
there can be adverting of mind and the rest about the past
and also about the future. Yet in both these cases mind,
you say, is without mental object. [4] Why not also say
then that, while there can be adverting of mind, etc., about
the present, mind occupied about a present object is mind
without object ?
[5] A.—But you admit that a ' past object' does not
exist [at the present moment] ? Surely then a mind occu-
pied with past object is occupied with no (that is, with a
non-existent) object. . . .
8. Of Initial Application of Mind and its Field of
Operation}
Controverted Point. — That initial mental application
'falls' on all consciousness.
From the Commentary.—This may happen in two ways : by way
of falling on consciousness as object, and by way of association,2 as a
concomitant of the consciousness in which it operates. In the absence
of any rule3 by which we can say, that such and such a consciousness
1
Vitakka is the distinguishable sense, or nuance, in a given state
of mental activity, of a ' directing-on-to an object.' In Buddhist
psychology it is an occasional or particular, not a constant, factor of
consciousness. See Compendium, 94 f., 238 f., 282. On the rather
unusual term anupatita , cf. Dhammapada, verse 302. Burmese
translators adopt two alternative renderings of vitakkanupatita :
(a) Those things which constantly accompany the initial application
or direction of the mind; (b) those things on which this vitakk a
constantly falls. The first alternative suggests the question : Does
vitakk a operate in all consciousness? The second suggests: Does
it operate on all consciousness ? While it may operate on all con-
sciousness as its object, it does not operate in all consciousness, since
it is absent in some, as in avitakka-citta.
2
Sampayogato.
3
Niyama .
cannot become an object of initial application, we might say that the
thesis is true. But since some consciousness is brought to pass inde-
pendently of any initial application, this does not fall on (i.e., operate
in) all consciousness. [Hence the contradictory of the thesis is true.]
Those who maintain the thesis—for instance, the Uttarapathakas—
fail to draw this distinction.
[1] Th.—If that is true, you must also be prepared to
admit in detail that [other mental properties1] sustained
application, zest, pleasure, pain, gladness, melancholy,
indifference, faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration,
understanding, lust, hate . . . indiscretion fall on (or
operate in) all consciousness. - But you are not so pre-
pared. . . .
[2-4] Contrariwise, is there not concentration with sus-
tained application only, not initial application; also con-
centration wherein there is neither kind of application ?
Were not, in fact, three kinds of concentrative exercise
distinguished by the Exalted One: (1) With both modes o f
.application; (2) with the sustained mode only; (3) with
neither?2
Hence your proposition is wrong.
9. Of Sound as purely Mental,
Controverted Point.—That sound is nothing more than a
diffusion of initial and sustained mental application.
3
From the Commentary.—Because it was said, ' Applied and dis-
cursive thinking is productive of speech,'4
therefore some — for
instance, the Pubbaseliyas—hold that sounds may occur even when
cognition is proceeding without work of sense, because they consist
merely in 'thrillings' [or irradiation] of initial and sustained applica-
1
Cetasika . Cf . vii. 3.
2
Digha-Nik., iii. 219; Majjhima-Nik., iii. 162; Samyutta-Nik.,
iv. 363; Anguttara-Nik., iv. 300.
3
In other words, that sounds are psychical 'thrillings' (vipphara,
or reverberations, or vibrations).
4
Majjhima-Nik., i. 301, where it is said that speech is an activity
or co-efficient of mind, because there is first thought, then speech.
tion of mind.
1
The Theravadin submits that if sound can be so
specialized, each mental property would send forth its own peculiar
sounds. If,not, then we cannot speak of auditory cognition of a sound
that is merely a matter of intellect, and not an object of sense. But
the Word : 'Hearing a sound, an irradiation of initial application
of mind, he reveals'
2
. . . shows there is auditory consciousness also.
[1] Th.—If this be true, you must affirm no less that
sounds from mental contact are solely an irradiation of
mental contact; that such as are from feeling are solely
an irradiation of feeling. So also for such as are from
perception, volition, thought in general, mindfulness, un-
derstanding. This you will not do.
[2] Must you not also affirm of a sound that is an irra-
diation of mental application, that it is [none the less] to
be cognized by hearing, impinges on the ear, comes into
the auditory avenue? This you deny; you affirm that
such a sound is not cognizable by hearing, etc. How then
can you speak of it as sound ?
1
A phrase from Digha-Nik., iii. 104, and Anguttara-Nik., i. 170.
Digha-Nik., i. 213, in the same context, omits -vippharasaddang
sutva and uses slightly different inflexions.
2
See preceding references.
Friday, June 17, 2011
Kathavatthu - Of Matter as Subjective, Of Bias & Insight as without Mental Object
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
3. Of Matter as Subjective.
Controverted Point.—Whether matter should be termed
subjective or objective.
From, the Commentary.—It is an opinion of some—for instance,
the Uttarapathakas—that matter should be termed sarammana
(i.e., co-object), not because it is so in the sense of making a mental
object [for itself], but inasmuch as it causes mental presentation.
The argument seeks to point out the distinction be ween the two
meanings of arammana.2
[1] Th.—If that is so, you must also affirm of matter or
body, that it has the mental features of ' adverting,' idea-
ting, reflecting, co-ordinated application, attending, willing,
anticipating, aiming3
—things which you would, on the
contrary, deny of matter.
[2] All, or any of them you can rightly affirm of mental
properties, such as contact (mental reaction), feeling, per-
ception, volition, cognition, faith, energy, mindfulness,
concentration, understanding, lust, hate, illusion, conceit,
2
So Br. edition: arammana-dvayassa vibhaga-das -
san'atthang . The PTS reading is not intelligible. Saram-
mana , in the orthodox view, means 'subjective,' because mind has
mental object. The opponent takes sarammana to mean ' objective,'
because matter is presented as object. This confusion of the terms
applicable to mind arises from the fact that he substitutes aram-
mana for paccaya in the compound sappaccaya, and misreads
sarammanatthena sarammanang . Thus the word aram-
manang has two meanings—' object' and paccaya. See § 4.
3
See VIII. 9, § 1.
erroneous opinion, doubt, mental inertia, distraction, im-
modesty, indiscretion—all of which you admit as subjective.
But matter is not one of these, and therefore such things
may not be affirmed of it.
[3] You deny in the case of matter all those mental
features—adverting, etc.—but claim for it the term ' subjec-
tive,' which is really applicable to ' contact,' sensation, etc.
These, as you admit, do not lack those mental features named.
[4] U.—But is not matter correlated (as an object)?1
Of course you assent. Then as correlated it is surely right
to apply the term 'subjective' to matter, etc. [since ' object'
is one of the twenty-four (causal) relations].
4. Of Bias as without Menial Object.
Controverted Point.—That latent (immoral) bias2 is with-
out mental object.
From the Commientary.—Some—for instance, the Andhakas and
certain of the Uttarapathakas—hold that what are called the (seven)
latent biases, being something distinct from mind, unconditioned,
indeterminate, are thereby without concomitant mental object. The
Theravadin's questions are to show what sort of phenomenon it is
that'has no mental object.'
[1] Th.—Then the forms of latent bias must be either
material quality, or Nibbana, or one of the five organs or
five objects of sense,3 which you deny.
1
Dhammasangani, § 595: rupang sappaccayang (translated
as 'conditioned ' in Bud. Psy. Eth.); Compendium, 194.
2
Anusaya. On this sevenfold 'Category of Evil,' see Com-
pendium, p. 172, n. 2. In the Yamaka it bulks very large. The
Commentary on that work attributes the metaphor to the relatively
ineradicable nature of the seven modes lying latent throughout the
life-term of the individual, and quotes the present argument as showing
a rejection of all the qualities claimed for anusaya (JPTS,
1910-12, p. 86). This deep-rootedness is brought out in Pss. of
the Brethren, verses 12, 768. Herbert Spencer's use of 'bias' first
suggested to us the suitability for it. See JRAS, 1894, p. 324.
3 Only sense - co-ordinating and sensations as co-ordinated have
'mental objects' (Vibhanga, 428).
But let us take the first form, the bias of sense-desire.
If this is without mental object, must you not also affirm
the same of all manifestations and notions of sense-desire
—to wit, sense-desire as lust, as an outburst of lustful desire,
as a Fetter, as a Flood, as a Bond, as an Obstacle ? Would
you not rather affirm just the opposite of these, that they
are concomitant with mental object ?
[2] Or again, in what aggregate is latent bias included ?
The aggregate of mental coefficients,
1
you say. But these
are concomitant with object not less than the other mental
aggregates: this you of course admit. How then can you
maintain your proposition ? [3] If you affirm that (a) the
bias of sense-lust has the aggregate of mental coefficients
involved with it, and yet is without mental object, you
must say no less of (b) sense-lust in general. But you
refuse (making of sense-lust as bias a thing apart).
[4] Thus you get: (a) aggregate of mental coefficients
without mental object; (b) aggregate o f mental coefficients
with mental object.
Then is that aggregate partly with, partly without,
mental object ? Then must you affirm the same of all the
mental aggregates
2
. . . which you may not. . . .
[5] Or, passing over the next five latent biases—resent-
ment, conceit, mere opinion, doubt, lust of rebirth—as
disposed of by this same argument, take similarly the
seventh—nescience—if this as latent bias is without object,
it must be no less without mental object when figured as
Flood, Bond, Outburst, Fetter, Obstacle—which you deny
[keeping the latent bias a thing apart].
[6, 8] The argument about the aggregates applies no
less to this form of bias.
[9] A. U.—But is it not right to say that, when an
average man of the world is thinking of something that is
morally good or indeterminate, he may be described as
1
Sankhara's . Cf. p. 229, n. 2.
2
These were taught as being all 'with mental object.' Bee Vib-
hanga, p. 428.
'having latent bias'? And are not [at that moment] those
forms of bias [latent in him] without mental object?
[10] Th.—But you could equally well say of him at such
a moment that he had lust in his -heart,1 and you deny
that lust is without mental object.2 . . .
5. Of Insight as without Mental Object.
Controverted Point—That insight3 is without mental
object.
From the Commentary.—Inasmuch as an Arahant cannot be said
to lack insight, that insight must, at least at times, be practically
without object, namely, when his visual consciousness is active, for
then he is occupied with the visible object engaging his sense of sight.
So think some, for instance, the Andhakas.
[1] Th.—Then insight must be either material quality,
or Nibbana, or one of the five organs of sense, or their five
external objects (since these are the things that are without
mental object). But this you deny. . . .
You deny also that understanding, as controlling power
or force, as right views, as the search for truth by intui-
tion,4
is without mental object, affirming the contrary.
Then why exclude insight ?
[2-4] Here, too, you judge that the aggregate o f mental
coefficients is involved. But as in the preceding discourse,
so here: you cannot say, a mental aggregate is without
object, or partly so. And you cannot affirm that under-
standing, which is involved in that aggregate, is with
mental object, while insight, also involved in it, is
without.
1
I.e., potentially, as something not extirpated.
2
' Hence the objectlessness of 'latent bias' is not properly sub-
stantiated.'—Comy.
3
Nanang—i.e. , Arahatta-magga-nanang—insight belonging
to the highest Path, that of Arahantship.
4
Dhammavicayo. Cf. Bud. Psy. Eth., p. 18, n. 1 (reading
E.g. for I.e.), with Compendium, p. 180, n. 3.
[5] A.—You deny that insight is objectless. Is it right
to say that the Arahant is ' full of insight,'1 while he is
visually cognitive ?
Th.—Yes.
A.—Has his insight at that moment an object ?
Th.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. .. . [6] But if you
substitute ' full of understanding' for 'full of insight,' you
yourself admit that he is full of understanding while visu-
ally cognitive, and at the same time you deny that his
understanding, during that process, has an object.2
1
Nani . It is used as a synonym of pannava in § 6. Cf.
Anguttara-Nik., iv. 340.
2
The insight is potential, not always actualized, i.e., exercised
about an object. There cannot be two mental objects at the same
instant of time.
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
3. Of Matter as Subjective.
Controverted Point.—Whether matter should be termed
subjective or objective.
From, the Commentary.—It is an opinion of some—for instance,
the Uttarapathakas—that matter should be termed sarammana
(i.e., co-object), not because it is so in the sense of making a mental
object [for itself], but inasmuch as it causes mental presentation.
The argument seeks to point out the distinction be ween the two
meanings of arammana.2
[1] Th.—If that is so, you must also affirm of matter or
body, that it has the mental features of ' adverting,' idea-
ting, reflecting, co-ordinated application, attending, willing,
anticipating, aiming3
—things which you would, on the
contrary, deny of matter.
[2] All, or any of them you can rightly affirm of mental
properties, such as contact (mental reaction), feeling, per-
ception, volition, cognition, faith, energy, mindfulness,
concentration, understanding, lust, hate, illusion, conceit,
2
So Br. edition: arammana-dvayassa vibhaga-das -
san'atthang . The PTS reading is not intelligible. Saram-
mana , in the orthodox view, means 'subjective,' because mind has
mental object. The opponent takes sarammana to mean ' objective,'
because matter is presented as object. This confusion of the terms
applicable to mind arises from the fact that he substitutes aram-
mana for paccaya in the compound sappaccaya, and misreads
sarammanatthena sarammanang . Thus the word aram-
manang has two meanings—' object' and paccaya. See § 4.
3
See VIII. 9, § 1.
erroneous opinion, doubt, mental inertia, distraction, im-
modesty, indiscretion—all of which you admit as subjective.
But matter is not one of these, and therefore such things
may not be affirmed of it.
[3] You deny in the case of matter all those mental
features—adverting, etc.—but claim for it the term ' subjec-
tive,' which is really applicable to ' contact,' sensation, etc.
These, as you admit, do not lack those mental features named.
[4] U.—But is not matter correlated (as an object)?1
Of course you assent. Then as correlated it is surely right
to apply the term 'subjective' to matter, etc. [since ' object'
is one of the twenty-four (causal) relations].
4. Of Bias as without Menial Object.
Controverted Point.—That latent (immoral) bias2 is with-
out mental object.
From the Commientary.—Some—for instance, the Andhakas and
certain of the Uttarapathakas—hold that what are called the (seven)
latent biases, being something distinct from mind, unconditioned,
indeterminate, are thereby without concomitant mental object. The
Theravadin's questions are to show what sort of phenomenon it is
that'has no mental object.'
[1] Th.—Then the forms of latent bias must be either
material quality, or Nibbana, or one of the five organs or
five objects of sense,3 which you deny.
1
Dhammasangani, § 595: rupang sappaccayang (translated
as 'conditioned ' in Bud. Psy. Eth.); Compendium, 194.
2
Anusaya. On this sevenfold 'Category of Evil,' see Com-
pendium, p. 172, n. 2. In the Yamaka it bulks very large. The
Commentary on that work attributes the metaphor to the relatively
ineradicable nature of the seven modes lying latent throughout the
life-term of the individual, and quotes the present argument as showing
a rejection of all the qualities claimed for anusaya (JPTS,
1910-12, p. 86). This deep-rootedness is brought out in Pss. of
the Brethren, verses 12, 768. Herbert Spencer's use of 'bias' first
suggested to us the suitability for it. See JRAS, 1894, p. 324.
3 Only sense - co-ordinating and sensations as co-ordinated have
'mental objects' (Vibhanga, 428).
But let us take the first form, the bias of sense-desire.
If this is without mental object, must you not also affirm
the same of all manifestations and notions of sense-desire
—to wit, sense-desire as lust, as an outburst of lustful desire,
as a Fetter, as a Flood, as a Bond, as an Obstacle ? Would
you not rather affirm just the opposite of these, that they
are concomitant with mental object ?
[2] Or again, in what aggregate is latent bias included ?
The aggregate of mental coefficients,
1
you say. But these
are concomitant with object not less than the other mental
aggregates: this you of course admit. How then can you
maintain your proposition ? [3] If you affirm that (a) the
bias of sense-lust has the aggregate of mental coefficients
involved with it, and yet is without mental object, you
must say no less of (b) sense-lust in general. But you
refuse (making of sense-lust as bias a thing apart).
[4] Thus you get: (a) aggregate of mental coefficients
without mental object; (b) aggregate o f mental coefficients
with mental object.
Then is that aggregate partly with, partly without,
mental object ? Then must you affirm the same of all the
mental aggregates
2
. . . which you may not. . . .
[5] Or, passing over the next five latent biases—resent-
ment, conceit, mere opinion, doubt, lust of rebirth—as
disposed of by this same argument, take similarly the
seventh—nescience—if this as latent bias is without object,
it must be no less without mental object when figured as
Flood, Bond, Outburst, Fetter, Obstacle—which you deny
[keeping the latent bias a thing apart].
[6, 8] The argument about the aggregates applies no
less to this form of bias.
[9] A. U.—But is it not right to say that, when an
average man of the world is thinking of something that is
morally good or indeterminate, he may be described as
1
Sankhara's . Cf. p. 229, n. 2.
2
These were taught as being all 'with mental object.' Bee Vib-
hanga, p. 428.
'having latent bias'? And are not [at that moment] those
forms of bias [latent in him] without mental object?
[10] Th.—But you could equally well say of him at such
a moment that he had lust in his -heart,1 and you deny
that lust is without mental object.2 . . .
5. Of Insight as without Mental Object.
Controverted Point—That insight3 is without mental
object.
From the Commentary.—Inasmuch as an Arahant cannot be said
to lack insight, that insight must, at least at times, be practically
without object, namely, when his visual consciousness is active, for
then he is occupied with the visible object engaging his sense of sight.
So think some, for instance, the Andhakas.
[1] Th.—Then insight must be either material quality,
or Nibbana, or one of the five organs of sense, or their five
external objects (since these are the things that are without
mental object). But this you deny. . . .
You deny also that understanding, as controlling power
or force, as right views, as the search for truth by intui-
tion,4
is without mental object, affirming the contrary.
Then why exclude insight ?
[2-4] Here, too, you judge that the aggregate o f mental
coefficients is involved. But as in the preceding discourse,
so here: you cannot say, a mental aggregate is without
object, or partly so. And you cannot affirm that under-
standing, which is involved in that aggregate, is with
mental object, while insight, also involved in it, is
without.
1
I.e., potentially, as something not extirpated.
2
' Hence the objectlessness of 'latent bias' is not properly sub-
stantiated.'—Comy.
3
Nanang—i.e. , Arahatta-magga-nanang—insight belonging
to the highest Path, that of Arahantship.
4
Dhammavicayo. Cf. Bud. Psy. Eth., p. 18, n. 1 (reading
E.g. for I.e.), with Compendium, p. 180, n. 3.
[5] A.—You deny that insight is objectless. Is it right
to say that the Arahant is ' full of insight,'1 while he is
visually cognitive ?
Th.—Yes.
A.—Has his insight at that moment an object ?
Th.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. .. . [6] But if you
substitute ' full of understanding' for 'full of insight,' you
yourself admit that he is full of understanding while visu-
ally cognitive, and at the same time you deny that his
understanding, during that process, has an object.2
1
Nani . It is used as a synonym of pannava in § 6. Cf.
Anguttara-Nik., iv. 340.
2
The insight is potential, not always actualized, i.e., exercised
about an object. There cannot be two mental objects at the same
instant of time.
Thursday, June 16, 2011
Kathavatthu - Of Release through Seeing the Good & Of the Ambrosial as an Object by which we are Bound
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
BOOK IX
I. Of Release through seeing the Good.1
Controverted Point.—That the Fetters are put of f for one
who discerns a blessing (in store).
From, the Commentary.—In our doctrine we are convinced that
when anyone discerns (a) the ' world ' (literally, ' the conditioned ') as
fnll of peril, and (6) Nibbana as a blessing, the ' Fetters' are put off .
But some—for instance, the Andhakas—take one of these two alterna-
tive statements, and say it is only2
by the latter discernment that
the Fetters are put off . It is to rebuke this partial view that the
Theravadin speaks.
[1] Th —But are not the Fetters also put off when the
world3 is considered as impermanent? You admit this, of
course. But [then you should not confine yourself to the
optimistic side].
[2] You admit, too, they are put off when the world is
considered as full of Ill , as disease, as a canker, a piercing
dart, as woe, as unbearable,4 as an enemy,5 as crumbling
away, as a calamity, as oppression, as peril, as trouble, as
fluctuating, as dissolving, as transient, as shelterless, as no
retreat, as no refuge, as without protection, as empty, bare
and void, as without soul, as full of danger, and mutable.
[But your statement hereby becomes one-sided.]
1
Anisangsa (literally, 'praise,' with two intensive prefixes; com-
mendable, because good; profit, advantage). The argument is that
the realization of present actual evils is as strong a stimulus, as vis
a tergo, to betterment, as the faith in the happiness of that betterment
attained—-the vis a fronte.
2
In the PTS edition read va or eva for evang.
3
Sankhara .
4
Or 'an affliction' (abadhato).
5
Literally, 'as other.'
[3] You admit then that (at the same moment) a man
can both consider the impermanence and so on of the
world, and see the blessings in Nibbana? No? But you
have admitted that he loses the Fetters when he does both.
You admit then that he can? But does this not involve us
in two simultaneous mental reactions, two consciousnesses,
and so on?
[4] A.—You reject my proposition. But did not the
Exalted One say: 'Take, bhikkhus, the ease of a bhikkhu
who lives contemplating the happiness in Nibbana, perceiving
and feeling that happiness continually, constantly, and un-
diluted, convinced of it in his mind and permeated with it by
insight?1 . . .
Surely then it is for one who discerns the happy prospect
that the Fetters are put off .
2. Of the Ambrosial2 as an Object by which we are
bound.
Controverted Point— That the Ambrosial as an object of
thought is a ' fetter.'
From the Commentary.—This is an opinion held, for instance, by
the Pubbaseliyas, and due to careless inference from such passages as
'He fancies things about Nibbana.'3
1
Anguttara-Nik., iv. 14. Cf. the Commentary (Manoratha-
purani ) on this passage. The K. V. Commentary concludes that
whereas the work of insight into the actual, the perilous present;
occupies the entrant at the threshold of the Ariyan Way, the Fetters
get removed, as, during his progress, he discerns the blessings of
Nibbana. The sense seems to require abbocchinnang, 'without
a break,' or 'uninterruptedly,' for abbokinnang , 'undiluted.' One
is tempted to render cetas a adhimuccamano by 'of his own
freewill.'
2
Amata, or 'not-dead.' As this term does not for Buddhists, as
it might for Europeans, suggest immortal life, we have not rendered
it by 'the Immortal,' but by a term which, though it literally does
mean that, has a vague suggestion of bliss.
3
See Majjhima-Nik., i. 4.
[1] Th.—If you say that, are you prepared to admit
that the Ambrosial is the object of consciousness accom-
panied by ' Fetters,' 'Ties,' ' Floods,' 'Bonds,' ' Hind-
rances,' ' Infections,' 'Graspings,' ' Corruptions '?1 Is
it not rather an object accompanied by the very oppo-
site ?
[2-4] You affirm that, on account of the Ambrosial occu-
pying the mind, lust, hate, ignorance may spring up. But
are you prepared to admit that the Ambrosial itself con-
duces to occasions for lusting, to lusting after, wishing for,
being inebriated, and captivated by, languishing for ?
That it conduces to occasions for hatred, anger, and resent-
ment? That it conduces to occasions for delusion, for
depriving of knowledge, for blinding vision, for suspend-
ing insight, for siding with trouble,
2
for failing to win
Nibbana? Is it not rather the opposite d f all these?
How then can you say that, on account of the Ambrosial
occupying the mind, lust, hate, and ignorance spring up ?
[5] All these things you may truly predicate as springing
up bedkuse of the occupation of the mind with material
qualities (rupa). But material qualities are not the
Ambrosial.
[6] You would not say that, whereas *the Fetters spring
up because of material qualities, the latter do not conduce
to Fetters, Ties, Floods, and all such spiritual defects and
dangers. How then can you affirm just the same of the
Ambrosial: that, whereas the Fetters spring up because of
it, it does not conduce to Fetters, and so forth? Or that,
whereas lust, hate, and ignorance spring up because of the
Ambrosial, nevertheless the Ambrosial is not an occasion
for lusting and all the rest ?
[7] P.—But was it not said by the Exalted One: 'He
perceives Nibbana as such, and having perceived it he
imagines things about Nibbana, with respect to Nibbana,
1
On these spiritual categories cf. p. 115, § 1; and see Bud. Psy.
Eth., iii., chaps, v., x., xii,, xiii.
2
Br, reads vighatapakkhiyang.
things as Nibbana, that "Nibbana is mine" dallying with
the idea'?1
Therefore the Ambrosial is an object of thought not yet
freed from bondage.
1
Majjhima-Nik., i. 4 : a Sutta, says the Commentary, which is
here inconclusive, because the Nibbana spoken of is simply temporal
well-being, so called. ' Falsely mistaken by the worldling for the real
thing; a matter connected with the satisfaction of natural desires
only,' wrote Buddhaghosa in the Papanca Sudani (Commentary on
the Majjhima-Nik.).
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
BOOK IX
I. Of Release through seeing the Good.1
Controverted Point.—That the Fetters are put of f for one
who discerns a blessing (in store).
From, the Commentary.—In our doctrine we are convinced that
when anyone discerns (a) the ' world ' (literally, ' the conditioned ') as
fnll of peril, and (6) Nibbana as a blessing, the ' Fetters' are put off .
But some—for instance, the Andhakas—take one of these two alterna-
tive statements, and say it is only2
by the latter discernment that
the Fetters are put off . It is to rebuke this partial view that the
Theravadin speaks.
[1] Th —But are not the Fetters also put off when the
world3 is considered as impermanent? You admit this, of
course. But [then you should not confine yourself to the
optimistic side].
[2] You admit, too, they are put off when the world is
considered as full of Ill , as disease, as a canker, a piercing
dart, as woe, as unbearable,4 as an enemy,5 as crumbling
away, as a calamity, as oppression, as peril, as trouble, as
fluctuating, as dissolving, as transient, as shelterless, as no
retreat, as no refuge, as without protection, as empty, bare
and void, as without soul, as full of danger, and mutable.
[But your statement hereby becomes one-sided.]
1
Anisangsa (literally, 'praise,' with two intensive prefixes; com-
mendable, because good; profit, advantage). The argument is that
the realization of present actual evils is as strong a stimulus, as vis
a tergo, to betterment, as the faith in the happiness of that betterment
attained—-the vis a fronte.
2
In the PTS edition read va or eva for evang.
3
Sankhara .
4
Or 'an affliction' (abadhato).
5
Literally, 'as other.'
[3] You admit then that (at the same moment) a man
can both consider the impermanence and so on of the
world, and see the blessings in Nibbana? No? But you
have admitted that he loses the Fetters when he does both.
You admit then that he can? But does this not involve us
in two simultaneous mental reactions, two consciousnesses,
and so on?
[4] A.—You reject my proposition. But did not the
Exalted One say: 'Take, bhikkhus, the ease of a bhikkhu
who lives contemplating the happiness in Nibbana, perceiving
and feeling that happiness continually, constantly, and un-
diluted, convinced of it in his mind and permeated with it by
insight?1 . . .
Surely then it is for one who discerns the happy prospect
that the Fetters are put off .
2. Of the Ambrosial2 as an Object by which we are
bound.
Controverted Point— That the Ambrosial as an object of
thought is a ' fetter.'
From the Commentary.—This is an opinion held, for instance, by
the Pubbaseliyas, and due to careless inference from such passages as
'He fancies things about Nibbana.'3
1
Anguttara-Nik., iv. 14. Cf. the Commentary (Manoratha-
purani ) on this passage. The K. V. Commentary concludes that
whereas the work of insight into the actual, the perilous present;
occupies the entrant at the threshold of the Ariyan Way, the Fetters
get removed, as, during his progress, he discerns the blessings of
Nibbana. The sense seems to require abbocchinnang, 'without
a break,' or 'uninterruptedly,' for abbokinnang , 'undiluted.' One
is tempted to render cetas a adhimuccamano by 'of his own
freewill.'
2
Amata, or 'not-dead.' As this term does not for Buddhists, as
it might for Europeans, suggest immortal life, we have not rendered
it by 'the Immortal,' but by a term which, though it literally does
mean that, has a vague suggestion of bliss.
3
See Majjhima-Nik., i. 4.
[1] Th.—If you say that, are you prepared to admit
that the Ambrosial is the object of consciousness accom-
panied by ' Fetters,' 'Ties,' ' Floods,' 'Bonds,' ' Hind-
rances,' ' Infections,' 'Graspings,' ' Corruptions '?1 Is
it not rather an object accompanied by the very oppo-
site ?
[2-4] You affirm that, on account of the Ambrosial occu-
pying the mind, lust, hate, ignorance may spring up. But
are you prepared to admit that the Ambrosial itself con-
duces to occasions for lusting, to lusting after, wishing for,
being inebriated, and captivated by, languishing for ?
That it conduces to occasions for hatred, anger, and resent-
ment? That it conduces to occasions for delusion, for
depriving of knowledge, for blinding vision, for suspend-
ing insight, for siding with trouble,
2
for failing to win
Nibbana? Is it not rather the opposite d f all these?
How then can you say that, on account of the Ambrosial
occupying the mind, lust, hate, and ignorance spring up ?
[5] All these things you may truly predicate as springing
up bedkuse of the occupation of the mind with material
qualities (rupa). But material qualities are not the
Ambrosial.
[6] You would not say that, whereas *the Fetters spring
up because of material qualities, the latter do not conduce
to Fetters, Ties, Floods, and all such spiritual defects and
dangers. How then can you affirm just the same of the
Ambrosial: that, whereas the Fetters spring up because of
it, it does not conduce to Fetters, and so forth? Or that,
whereas lust, hate, and ignorance spring up because of the
Ambrosial, nevertheless the Ambrosial is not an occasion
for lusting and all the rest ?
[7] P.—But was it not said by the Exalted One: 'He
perceives Nibbana as such, and having perceived it he
imagines things about Nibbana, with respect to Nibbana,
1
On these spiritual categories cf. p. 115, § 1; and see Bud. Psy.
Eth., iii., chaps, v., x., xii,, xiii.
2
Br, reads vighatapakkhiyang.
things as Nibbana, that "Nibbana is mine" dallying with
the idea'?1
Therefore the Ambrosial is an object of thought not yet
freed from bondage.
1
Majjhima-Nik., i. 4 : a Sutta, says the Commentary, which is
here inconclusive, because the Nibbana spoken of is simply temporal
well-being, so called. ' Falsely mistaken by the worldling for the real
thing; a matter connected with the satisfaction of natural desires
only,' wrote Buddhaghosa in the Papanca Sudani (Commentary on
the Majjhima-Nik.).
Kathavatthu - Of Vital Power & Of a Result of Karma
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
10. Of Vital Power.
Controverted Point.—That there is no such thing as a.
material vital power.
From the Commentary.—Some, as, for instance, the Pubbaseliyas.
and Sammitiyas, hold that, because vital power is an immaterial fact,
distinct from consciousness, therefore there is nothing material in it.
[1] Th.—If there is not, you imply also that, in material
(organic) phenomena, there is no such thing as ' a term
of life, or a subsisting, no going on, being kept going on, no
progress, procedure or preservation of them'3—but you
3
This is the canonical formula for jivitindriya , or vital power
(see Bud. Psy. Eth., § 9). The Burmese translator also reads thiti
as a separate synonym of ayu and the rest, and understanding each
in the instrumental sense, he renders the passage thus: 'Is there
no such thing as a means of living, subsisting, maintaining, moving,
or preserving?'
deny that; in fact, you maintain the opposite. Hence
your proposition falls through.
[2] With regard to the immaterial, you affirm both the
existence of immaterial vital power and also its continuity,
going on, etc. Why do you affirm the latter only, and
deny the former ?
[3] You admit that the life-term of immaterial organic
phenomena is immaterial vital power: why not admit the
corresponding counterpart in the case of material organic
power ? Why is it wrong to deny the latter when you
admit the former ?
[4] You say that, for you, the life-term of material
organic phenomena is an immaterial vital power ? Would
you then maintain the contrary? No? Why not? [5]
Both vital powers, you say, are immaterial. It seems to
me you could with equal plausibility say that both were
material.
[6, 7] You will admit that vital power is still present in
one who has fallen into a cataleptic trance.
1
Yet you could
not call his vital power (he being unconscious) immaterial.
In which aggregates is the vital power included ? In that
of mental coefficients,
2
you say? But is that aggregate
existent in one who has attained trance? 'No,' you say ?
I repeat my question. 'Yes,' you now say. But if anyone
in trance has mental coefficients, he will also have the
other mental aggregates—feeling, perception, cognitive
consciousness. 'No,' you say? I repeat my question.
' Yes,' you now say.
3
Then that person cannot be in a
cataleptic trance.
1
Nirodha , literally cessation (viz., of consciousness) : the utmost
result of Jhana abstraction. Everything mental (immaterial) is
suspended for a time.
2
Sankhara. These, in the Suttas, are defined as activity in
deed, word, and thought; in Abhidhamma as fifty phases, more or
less of them present in states of consciousness. ' The opponent thinks
of the fifty, and denies; then of the three activities, and assents.'—
Comy. Cf. XIX. 2.
3
He denies with respect to mid-trance, but assents with respect to
entrance into and emergence from trance.—Comy.
[8, 9] If there be no material vital power, no vital power
can exist for the inmates of the unconscious sphere,1 for
how can they have an immaterial (or mental) vital power ?
The argument above as to mental coefficients, which you
say they have, applies to them also. They cannot be as
they are and yet possess all five aggregates, as in a five-
mode existence.
[10] [If vital power be wholly psychical, it must be
affected by mental conditions; for instance,] you will admit
that vital power, springing from a consciousness that seeks
rebirth, must, when that consciousness breaks off , be itself
broken of f in part. Now, would you say the same of a
purely mental phase such as ' contact' (or mental reaction
to stimulus) ? Why not ? You mean that contact would
be broken off , not in part, but entirely ? Now, would you
say the same of vital power [it being, as you say, not
material] ? You deny. .. .
[11] P. S.—Are there then two vital powers (material
and immaterial) ?
Th.—Yes.
P. S.—Then you are committed to this—that we live
with two lives, die with two deaths?
2
Th.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
11. Of a Result of Karma,
Controverted, Point.—That because of karma an Arahant
may fall away from Arahant ship.
1
See above, I. 3 ; III. 11.
2
'At the moment of decease the two break off together.'—Comy.
The Compendium, when treating of mind, takes note only of the
psychic vital power. Cf. Introduction, p. 17: 'The activities of will
and the other concomitant properties [or coefficients] are due to the
psychic life (jivitindriya), which infuses mental life into one and
all, constituting the whole a psychosis or psychical state.' But when
treating of matter, the author notices physical vital power (Com-
pendium, p. 156). The doctrine as to the two is clearly stated in
Vibhanga, 123: 'Vital power is twofold: material and immaterial.'
From the Commentary.—Such is an opinion held, for instance, by
the Pubbaseliyas and Sammitiyas, the Arahant so falling being one
who, in a former birth, calumniated one who was then Arahant. For
any other comment, see the argument on the falling away from
Arahantship (I. 2, p. 64 f.).
[1, 2] Th.—How can you affirm this without also affirm-
ing—which you will not—that those in the three lower
stages of fruition may fall away from their fruit ?
[3] And your claim is that he may fall away, not because
o f such karma, or prior action, as murder, theft, fornica-
tion, evil speech, matricide, parricide, Arahanticide, wound-
ing a Buddha, or schism-making, but because of having
calumniated Arahants. You affirm he may fall away be-
cause of having calumniated Arahants, but you deny that
everyone who calumniates Arahants realizes Arahantship.1
Therefore your proposition that falling is due to calumnia-
tion is absurd.
1 'The opponent, not discerning the constancy (niyama) in the
attaining (leg. sampapunane) of Arahantship with such a karma,
denies.'—Comy. The denial amounts to the admission that some who
calumniated Arahants realize Arahantship. The converse of this is-
that all Arahants are not those who so calumniated. If those who
did not so calumniate fall at all, their fall cannot possibly be due
to calumniation, because they had not calumniated. Therefore the
opponent's proposition is not universally valid on his own showing.
The orthodox view, however, is that there can never be a true falling,
because, among other reasons, all the previous karmas had been
exhausted. It is not necessary here to work out this obvious argu-
ment, all that is necessary being to disprove the opponent's statement
by refuting him on his own grounds.
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
10. Of Vital Power.
Controverted Point.—That there is no such thing as a.
material vital power.
From the Commentary.—Some, as, for instance, the Pubbaseliyas.
and Sammitiyas, hold that, because vital power is an immaterial fact,
distinct from consciousness, therefore there is nothing material in it.
[1] Th.—If there is not, you imply also that, in material
(organic) phenomena, there is no such thing as ' a term
of life, or a subsisting, no going on, being kept going on, no
progress, procedure or preservation of them'3—but you
3
This is the canonical formula for jivitindriya , or vital power
(see Bud. Psy. Eth., § 9). The Burmese translator also reads thiti
as a separate synonym of ayu and the rest, and understanding each
in the instrumental sense, he renders the passage thus: 'Is there
no such thing as a means of living, subsisting, maintaining, moving,
or preserving?'
deny that; in fact, you maintain the opposite. Hence
your proposition falls through.
[2] With regard to the immaterial, you affirm both the
existence of immaterial vital power and also its continuity,
going on, etc. Why do you affirm the latter only, and
deny the former ?
[3] You admit that the life-term of immaterial organic
phenomena is immaterial vital power: why not admit the
corresponding counterpart in the case of material organic
power ? Why is it wrong to deny the latter when you
admit the former ?
[4] You say that, for you, the life-term of material
organic phenomena is an immaterial vital power ? Would
you then maintain the contrary? No? Why not? [5]
Both vital powers, you say, are immaterial. It seems to
me you could with equal plausibility say that both were
material.
[6, 7] You will admit that vital power is still present in
one who has fallen into a cataleptic trance.
1
Yet you could
not call his vital power (he being unconscious) immaterial.
In which aggregates is the vital power included ? In that
of mental coefficients,
2
you say? But is that aggregate
existent in one who has attained trance? 'No,' you say ?
I repeat my question. 'Yes,' you now say. But if anyone
in trance has mental coefficients, he will also have the
other mental aggregates—feeling, perception, cognitive
consciousness. 'No,' you say? I repeat my question.
' Yes,' you now say.
3
Then that person cannot be in a
cataleptic trance.
1
Nirodha , literally cessation (viz., of consciousness) : the utmost
result of Jhana abstraction. Everything mental (immaterial) is
suspended for a time.
2
Sankhara. These, in the Suttas, are defined as activity in
deed, word, and thought; in Abhidhamma as fifty phases, more or
less of them present in states of consciousness. ' The opponent thinks
of the fifty, and denies; then of the three activities, and assents.'—
Comy. Cf. XIX. 2.
3
He denies with respect to mid-trance, but assents with respect to
entrance into and emergence from trance.—Comy.
[8, 9] If there be no material vital power, no vital power
can exist for the inmates of the unconscious sphere,1 for
how can they have an immaterial (or mental) vital power ?
The argument above as to mental coefficients, which you
say they have, applies to them also. They cannot be as
they are and yet possess all five aggregates, as in a five-
mode existence.
[10] [If vital power be wholly psychical, it must be
affected by mental conditions; for instance,] you will admit
that vital power, springing from a consciousness that seeks
rebirth, must, when that consciousness breaks off , be itself
broken of f in part. Now, would you say the same of a
purely mental phase such as ' contact' (or mental reaction
to stimulus) ? Why not ? You mean that contact would
be broken off , not in part, but entirely ? Now, would you
say the same of vital power [it being, as you say, not
material] ? You deny. .. .
[11] P. S.—Are there then two vital powers (material
and immaterial) ?
Th.—Yes.
P. S.—Then you are committed to this—that we live
with two lives, die with two deaths?
2
Th.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
11. Of a Result of Karma,
Controverted, Point.—That because of karma an Arahant
may fall away from Arahant ship.
1
See above, I. 3 ; III. 11.
2
'At the moment of decease the two break off together.'—Comy.
The Compendium, when treating of mind, takes note only of the
psychic vital power. Cf. Introduction, p. 17: 'The activities of will
and the other concomitant properties [or coefficients] are due to the
psychic life (jivitindriya), which infuses mental life into one and
all, constituting the whole a psychosis or psychical state.' But when
treating of matter, the author notices physical vital power (Com-
pendium, p. 156). The doctrine as to the two is clearly stated in
Vibhanga, 123: 'Vital power is twofold: material and immaterial.'
From the Commentary.—Such is an opinion held, for instance, by
the Pubbaseliyas and Sammitiyas, the Arahant so falling being one
who, in a former birth, calumniated one who was then Arahant. For
any other comment, see the argument on the falling away from
Arahantship (I. 2, p. 64 f.).
[1, 2] Th.—How can you affirm this without also affirm-
ing—which you will not—that those in the three lower
stages of fruition may fall away from their fruit ?
[3] And your claim is that he may fall away, not because
o f such karma, or prior action, as murder, theft, fornica-
tion, evil speech, matricide, parricide, Arahanticide, wound-
ing a Buddha, or schism-making, but because of having
calumniated Arahants. You affirm he may fall away be-
cause of having calumniated Arahants, but you deny that
everyone who calumniates Arahants realizes Arahantship.1
Therefore your proposition that falling is due to calumnia-
tion is absurd.
1 'The opponent, not discerning the constancy (niyama) in the
attaining (leg. sampapunane) of Arahantship with such a karma,
denies.'—Comy. The denial amounts to the admission that some who
calumniated Arahants realize Arahantship. The converse of this is-
that all Arahants are not those who so calumniated. If those who
did not so calumniate fall at all, their fall cannot possibly be due
to calumniation, because they had not calumniated. Therefore the
opponent's proposition is not universally valid on his own showing.
The orthodox view, however, is that there can never be a true falling,
because, among other reasons, all the previous karmas had been
exhausted. It is not necessary here to work out this obvious argu-
ment, all that is necessary being to disprove the opponent's statement
by refuting him on his own grounds.
Kathavatthu - Of Matter in the Arupa-Sphere & as Ethically Good or Bad
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
8. Of Matter in Arupa-Sphere.
Controverted, Point.—That there is matter among the
Immaterial.
From the Commentary.—Some (as, for instance, the Andhakas),
judging by the Word—' Because of consciousness there comes mind
and body'1—imagined that, even in the Arupa-sphere of exist-
ence, there was a subtle, refined matter segregated from grosser
matter.
[1] Th.—Is then 'matter' (rupa) a sphere of life, a
destiny, a realm of beings, renewed life, a matrix, an
acquiring of individuality ? This you deny; but all this
you can predicate truly o f Arupa. Hence you cannot
maintain your proposition.
[2] You cannot predicate them truly of a five-mode
existence, one mode of which is material qualities. But
you can do so respecting a four-mode existence, that is,
with the material qualities omitted, as is the case with
Arupa. . . .
[3] You can predicate them truly of the Rupa-sphere,
where there yet is matter. But this sphere is not iden-
tical with the Arupa-sphere. [4] And i f you predicate
matter of the Arupa-sphere, you must show that matter
agrees with the description you can truly give of the Arupa-
sphere as a state of existence, a destiny, etc.
[5] Again, did not the Exalted One say that the Arupa
was a way of escape from visible or material things ? If
that is true, do you still maintain your proposition ? Yes ?
Well, then, the Exalted One said that renunciation was a
way of escape from sense-desires.
2
Now, according to your
reasoning (if there is matter in the Immaterial), there are
sense-desires in renunciation, and there are intoxicants in
1
Dialogues, ii. 52 f.; Samyutta-Nik., ii. 1, passim; Compendium,.
p. 188; Buddhism (Mrs. Rhys Davids), p. 91.
2
Nekkhamma . . . kama , a (very poor) word-play of exegetical
derivation. The former term = going out or down from. Cf. Digha-
Nik., iii. 239 f., 275; Anguttara-Nik., iii. 245.
those who are freed from them, there are things ' included'
(in intoxicant-infested states of the three spheres) among
the 'unincluded'1 which is absurd.
9. Of Matter as ethically Good or Bad.
Controverted Point.—That physical actions [involved in
bodily and vocal intimations] proceeding from good or bad
thoughts amount to a moral act of karma.
From the Commentary.—Some (as, for instance, the Mahirjsasakas
and the Sammitiyas) hold that acts of body and voice being, as they
are, just material qualities, reckoned as bodily and vocal intimation 2
are morally good if proceeding from what is good, and morally bad
if proceeding from what is bad. But if, runs the counter-argument,
they are to be considered as positively moral, and not amoral—as
we are taught
3
—then all the characteristics of the morally good or
bad must apply to them, as well as material characteristics.
[1] Th.—If that be so—if rttpa involved in bodily action
be of morally good import—then it must have a mental
object, and the mental attributes of' adverting,' ideating,4
co-ordinated application, attending, willing, anticipating,
1
I.e., the Ariyan Way or Order (niyama) , with its Paths and
Fruits (Bud. Psy. Eth., pp. 254, 335).
2
See Compendium, p. 264; Bud. Psy. Eth., 192 f.; and below,
X. 10, 11.
3
Bud. Psy. Eth., p 169, especially n. 5.
4
Abhogo , from bhuj , to bend, turn (cf. our 'bow,' 'bough,'
from the common Aryan root bhugh) , is synonymous with avaj -
jana (or avattana) , the preceding term. Popularly equivalent to
manakkara (mind-doing, mentation), it is technically defined, with
the former term, as the adverting of consciousness, when attention is
arrested or roused. It is tantamount to 'what is in the mind' ; hence
the rendering 'ideating.' Cf. Milinda (translation), i. 147 : Would a
wind that had died away acquiesce in being produced again ? No, i t
can have no idea (abhogang) , or will (cetanang) to be reproduced
. . . it is an unconscious thing.'
aiming,1 which you deny. But otherwise it is not
good.
[2] All these things you can predicate about the good
contact proceeding from good consciousness, as well as
about the good feeling, perception, volition, faith, energy,
mindfulness, concentration, understanding, that proceed
from good consciousness, and have an object o f thought,
but you cannot do so about rupa involved in bodily action.
[3] Or again, you would admit that, if rupa of the kind
you name has no mental object, it will have no mental
adverting, ideating, and so on ; but you would deny that
contact, feeling, perception, and the rest, similarly pro-
ceeding from good thought—good, but without mental
object—lacked mental adverting, ideating, and so on.
[4] Now take the matter involved in the bodily action,
resulting from good thought: Is all of it morally good?
You deny. But then you cannot maintain your pro-
position as generally true. For instance, would you call
visible object which was the consequence of good thought,
' good' matter ? Are audible, odorous, sapid, or tangible
object, or the four elements: extended, cohesive, hot, and
mobile, [if they 'happened' as] the result of good thought,
'good' matter ? You deny. [5] Then would you call any
of them, under the circumstances, indeterminate matter
(neither good nor bad) ? ' Yes' you say; yet you deny that
the matter or material quality appearing, under the circum-
stances, as bodily action is indeterminate. That, you say,
would be 'good.' . . .
[6] Let us then take your 'good' bodily action which,
as matter, has no mental object: must you not equally
allow that visible or other sense-object, or those four
elements which, as matter, have no mental object, are
also, under the circumstances, ' good' ? But you deny.
.. . [7] Similarly you refuse to see that, if you allow
1
The last two are equivalents of cetana , volition. The former
is volition under the aspect of preparation, or exertion; the latter is
the same,regarded as persistent.—Comy. The former—patthana—
in its popular meaning, is 'praying,' and is used as equivalent to
asingsa, hope.
any sense-object, or any element brought about by good
thought, and having no mental object, to be indeterminate,
you must equally allow the 'matter ' of bodily intimation
resulting from good thought and with no mental object, to
be indeterminate. . . .
[8] You call this bodily intimation, which is consequent
on good thought, ' good' matter [even though it is so un-
mental as] not to be conjoined with any [mental reaction
or] ' contact.' Yet you would deny the possibility o f this
if, for ' bodily intimation,' you substitute any sense-object,
or one of the elements.
[9] Taken conversely, you allow that any object of sense
or an element consequent on good thought, but not con-
joined with any mental reaction, is indeterminate (neither
good nor bad). Yet you would deny the indeterminateness
if, for sense-object or element, you substitute matter
of bodily action born of good thought.
[10, 11] And if to ' not conjoined with mental reaction
or contact' I add ' not having a mental object,' your
attitude is the same, in both alternatives [8, 9].
[12-15] The whole argument to be repeated for 'vocal'
instead of 'bodily intimation.'
[16] Next with respect to bodily intimation proceeding
from bad thought. You affirm similarly that this is ' morally
bad ' matter. Then it too must have a mental object, and
those mental attributes named above,
1
which you deny.
But otherwise it is not morally bad. [17] All these things
you can predicate about the bad reaction, or 'contact,' pro-
ceeding from bad consciousness, as well as about the bad
feeling, perception, volition, lust, hate and dulness, pride,
erroneous opinion, doubt, sloth, distraction, immodesty,
and indiscretion, that proceed from bad consciousness,
having a mental object, but you cannot do so about that
bodily intimation, which is rupa, or of material quality
[18]2 Or again, you will admit that, if bad rupa of the
kind you name has no mental object, it will have no mental
adverting and other mental attributes named above ; but
1 See § [1].
2 Cf. §§ 3, 4.
you will deny that contact, feeling, perception, volition,
lust, hate, and so on, proceeding from bad thought, bad
and having no mental object, lack mental adverting and
those other attributes. . . .
[19] Now this that you call ' morally bad ' matter pro-
ceeding from bad consciousness :—is all of it bad ? Yes ?
Whether it be ' bodily intimation,' or other material quality ?
This you deny, so your proposition amounts to this: that
some material qualities resulting from bad consciousness
are bad, some not.
[20-23] And all that we have argued as to ' bodily
intimation ' as ' bad ' matter applies to 'vocal intimation.'
[24]1 For instance, would you call visible object which
was the consequence o f bad consciousness ' bad ' matter ?
Or audible, odorous, sapid, or tangible matter ? Or any of
the four elements ? Or impure matter, tears, blood, sweat
(i f any of them happened as the result of bad consciousness)
—would you call them ' bad ' matter ? You deny. [251
Then would you call any o f them, under the circumstances,
indeterminate matter ? ' Yes,' yon say. Yet you deny that
the matter or material quality appearing, under the cir-
cumstances, as bodily or vocal action, is indeterminate.
That, you say, would be ' bad.' . . .
[26]2 Let us then take your ' bad' vocal action, which,
as material, has no mental object : must you not
equally allow that any sense-object, or any o f the four
elements, or impure matter, tears, blood, sweat, which
have no mental object, are also, under the circumstances,
'bad'? But you deny. . . . [27] Similarly you refuse to
see that, if you allow any of these things, when brought
about by thought, and having no mental object, to be
indeterminate, you must equally allow the ' matter,' bodily
or vocal, of action resulting from bad thought, and with no
mental object, to be indeterminate.
[28-31] are simply repetitions of [8-11], substituting 'bad'
for 'good,' 'vocal' for 'bodily,' and adding ' impure matter,
tears, blood, sweat' to the sense-objects and four elements.
1 Cf. [4], [5].
2 Cf. [6], [7].
[32] M. S.—But if we may not say that matter is good
or bad, is not deed or word as an act good or bad? [This
being quite orthodox,] our proposition must be right.
[33] Th.—But if you maintain that matter is good or
bad, you must not hesitate to say that all five organs and
objects of sense, the four elements and impure matter, etc.,
are (intrinsically) good or bad—which you deny. [34] If
body and bodily action be material, would you affirm that
mind and mental action are so ? If these, on the contrary,
are both immaterial, would you affirm that both body and
bodily action are immaterial ? Or if body is material and
bodily action immaterial, would you speak similarly of
mind and mental action ?1
[35] To say that bodily action
as well as body is material, involves such statements as
' sense-consciousness is material because the sense-organs
are material.'
[36] You must not say that rupa, or matter, is action
{or karma). For was it not said by the Exalted One :
'I say, bhikkhus, that volition is karma; when tve have willed,
then toe make action (or karma) by deed, word, and thought ?5 2
[37] And again: 'When, Ananda, there is action, subjec-
tive pleasure or pain arises because it is well determined by
the deed. So also when there is speech or thought, subjective
pleasure or pain arises because it is well determined by the
action of speech or of thought.'3
[38] And again: 'There are, bhikkhus, three modes of
volitional acts of body, four modes of volitional acts of speech,
and three modes of volitional acts of mind, all of which amount
to immoral deeds, bringing forth4 ill and entailing it as result.
And there are a like number of modes of volitional acts of body,
1
The PTS adds a repetition of the first question in this section.
Br. omits both the repetition and also the third question. They are
all only so many parallel instances to show the unreasonableness of
implicating the whole of matter in statements about bodily and
vocal action.
2
Anguttara-Nik., iii. 415.
3
Ib., ii. 157 f.; Samyutta-Nik., ii. 39 f .
4
Read dukkhudrayang. So the Br. translation.
t.s . v .
speech, and mind amounting to moral [karma], bringing forth
and entailing happiness as result.'1
[39] Once more:.'If, Ananda, this foolish man, SamiddJdr
when ashed by the Wanderer Pdtaliputta, were to answer:
"Brother Pataliputta, it is when anyone has acted intentionally
in deed, word, and thought that he comes to feel pleasant, or
painful, or neutral feeling, felt as pleasure, as pain, or as
neitherso ansivering he would make right answer' ?2
Is the Suttanta thus ? Then it is not right to say:.
Matter, or material quality, is karma (action).
1
We cannot trace this passage (cf. Compendium, pp. 145, 146).
The Burmese translator adds a note : 'The Theravadin takes kaya,
vaci , mano, when compounded with kamma , to denote merely
a means (nimitta) , and kamma by itself to denote volition
(cetana) . But the opponent takes feach compound to mean a moral
act (of deed, word, or thought).' Hereby we see how certain purely
immoral actions involved in gestures and speech, proceeding from
moral thoughts, came to be regarded as also moral.
2
Majjhima-Nik., iii. 209. All four passages are quoted in Buddha-
ghosa's Atthasalini (PTS), p. 88.
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
8. Of Matter in Arupa-Sphere.
Controverted, Point.—That there is matter among the
Immaterial.
From the Commentary.—Some (as, for instance, the Andhakas),
judging by the Word—' Because of consciousness there comes mind
and body'1—imagined that, even in the Arupa-sphere of exist-
ence, there was a subtle, refined matter segregated from grosser
matter.
[1] Th.—Is then 'matter' (rupa) a sphere of life, a
destiny, a realm of beings, renewed life, a matrix, an
acquiring of individuality ? This you deny; but all this
you can predicate truly o f Arupa. Hence you cannot
maintain your proposition.
[2] You cannot predicate them truly of a five-mode
existence, one mode of which is material qualities. But
you can do so respecting a four-mode existence, that is,
with the material qualities omitted, as is the case with
Arupa. . . .
[3] You can predicate them truly of the Rupa-sphere,
where there yet is matter. But this sphere is not iden-
tical with the Arupa-sphere. [4] And i f you predicate
matter of the Arupa-sphere, you must show that matter
agrees with the description you can truly give of the Arupa-
sphere as a state of existence, a destiny, etc.
[5] Again, did not the Exalted One say that the Arupa
was a way of escape from visible or material things ? If
that is true, do you still maintain your proposition ? Yes ?
Well, then, the Exalted One said that renunciation was a
way of escape from sense-desires.
2
Now, according to your
reasoning (if there is matter in the Immaterial), there are
sense-desires in renunciation, and there are intoxicants in
1
Dialogues, ii. 52 f.; Samyutta-Nik., ii. 1, passim; Compendium,.
p. 188; Buddhism (Mrs. Rhys Davids), p. 91.
2
Nekkhamma . . . kama , a (very poor) word-play of exegetical
derivation. The former term = going out or down from. Cf. Digha-
Nik., iii. 239 f., 275; Anguttara-Nik., iii. 245.
those who are freed from them, there are things ' included'
(in intoxicant-infested states of the three spheres) among
the 'unincluded'1 which is absurd.
9. Of Matter as ethically Good or Bad.
Controverted Point.—That physical actions [involved in
bodily and vocal intimations] proceeding from good or bad
thoughts amount to a moral act of karma.
From the Commentary.—Some (as, for instance, the Mahirjsasakas
and the Sammitiyas) hold that acts of body and voice being, as they
are, just material qualities, reckoned as bodily and vocal intimation 2
are morally good if proceeding from what is good, and morally bad
if proceeding from what is bad. But if, runs the counter-argument,
they are to be considered as positively moral, and not amoral—as
we are taught
3
—then all the characteristics of the morally good or
bad must apply to them, as well as material characteristics.
[1] Th.—If that be so—if rttpa involved in bodily action
be of morally good import—then it must have a mental
object, and the mental attributes of' adverting,' ideating,4
co-ordinated application, attending, willing, anticipating,
1
I.e., the Ariyan Way or Order (niyama) , with its Paths and
Fruits (Bud. Psy. Eth., pp. 254, 335).
2
See Compendium, p. 264; Bud. Psy. Eth., 192 f.; and below,
X. 10, 11.
3
Bud. Psy. Eth., p 169, especially n. 5.
4
Abhogo , from bhuj , to bend, turn (cf. our 'bow,' 'bough,'
from the common Aryan root bhugh) , is synonymous with avaj -
jana (or avattana) , the preceding term. Popularly equivalent to
manakkara (mind-doing, mentation), it is technically defined, with
the former term, as the adverting of consciousness, when attention is
arrested or roused. It is tantamount to 'what is in the mind' ; hence
the rendering 'ideating.' Cf. Milinda (translation), i. 147 : Would a
wind that had died away acquiesce in being produced again ? No, i t
can have no idea (abhogang) , or will (cetanang) to be reproduced
. . . it is an unconscious thing.'
aiming,1 which you deny. But otherwise it is not
good.
[2] All these things you can predicate about the good
contact proceeding from good consciousness, as well as
about the good feeling, perception, volition, faith, energy,
mindfulness, concentration, understanding, that proceed
from good consciousness, and have an object o f thought,
but you cannot do so about rupa involved in bodily action.
[3] Or again, you would admit that, if rupa of the kind
you name has no mental object, it will have no mental
adverting, ideating, and so on ; but you would deny that
contact, feeling, perception, and the rest, similarly pro-
ceeding from good thought—good, but without mental
object—lacked mental adverting, ideating, and so on.
[4] Now take the matter involved in the bodily action,
resulting from good thought: Is all of it morally good?
You deny. But then you cannot maintain your pro-
position as generally true. For instance, would you call
visible object which was the consequence of good thought,
' good' matter ? Are audible, odorous, sapid, or tangible
object, or the four elements: extended, cohesive, hot, and
mobile, [if they 'happened' as] the result of good thought,
'good' matter ? You deny. [5] Then would you call any
of them, under the circumstances, indeterminate matter
(neither good nor bad) ? ' Yes' you say; yet you deny that
the matter or material quality appearing, under the circum-
stances, as bodily action is indeterminate. That, you say,
would be 'good.' . . .
[6] Let us then take your 'good' bodily action which,
as matter, has no mental object: must you not equally
allow that visible or other sense-object, or those four
elements which, as matter, have no mental object, are
also, under the circumstances, ' good' ? But you deny.
.. . [7] Similarly you refuse to see that, if you allow
1
The last two are equivalents of cetana , volition. The former
is volition under the aspect of preparation, or exertion; the latter is
the same,regarded as persistent.—Comy. The former—patthana—
in its popular meaning, is 'praying,' and is used as equivalent to
asingsa, hope.
any sense-object, or any element brought about by good
thought, and having no mental object, to be indeterminate,
you must equally allow the 'matter ' of bodily intimation
resulting from good thought and with no mental object, to
be indeterminate. . . .
[8] You call this bodily intimation, which is consequent
on good thought, ' good' matter [even though it is so un-
mental as] not to be conjoined with any [mental reaction
or] ' contact.' Yet you would deny the possibility o f this
if, for ' bodily intimation,' you substitute any sense-object,
or one of the elements.
[9] Taken conversely, you allow that any object of sense
or an element consequent on good thought, but not con-
joined with any mental reaction, is indeterminate (neither
good nor bad). Yet you would deny the indeterminateness
if, for sense-object or element, you substitute matter
of bodily action born of good thought.
[10, 11] And if to ' not conjoined with mental reaction
or contact' I add ' not having a mental object,' your
attitude is the same, in both alternatives [8, 9].
[12-15] The whole argument to be repeated for 'vocal'
instead of 'bodily intimation.'
[16] Next with respect to bodily intimation proceeding
from bad thought. You affirm similarly that this is ' morally
bad ' matter. Then it too must have a mental object, and
those mental attributes named above,
1
which you deny.
But otherwise it is not morally bad. [17] All these things
you can predicate about the bad reaction, or 'contact,' pro-
ceeding from bad consciousness, as well as about the bad
feeling, perception, volition, lust, hate and dulness, pride,
erroneous opinion, doubt, sloth, distraction, immodesty,
and indiscretion, that proceed from bad consciousness,
having a mental object, but you cannot do so about that
bodily intimation, which is rupa, or of material quality
[18]2 Or again, you will admit that, if bad rupa of the
kind you name has no mental object, it will have no mental
adverting and other mental attributes named above ; but
1 See § [1].
2 Cf. §§ 3, 4.
you will deny that contact, feeling, perception, volition,
lust, hate, and so on, proceeding from bad thought, bad
and having no mental object, lack mental adverting and
those other attributes. . . .
[19] Now this that you call ' morally bad ' matter pro-
ceeding from bad consciousness :—is all of it bad ? Yes ?
Whether it be ' bodily intimation,' or other material quality ?
This you deny, so your proposition amounts to this: that
some material qualities resulting from bad consciousness
are bad, some not.
[20-23] And all that we have argued as to ' bodily
intimation ' as ' bad ' matter applies to 'vocal intimation.'
[24]1 For instance, would you call visible object which
was the consequence o f bad consciousness ' bad ' matter ?
Or audible, odorous, sapid, or tangible matter ? Or any of
the four elements ? Or impure matter, tears, blood, sweat
(i f any of them happened as the result of bad consciousness)
—would you call them ' bad ' matter ? You deny. [251
Then would you call any o f them, under the circumstances,
indeterminate matter ? ' Yes,' yon say. Yet you deny that
the matter or material quality appearing, under the cir-
cumstances, as bodily or vocal action, is indeterminate.
That, you say, would be ' bad.' . . .
[26]2 Let us then take your ' bad' vocal action, which,
as material, has no mental object : must you not
equally allow that any sense-object, or any o f the four
elements, or impure matter, tears, blood, sweat, which
have no mental object, are also, under the circumstances,
'bad'? But you deny. . . . [27] Similarly you refuse to
see that, if you allow any of these things, when brought
about by thought, and having no mental object, to be
indeterminate, you must equally allow the ' matter,' bodily
or vocal, of action resulting from bad thought, and with no
mental object, to be indeterminate.
[28-31] are simply repetitions of [8-11], substituting 'bad'
for 'good,' 'vocal' for 'bodily,' and adding ' impure matter,
tears, blood, sweat' to the sense-objects and four elements.
1 Cf. [4], [5].
2 Cf. [6], [7].
[32] M. S.—But if we may not say that matter is good
or bad, is not deed or word as an act good or bad? [This
being quite orthodox,] our proposition must be right.
[33] Th.—But if you maintain that matter is good or
bad, you must not hesitate to say that all five organs and
objects of sense, the four elements and impure matter, etc.,
are (intrinsically) good or bad—which you deny. [34] If
body and bodily action be material, would you affirm that
mind and mental action are so ? If these, on the contrary,
are both immaterial, would you affirm that both body and
bodily action are immaterial ? Or if body is material and
bodily action immaterial, would you speak similarly of
mind and mental action ?1
[35] To say that bodily action
as well as body is material, involves such statements as
' sense-consciousness is material because the sense-organs
are material.'
[36] You must not say that rupa, or matter, is action
{or karma). For was it not said by the Exalted One :
'I say, bhikkhus, that volition is karma; when tve have willed,
then toe make action (or karma) by deed, word, and thought ?5 2
[37] And again: 'When, Ananda, there is action, subjec-
tive pleasure or pain arises because it is well determined by
the deed. So also when there is speech or thought, subjective
pleasure or pain arises because it is well determined by the
action of speech or of thought.'3
[38] And again: 'There are, bhikkhus, three modes of
volitional acts of body, four modes of volitional acts of speech,
and three modes of volitional acts of mind, all of which amount
to immoral deeds, bringing forth4 ill and entailing it as result.
And there are a like number of modes of volitional acts of body,
1
The PTS adds a repetition of the first question in this section.
Br. omits both the repetition and also the third question. They are
all only so many parallel instances to show the unreasonableness of
implicating the whole of matter in statements about bodily and
vocal action.
2
Anguttara-Nik., iii. 415.
3
Ib., ii. 157 f.; Samyutta-Nik., ii. 39 f .
4
Read dukkhudrayang. So the Br. translation.
t.s . v .
speech, and mind amounting to moral [karma], bringing forth
and entailing happiness as result.'1
[39] Once more:.'If, Ananda, this foolish man, SamiddJdr
when ashed by the Wanderer Pdtaliputta, were to answer:
"Brother Pataliputta, it is when anyone has acted intentionally
in deed, word, and thought that he comes to feel pleasant, or
painful, or neutral feeling, felt as pleasure, as pain, or as
neitherso ansivering he would make right answer' ?2
Is the Suttanta thus ? Then it is not right to say:.
Matter, or material quality, is karma (action).
1
We cannot trace this passage (cf. Compendium, pp. 145, 146).
The Burmese translator adds a note : 'The Theravadin takes kaya,
vaci , mano, when compounded with kamma , to denote merely
a means (nimitta) , and kamma by itself to denote volition
(cetana) . But the opponent takes feach compound to mean a moral
act (of deed, word, or thought).' Hereby we see how certain purely
immoral actions involved in gestures and speech, proceeding from
moral thoughts, came to be regarded as also moral.
2
Majjhima-Nik., iii. 209. All four passages are quoted in Buddha-
ghosa's Atthasalini (PTS), p. 88.
Kathavatthu - Of the Rupa & Arupa-Element & Senses in the Rupa-Sphere
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
5. Of the Rupa-element.
Controverted Point.—That the ultimate 'datum or ele-
ment of rupa' is things [cognized as] material.
From the Commentary.—The Theravadin criticizes this view—
held, for instance, by the Andhakas—on the ground that the 'Rupa-
element' includes all the spheres of life known as Rupa-bhava,
and is therefore more extensive than just material qualities of things.1
[1] Th.—Is then rupa a sphere of life, a destiny, a realm
of beings, renewed life, a matrix, a station for rebirth-con-
sciousness, an acquiring of individuality ? Is there karma
leading to it, beings to be reborn in it ? Do they get born,
grow old, die, decease, get rebirth there? Are the five
aggregates 'in' rupa ? Is it a five-mode existence ? [2]
Now all these you can predicate of the Rupa-datum, but
not of rupa, or material quality. Hence the latter has not
all that is implicated in the former.
Again, if the Rupa-datum consists only of material quali-
ties—and, as you will admit, there is material quality in the
Kama-datum—is this latter datum the same as Rupa-datum?
You say 'no.' But think. You must admit it is.2 Then
we get a man in two life-spheres at the same time. . . .
6. Of the Arupa-Element.
Controverted Point. — That the ultimate 'datum, or
element' of arupa is things [cognized as] immaterial.
From the Commentary. — Here the same method is followed.
Instruction is given by taking a certain immaterial notion—'feeling'
—and asking if that is a sphere of life, etc.; thus it is showed that in
no case are the two identical.
[1] Th.—Is then feeling a sphere of life, a destiny, a realm
of beings, renewed life, a matrix, a station for rebirth-
consciousness, an acquiring of individuality? Is there
1
Here there is the corresponding difficulty of the ambiguity of
rupa. See Compendium, 271 f.; Bud. Psy. Eth., 43 f.
2
He denies, so as not to contradict the accepted triad of life-spheres.
When pushed, he assents, because of his thesis.—Comy.
karma leading to it? Are beings to be reborn in it? Do
they get old, die, decease from, get reborn in it ? Are the
five aggregates ' in' feeling ? Is it a five-mode existence ?
[2] Now all these you can predicate of the Arupa-datum or
element, but not of feeling only.
Again, if the Arupa-element mean only immaterial things
—and you will admit there is feeling and other mental
aggregates in the Kama-element—are these two elements
or data identical ? Either you must deny (which were
unorthodox) or assent. In the latter case we get a person
in two spheres of life at the same time. The same argu-
ment holds good for Arupa and Rupa data. And if all
three be mutually identical, we get a person in three
spheres of life at the same time. . . .
7. Of the Senses in the Rupa-Sphere.
Controverted Point- That in the Rupa-sphere1 the in-
dividual has all the six senses.
From the Commentary.—Some (as, for instance, the Andhakas and
Sammitiyas), judging by the Sutta-passage—'having form, made of
mind,with all its main and lesser parts complete, not deficient in any
organ'2
—imagine that the Brahma-group and the rest had sensations
of smell, taste, and touch.
[1] Th.—If that be so, and one in that sphere have, say,
the sense of smell, you must admit odorous objects for him
to smell; and so too for the senses of taste and touch.
[2] But you deny the existence, in that sphere, of such
objects. [3-6] Yet it seems only rational that, admitting,
as you do, the existence in that sphere of both organ and
object in the case of sight, hearing, and [sense-co-ordination
or] mind, you should admit no less as to the other fields of
1
This includes sixteen grades of devas, the Brahma-heavens being
the lowest (Compendium, p. 138).
2
Dialogues, i. 47. In the Rupa heavens, where 'a subtle residuum
of matter is still met with' (Compendium, p. 12), only sight, hearing,
and intellectual co-ordination of these survives.
sense, once yon affirm the existence, in that sphere, of any of
the other sense-organs. [7-8] ' No,' you say. You are pre-
pared to admit organs of sight, hearing, and co-ordination,
and corresponding objects seen, heard, and cognized by
those organs; yet while you admit the other sense-organs,
you deny the existence of their objects. [9-10] In fact,
even if you were to concede the existence, in that sphere,
of objects odorous, sapid, and tangible, you would, you say,
deny they were apprehended by the corresponding organs,
though you admit the corresponding apprehension in the
case of sight, etc.
[11-13] But there are among you some1 who would admit
this apprehension of odours, tastes, and touches by the re-
spective organs, the existence of which you affirm. I would
ask them whether there exists in that sphere the odour of
roots, pith, bark, leaves, flowers, fruit, raw flesh, poisonous,
pleasant, or evil odours; whether there exists there also the
taste of roots, pith, bark, leaves, flowers, fruit, or sour,
sweet, bitter, pungent, saline, alkaline, acrid, astringent,
nice, or nauseous tastes; whether there exist there also
hard and soft, smooth and rough, pleasant and painful
contacts, heavy and light tangibles?
2
You deny that any
of these does exist in that sphere. . . .
[14] A. S.—But is there not in that sphere the where-
withal3 for smelling, tasting, touching ?
Th.—Yes.
A. S.—Surely then it is right to say that in the Rupa-
element the individual has all six senses ?
1
Certain teachers who will have it that the fields of sense are there
complete, each organ having its function.—Comy.
2
These are standard formulas of enumeration. See Bud. Psy.
Eth., pp. 187-89, 198.
3
Ghana-nimittang, etc. But this is only a matter of external
appearance, not of organ and mental object, and is therefore a futile
reference.—Comy.
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
5. Of the Rupa-element.
Controverted Point.—That the ultimate 'datum or ele-
ment of rupa' is things [cognized as] material.
From the Commentary.—The Theravadin criticizes this view—
held, for instance, by the Andhakas—on the ground that the 'Rupa-
element' includes all the spheres of life known as Rupa-bhava,
and is therefore more extensive than just material qualities of things.1
[1] Th.—Is then rupa a sphere of life, a destiny, a realm
of beings, renewed life, a matrix, a station for rebirth-con-
sciousness, an acquiring of individuality ? Is there karma
leading to it, beings to be reborn in it ? Do they get born,
grow old, die, decease, get rebirth there? Are the five
aggregates 'in' rupa ? Is it a five-mode existence ? [2]
Now all these you can predicate of the Rupa-datum, but
not of rupa, or material quality. Hence the latter has not
all that is implicated in the former.
Again, if the Rupa-datum consists only of material quali-
ties—and, as you will admit, there is material quality in the
Kama-datum—is this latter datum the same as Rupa-datum?
You say 'no.' But think. You must admit it is.2 Then
we get a man in two life-spheres at the same time. . . .
6. Of the Arupa-Element.
Controverted Point. — That the ultimate 'datum, or
element' of arupa is things [cognized as] immaterial.
From the Commentary. — Here the same method is followed.
Instruction is given by taking a certain immaterial notion—'feeling'
—and asking if that is a sphere of life, etc.; thus it is showed that in
no case are the two identical.
[1] Th.—Is then feeling a sphere of life, a destiny, a realm
of beings, renewed life, a matrix, a station for rebirth-
consciousness, an acquiring of individuality? Is there
1
Here there is the corresponding difficulty of the ambiguity of
rupa. See Compendium, 271 f.; Bud. Psy. Eth., 43 f.
2
He denies, so as not to contradict the accepted triad of life-spheres.
When pushed, he assents, because of his thesis.—Comy.
karma leading to it? Are beings to be reborn in it? Do
they get old, die, decease from, get reborn in it ? Are the
five aggregates ' in' feeling ? Is it a five-mode existence ?
[2] Now all these you can predicate of the Arupa-datum or
element, but not of feeling only.
Again, if the Arupa-element mean only immaterial things
—and you will admit there is feeling and other mental
aggregates in the Kama-element—are these two elements
or data identical ? Either you must deny (which were
unorthodox) or assent. In the latter case we get a person
in two spheres of life at the same time. The same argu-
ment holds good for Arupa and Rupa data. And if all
three be mutually identical, we get a person in three
spheres of life at the same time. . . .
7. Of the Senses in the Rupa-Sphere.
Controverted Point- That in the Rupa-sphere1 the in-
dividual has all the six senses.
From the Commentary.—Some (as, for instance, the Andhakas and
Sammitiyas), judging by the Sutta-passage—'having form, made of
mind,with all its main and lesser parts complete, not deficient in any
organ'2
—imagine that the Brahma-group and the rest had sensations
of smell, taste, and touch.
[1] Th.—If that be so, and one in that sphere have, say,
the sense of smell, you must admit odorous objects for him
to smell; and so too for the senses of taste and touch.
[2] But you deny the existence, in that sphere, of such
objects. [3-6] Yet it seems only rational that, admitting,
as you do, the existence in that sphere of both organ and
object in the case of sight, hearing, and [sense-co-ordination
or] mind, you should admit no less as to the other fields of
1
This includes sixteen grades of devas, the Brahma-heavens being
the lowest (Compendium, p. 138).
2
Dialogues, i. 47. In the Rupa heavens, where 'a subtle residuum
of matter is still met with' (Compendium, p. 12), only sight, hearing,
and intellectual co-ordination of these survives.
sense, once yon affirm the existence, in that sphere, of any of
the other sense-organs. [7-8] ' No,' you say. You are pre-
pared to admit organs of sight, hearing, and co-ordination,
and corresponding objects seen, heard, and cognized by
those organs; yet while you admit the other sense-organs,
you deny the existence of their objects. [9-10] In fact,
even if you were to concede the existence, in that sphere,
of objects odorous, sapid, and tangible, you would, you say,
deny they were apprehended by the corresponding organs,
though you admit the corresponding apprehension in the
case of sight, etc.
[11-13] But there are among you some1 who would admit
this apprehension of odours, tastes, and touches by the re-
spective organs, the existence of which you affirm. I would
ask them whether there exists in that sphere the odour of
roots, pith, bark, leaves, flowers, fruit, raw flesh, poisonous,
pleasant, or evil odours; whether there exists there also the
taste of roots, pith, bark, leaves, flowers, fruit, or sour,
sweet, bitter, pungent, saline, alkaline, acrid, astringent,
nice, or nauseous tastes; whether there exist there also
hard and soft, smooth and rough, pleasant and painful
contacts, heavy and light tangibles?
2
You deny that any
of these does exist in that sphere. . . .
[14] A. S.—But is there not in that sphere the where-
withal3 for smelling, tasting, touching ?
Th.—Yes.
A. S.—Surely then it is right to say that in the Rupa-
element the individual has all six senses ?
1
Certain teachers who will have it that the fields of sense are there
complete, each organ having its function.—Comy.
2
These are standard formulas of enumeration. See Bud. Psy.
Eth., pp. 187-89, 198.
3
Ghana-nimittang, etc. But this is only a matter of external
appearance, not of organ and mental object, and is therefore a futile
reference.—Comy.
Kathavatthu - Of the Pleasures of Sense & Of Sense-Desires
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
3. Of the Pleasures of Sense.
Controverted Point.—That the kama-sphere means only
the fivefold pleasures of sense.
From the Commentary.—This discourse is intended to teach those
who, like the Pubbaseliyas, contract the meaning of kama-dhatu
(element or datum of desire) to that of kama-guna (pleasurable
sensations), ignoring the difference in the meaning of the two terms.
It is true that in the Sutta—' There are these five kinds of pleasurable
sensations, bhikkhus'1
—the whole world of kamadhatu is im-
plied. But generally kamadhatu may stand for vatthukarna ,
objects of sense - desire; kilesakama , corrupt, worldly desires ;
and kamabhava , or the eleven lowest planes of existence (from
purgatory to the six lowest heavens). In the first term kama
means 'to be desired'; in the second, it means both ' to be desired'
and ' to desire.' But in the last term kama means 'to be desired'
or 'desiring,' or 'place where objects of sense happen.' Dhatu , as
always, means self-existing ultimate, without entity, non-substantial.
2
[1] Th.—You admit, do you not, that desire, intention,
zest, and joy, and the passion or lust
3
that is involved in
each, are all bound up with the fivefold pleasures of sense?
4
How then can you maintain that the kama-life is only those
pleasures?
[2] Do you mean that human organs of sense are not co-
extensive with kama-life, the five organs of external sense
and the co-ordinating sense, or mind ? No,5 you say
(meaning only the pleasures of sense in your proposition) ;
but think again as to mind. . . . Yes, you now say, mind
is not kama-life.6
But was it not said by the Exalted One:
1
Majjhima-Nik, i. 85. See Digha-Nik., iii. 234, for other
references.
2
The PTS edition of the Commentary, through either corrupt
MSS., or printing errors, or defective punctuation, is here not
always intelligible. A perusal of the Br. edition will make the
meaning clearer.
3
Here kamadhatu means kilesakama.—Comy.
4
As objects, kamagunaramnano.—Comy .
5
The opponent does not reject these as objects of desire (vatthu-
kama).—Comy.
6
He recollects the sublimer and also the supramundane or spiritual
work of mind.— Comy. Read te-bhumaka-mano (ib.).
' Fivefold the world's sense-pleasures be,
And mind as sixth, our lore doth rede.
Whoso therein doth purge desire,
1
Is thus from ill ancl sorrow freed' ?
Hence it cannot be said that the kama-life does not in-
clude the mind.
[3] Again, can you say that the pleasures of sense
amount to a sphere of life,2
a destiny, a realm of beings,
to renewed life, to a matrix, a station for consciousness, an
acquiring of individuality ? Is there karma leading to
them ? Are there beings to be reborn in them ? Do beings
get born, grow old, die, decease, get reborn 'in' sense-
pleasures ? Are there the five aggregates in them ? Are
they a five-mode existence? Are Buddhas Supreme, Silent
Buddhas, Chief Pairs of disciples3 reborn in them? [4] All
these things you can predicate of the ' kama-element,' but
not one of them of the pleasures of sense.
[5] P.—But was it not said by the Exalted One: Bhik-
khus, there are these fivefold kdma-ple astir es—ivhich are
they? Objects desirable, meet, agreeable, dear, connected
with 'kama,' and seductive, are cognizable by sight, hearing,
smell, taste, and touch—these are the five kinds of kama-
pleasures'?4
Hence surely the kama-element is only those five.
4. Of Sense-Desires.
Controverted Point.—Whether the subjective sense-desires
or the objective five fields of sense constitute kama's.
From the Commentary.—Going merely by the Sutta last quoted
above, some, like the Pubbaseliyas, hold the latter view. The
1 Samyutta-Nik., i. 16.
2 Here kamadhatu = kama-bhava or -loka .
3 See above, I. 3, §§ 9,10.
4 Anguttara-Nik., iii. 411, etc.
Theravadin shows that 'corruptions' alone truly constitute sen-
suality.1
[1] is verbatim = § 1 in VIII. 3, and [2] is verbatim=§ 5,
save for the substitution of ' Hence sensuality consists in
only the five fields of sense-object.'
[3] Th.—But was it not also said by the Exalted One:
'There are these fivefold pleasures of sense, bhikkhus: which
are the five? Objects desirable, . . . adapted to sense-desires
(kama), and seductive are cognizable by sight, hearing, etc. . . .
five kinds of [objects associated with] sense-pleasure. Never-
theless, bhikkhus, these are not sense-desires; they are called
in the Ariyan discipline [objects of] sense-pleasures [kama-
guna]. For kama is a man's lustful intention' ;2
' The manifold of objects3 in the world—
This in itself is not 'desires of sense."
Lustful intention4 is man's sense-desires.
That manifold of objects doth endure;
The will thereto the wise exterminate '
Hence it is wrong to say that just the five kinds of sense-
objects constitute sense-desires.
1
Read kamabhavang , 'state of having kama's.' The translators'
difficulties increase in this discourse. But the Indian conception of
all the universe, save the higher and highest heavens, in terms of
'desire,' is of great interest. See Ency. Religion and Ethics, 'Desire,
Buddhist,' by Mrs. Rhys Davids.
2
Anguttara-Nik., iii. 411. Br. does not support the reading of the
PTS text—Te ariyassa . . .—as verse, but agrees with Edmund
Hardy's reading in the PTS edition of the Nikaya, which we have
mainly followed. Cf. ibid., the many differences of reading in the
MSS. consulted. The gathas occur, as above, in Samyutta-, i. 22.
In the Anguttara line 3 is prefixed to the verses, and repeated as line 4
(in translation above, line 3 in text).
3
The Pali for this phrase, yani citrani—'the varied things
which'—is paraphrased in the Anguttara Commentary with 'objects':
citra-citrarammanani.
4
Ib., paraphrased as sankappavasena uppannarage.
5
Or 'discipline' (vinayanti).
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
3. Of the Pleasures of Sense.
Controverted Point.—That the kama-sphere means only
the fivefold pleasures of sense.
From the Commentary.—This discourse is intended to teach those
who, like the Pubbaseliyas, contract the meaning of kama-dhatu
(element or datum of desire) to that of kama-guna (pleasurable
sensations), ignoring the difference in the meaning of the two terms.
It is true that in the Sutta—' There are these five kinds of pleasurable
sensations, bhikkhus'1
—the whole world of kamadhatu is im-
plied. But generally kamadhatu may stand for vatthukarna ,
objects of sense - desire; kilesakama , corrupt, worldly desires ;
and kamabhava , or the eleven lowest planes of existence (from
purgatory to the six lowest heavens). In the first term kama
means 'to be desired'; in the second, it means both ' to be desired'
and ' to desire.' But in the last term kama means 'to be desired'
or 'desiring,' or 'place where objects of sense happen.' Dhatu , as
always, means self-existing ultimate, without entity, non-substantial.
2
[1] Th.—You admit, do you not, that desire, intention,
zest, and joy, and the passion or lust
3
that is involved in
each, are all bound up with the fivefold pleasures of sense?
4
How then can you maintain that the kama-life is only those
pleasures?
[2] Do you mean that human organs of sense are not co-
extensive with kama-life, the five organs of external sense
and the co-ordinating sense, or mind ? No,5 you say
(meaning only the pleasures of sense in your proposition) ;
but think again as to mind. . . . Yes, you now say, mind
is not kama-life.6
But was it not said by the Exalted One:
1
Majjhima-Nik, i. 85. See Digha-Nik., iii. 234, for other
references.
2
The PTS edition of the Commentary, through either corrupt
MSS., or printing errors, or defective punctuation, is here not
always intelligible. A perusal of the Br. edition will make the
meaning clearer.
3
Here kamadhatu means kilesakama.—Comy.
4
As objects, kamagunaramnano.—Comy .
5
The opponent does not reject these as objects of desire (vatthu-
kama).—Comy.
6
He recollects the sublimer and also the supramundane or spiritual
work of mind.— Comy. Read te-bhumaka-mano (ib.).
' Fivefold the world's sense-pleasures be,
And mind as sixth, our lore doth rede.
Whoso therein doth purge desire,
1
Is thus from ill ancl sorrow freed' ?
Hence it cannot be said that the kama-life does not in-
clude the mind.
[3] Again, can you say that the pleasures of sense
amount to a sphere of life,2
a destiny, a realm of beings,
to renewed life, to a matrix, a station for consciousness, an
acquiring of individuality ? Is there karma leading to
them ? Are there beings to be reborn in them ? Do beings
get born, grow old, die, decease, get reborn 'in' sense-
pleasures ? Are there the five aggregates in them ? Are
they a five-mode existence? Are Buddhas Supreme, Silent
Buddhas, Chief Pairs of disciples3 reborn in them? [4] All
these things you can predicate of the ' kama-element,' but
not one of them of the pleasures of sense.
[5] P.—But was it not said by the Exalted One: Bhik-
khus, there are these fivefold kdma-ple astir es—ivhich are
they? Objects desirable, meet, agreeable, dear, connected
with 'kama,' and seductive, are cognizable by sight, hearing,
smell, taste, and touch—these are the five kinds of kama-
pleasures'?4
Hence surely the kama-element is only those five.
4. Of Sense-Desires.
Controverted Point.—Whether the subjective sense-desires
or the objective five fields of sense constitute kama's.
From the Commentary.—Going merely by the Sutta last quoted
above, some, like the Pubbaseliyas, hold the latter view. The
1 Samyutta-Nik., i. 16.
2 Here kamadhatu = kama-bhava or -loka .
3 See above, I. 3, §§ 9,10.
4 Anguttara-Nik., iii. 411, etc.
Theravadin shows that 'corruptions' alone truly constitute sen-
suality.1
[1] is verbatim = § 1 in VIII. 3, and [2] is verbatim=§ 5,
save for the substitution of ' Hence sensuality consists in
only the five fields of sense-object.'
[3] Th.—But was it not also said by the Exalted One:
'There are these fivefold pleasures of sense, bhikkhus: which
are the five? Objects desirable, . . . adapted to sense-desires
(kama), and seductive are cognizable by sight, hearing, etc. . . .
five kinds of [objects associated with] sense-pleasure. Never-
theless, bhikkhus, these are not sense-desires; they are called
in the Ariyan discipline [objects of] sense-pleasures [kama-
guna]. For kama is a man's lustful intention' ;2
' The manifold of objects3 in the world—
This in itself is not 'desires of sense."
Lustful intention4 is man's sense-desires.
That manifold of objects doth endure;
The will thereto the wise exterminate '
Hence it is wrong to say that just the five kinds of sense-
objects constitute sense-desires.
1
Read kamabhavang , 'state of having kama's.' The translators'
difficulties increase in this discourse. But the Indian conception of
all the universe, save the higher and highest heavens, in terms of
'desire,' is of great interest. See Ency. Religion and Ethics, 'Desire,
Buddhist,' by Mrs. Rhys Davids.
2
Anguttara-Nik., iii. 411. Br. does not support the reading of the
PTS text—Te ariyassa . . .—as verse, but agrees with Edmund
Hardy's reading in the PTS edition of the Nikaya, which we have
mainly followed. Cf. ibid., the many differences of reading in the
MSS. consulted. The gathas occur, as above, in Samyutta-, i. 22.
In the Anguttara line 3 is prefixed to the verses, and repeated as line 4
(in translation above, line 3 in text).
3
The Pali for this phrase, yani citrani—'the varied things
which'—is paraphrased in the Anguttara Commentary with 'objects':
citra-citrarammanani.
4
Ib., paraphrased as sankappavasena uppannarage.
5
Or 'discipline' (vinayanti).
Kathavatthu - Of Divers Destinies & Of an Intermediate State
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
BOOK VIII
1. Of Divers Destinies.1
Controverted Point.—That there are six spheres of destiny.
From the Commentary.—There is an opinion among some schools
—the Andhakas and Uttarapathakas—that the Asuras form a sixth
plane of rebirth. The Theravadin contradicts this in virtue of the
hair-raising illustration of the five divisions of destiny in the Sutta:
' There are these five destinies, Sariputta.'2 .. . It is true that a
troop of Asuras—that of Vepacitti3—was freed from the fourfold plane
of misery, but not to form a separate plane. They were taken up
among the devas. The Kalakanjakas were taken up among the Petas.
[1] Th.—Did not the Exalted One name five destinies—
purgatory, the animal kingdom, the Peta-realm, mankind,
the devas? [2] And did not the Kalakanjaka Asuras, who
resembled the Petas in [ugly or frightful] shape, sex-life,
diet, and length of life, intermarry with them? [3] And
did not Vepacitti's troop, who in the same respects re-
sembled the devas, intermarry with devas? [4] And had
not Vepacitti's troop been formerly devas ?
[5] A. U.—But since there is an Asura-group, it is
surely right to speak of it as a [possible] destiny?4
1
Gati , literally, a going, or bourne, a career. On these, concisely
stated, see Compendium, p. 137.
2
Majjhima-Nik., i. 73.
3
Samyutta-Nik., i. 221 f. Cf. Dialogues, ii. 289 ; Pss. of the
Brethren, verse 749.
4
The Commentary includes between 'in shape' and 'sex-life,' the
[bracketed] term bibhaccha—Bibhaccha ti virupa dud-
dasika . It also paraphrases samanabhoga . (rendered as 're-
sembling . . . in sex-life') by sadisa-methuna-samacara ;
and samanahara ('resembling .. . in diet') by sadisa-khela-
singhanika-pubba-lohitadi-ahara.
2. Of an Intermediate State.
Controverted Point.—That there is an intermediate state
of existence.
From the Commentary.—Some (as, for instance, the Pubbaseliyas
and Sammitiyas), by a careless acceptation of the Sutta-phrase—
'completed existence within the interval'
1
—held that there is an
interim stage where a being awaits reconception for a week or longer.
The counter-argument is based on the Exalted One's dictum that there
are three states of becoming only—the Kama-, the Rupa-, and the
Arupa-worlds.
2
And it is because of that dictum that the opponent
[in so far as he is orthodox] has to deny so many of the questions.
[1] Th.—If there be such a state, you must identify it
with either the Kama-life, or Rupa-life, or Arupa-life,
which you refuse to do. . . .
[2] You deny that there is an intermediate state between
the first and second, or the second and third, of these . . .
[3] you affirm, indeed, that is no such thing; how then
can you maintain your proposition ?
[4] Is it a fifth matrix, a sixth destiny, an eighth station
for reborn consciousness,
3
a tenth realm of beings ? Is it a
mode of living, a destiny, a realm of beings, a renewal of
life, a matrix, a station of consciousness, an acquiring of
individuality? Is there karma leading to it? Are there
beings who approach thither ? Do beings get born in it,
grow old, die in it, decease from it, and get reborn from it?
Do the five aggregates exist in it? Is it a five-mode
existence ? All this you deny. How then can you main-
tain your proposition?
[5-7] You admit that every one of these [categories or
notions] applies to each of the three planes of life named
above, the only difference being that the first two—Kama-
life and Rupa-life—are five-mode existences; the last—
1
I.e., died within the first half of the normal life-span in those
heavens. See I. 4, § 9.
2
Samyutta-Nik., ii. 3, etc. Cf. Compendium, 81, n. 2, 138 f.
3
The seven 'stations' (vinnanatthitiyo), or opportunities for
the resultant rebirth-consciousness (the effect of a dying person's
consciousness) to happen—are described in Dialogues, ii. 66 f.
Arupa-life—is a four-mode existence (that is, without
material qualities). If then there is an intermediate
stage of life, you must be able to predicate some or all of
these [notions or categories] of it. But you say you
cannot. . . .
[8] But you deny also that there is an intermediate life for
all beings. Hence your proposition is not universally valid.
[9-11] For whom then do you deny the intermediate
state? For the person whose retribution is immediate?1
If you assent, to that extent your proposition is for you not
true. Or is it for the person whose retribution is not im-
mediate that you affirm this state ? Yes, you say. Then
you must deny it for his opposite.
You deny it also for one who is to be reborn in purgatory,,
in the sphere of unconscious beings, in the immaterial
heavens. Therefore to that extent your proposition is not
universally valid. Nevertheless, you maintain that there-
is an intermediate stage of life for one whose retribution is
not immediate, for one who is not to be reborn in purga-
tory, nor among the ' unconscious beings,' nor in the im-
material heavens. [Concerning these you have yet to state
in what respect, as a plane of life, it resembles, or differs
from, the three named by the Exalted One.]
[12] P.S.2—But are there not beings who ' complete
existence within the first half of the term ?' If so, are we
not right ?
[13] Th.—Granted that there are such beings, is there
a separate interval-state [between any two recognized exist-
ences] ? Yes, you say. But granted that there are beings
who 'complete existence within the second half of the term,'
is there a separate state of life corresponding thereto ? If
you deny, you must also deny your proposition [since you
rest it on this basis].
The same argument applies to such cognate terms as
' beings who complete existence without,' and again, 'with
difficulty and striving' (see above, I., 4, § 9, n. 1).
1 On this term, see Bud. Psy. Eth., § 1028.
2 Pubbaseliya, Sammitiya.
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
BOOK VIII
1. Of Divers Destinies.1
Controverted Point.—That there are six spheres of destiny.
From the Commentary.—There is an opinion among some schools
—the Andhakas and Uttarapathakas—that the Asuras form a sixth
plane of rebirth. The Theravadin contradicts this in virtue of the
hair-raising illustration of the five divisions of destiny in the Sutta:
' There are these five destinies, Sariputta.'2 .. . It is true that a
troop of Asuras—that of Vepacitti3—was freed from the fourfold plane
of misery, but not to form a separate plane. They were taken up
among the devas. The Kalakanjakas were taken up among the Petas.
[1] Th.—Did not the Exalted One name five destinies—
purgatory, the animal kingdom, the Peta-realm, mankind,
the devas? [2] And did not the Kalakanjaka Asuras, who
resembled the Petas in [ugly or frightful] shape, sex-life,
diet, and length of life, intermarry with them? [3] And
did not Vepacitti's troop, who in the same respects re-
sembled the devas, intermarry with devas? [4] And had
not Vepacitti's troop been formerly devas ?
[5] A. U.—But since there is an Asura-group, it is
surely right to speak of it as a [possible] destiny?4
1
Gati , literally, a going, or bourne, a career. On these, concisely
stated, see Compendium, p. 137.
2
Majjhima-Nik., i. 73.
3
Samyutta-Nik., i. 221 f. Cf. Dialogues, ii. 289 ; Pss. of the
Brethren, verse 749.
4
The Commentary includes between 'in shape' and 'sex-life,' the
[bracketed] term bibhaccha—Bibhaccha ti virupa dud-
dasika . It also paraphrases samanabhoga . (rendered as 're-
sembling . . . in sex-life') by sadisa-methuna-samacara ;
and samanahara ('resembling .. . in diet') by sadisa-khela-
singhanika-pubba-lohitadi-ahara.
2. Of an Intermediate State.
Controverted Point.—That there is an intermediate state
of existence.
From the Commentary.—Some (as, for instance, the Pubbaseliyas
and Sammitiyas), by a careless acceptation of the Sutta-phrase—
'completed existence within the interval'
1
—held that there is an
interim stage where a being awaits reconception for a week or longer.
The counter-argument is based on the Exalted One's dictum that there
are three states of becoming only—the Kama-, the Rupa-, and the
Arupa-worlds.
2
And it is because of that dictum that the opponent
[in so far as he is orthodox] has to deny so many of the questions.
[1] Th.—If there be such a state, you must identify it
with either the Kama-life, or Rupa-life, or Arupa-life,
which you refuse to do. . . .
[2] You deny that there is an intermediate state between
the first and second, or the second and third, of these . . .
[3] you affirm, indeed, that is no such thing; how then
can you maintain your proposition ?
[4] Is it a fifth matrix, a sixth destiny, an eighth station
for reborn consciousness,
3
a tenth realm of beings ? Is it a
mode of living, a destiny, a realm of beings, a renewal of
life, a matrix, a station of consciousness, an acquiring of
individuality? Is there karma leading to it? Are there
beings who approach thither ? Do beings get born in it,
grow old, die in it, decease from it, and get reborn from it?
Do the five aggregates exist in it? Is it a five-mode
existence ? All this you deny. How then can you main-
tain your proposition?
[5-7] You admit that every one of these [categories or
notions] applies to each of the three planes of life named
above, the only difference being that the first two—Kama-
life and Rupa-life—are five-mode existences; the last—
1
I.e., died within the first half of the normal life-span in those
heavens. See I. 4, § 9.
2
Samyutta-Nik., ii. 3, etc. Cf. Compendium, 81, n. 2, 138 f.
3
The seven 'stations' (vinnanatthitiyo), or opportunities for
the resultant rebirth-consciousness (the effect of a dying person's
consciousness) to happen—are described in Dialogues, ii. 66 f.
Arupa-life—is a four-mode existence (that is, without
material qualities). If then there is an intermediate
stage of life, you must be able to predicate some or all of
these [notions or categories] of it. But you say you
cannot. . . .
[8] But you deny also that there is an intermediate life for
all beings. Hence your proposition is not universally valid.
[9-11] For whom then do you deny the intermediate
state? For the person whose retribution is immediate?1
If you assent, to that extent your proposition is for you not
true. Or is it for the person whose retribution is not im-
mediate that you affirm this state ? Yes, you say. Then
you must deny it for his opposite.
You deny it also for one who is to be reborn in purgatory,,
in the sphere of unconscious beings, in the immaterial
heavens. Therefore to that extent your proposition is not
universally valid. Nevertheless, you maintain that there-
is an intermediate stage of life for one whose retribution is
not immediate, for one who is not to be reborn in purga-
tory, nor among the ' unconscious beings,' nor in the im-
material heavens. [Concerning these you have yet to state
in what respect, as a plane of life, it resembles, or differs
from, the three named by the Exalted One.]
[12] P.S.2—But are there not beings who ' complete
existence within the first half of the term ?' If so, are we
not right ?
[13] Th.—Granted that there are such beings, is there
a separate interval-state [between any two recognized exist-
ences] ? Yes, you say. But granted that there are beings
who 'complete existence within the second half of the term,'
is there a separate state of life corresponding thereto ? If
you deny, you must also deny your proposition [since you
rest it on this basis].
The same argument applies to such cognate terms as
' beings who complete existence without,' and again, 'with
difficulty and striving' (see above, I., 4, § 9, n. 1).
1 On this term, see Bud. Psy. Eth., § 1028.
2 Pubbaseliya, Sammitiya.
Wednesday, June 15, 2011
Kathavatthu - Of Decay and Death and Karma, Of the Ariyan Mind and its Results, Of Results as again causing Results
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
8. Of Decay and Death and Karma.
Controverted Point.—That old age and death are a result
of action.
From the Commentary.—Inasmuch as some action does conduce to
that deterioration we call decay or old age, and to that curtailing of life
we call death, some, like the Andhakas, hold that old age and death are
the 'result (vipaka)' of that action. Now there is between morally
bad action and material decay the relation known as karma,2 but the
moral cause and the physical effect differ in kind. Hence the latter is
not subjective result (vipaka). It is unlike any mental state :—con-
tact, feeling, etc.—such as is produced by karma. Besides, it is partly
due to the physical order (utu).3
[1, 2] Th.—The first two sections are verbatim as in the
preceding discourse, save that instead of 'result of action'
(kamma-vipaka), ' result' (vipaka) only is used.
[3] Again, you admit, do you not, that the decay and
dying of bad states of mind is the result of previous bad
states ? But then you must also admit that the decay and
dying of good states of mind is the result of previous good
2
Kamma and vipaka (result in sentience) are two of the
twenty-four paccayas or correlations of things physical or mental.
Compendium, 191 f .
3
In the Comy. p. 101, last line (PTS), read: Utusamutthanadi-
bhedena tang patilabhavasena ayuno ca. . . .
states—which you deny. . . . But in denying the latter,
you imply denial of the former statement. . . .
[4] Or do you hold that the decay and dying of good
states of mind is the result of previous bad states ? You
do, you say. Then you imply that the decay and dying of
bad states is the result of previous good states—which you
deny. . . . But in denying this, you imply denial of the
former statement. . . .
[5] Or do you affirm that the decay and dying of both
good and bad states of mind are the result of bad states ?
You do, you' say. Then you must say no less: 'is the
result of good states'—which you deny. . . .
[6] A.—You say my proposition is false. But surely
acts conduce to the deterioration and to the curtailment of
life ? If so, my proposition is true.
9. Of the Ariyan Mind and its Results.
Controverted Point.—That Ariyan states of mind have
no [positive] result.
1
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Andhakas, hold that the
fruits of religious life, being merely the negative putting away of corrupt
qualities, are not properly states of mind. By religious life is meant
the career of a recluse, or progress in the Paths, as it is said: ' I will
show you the religious life and the fruits thereof,'2 the former being
the Fourfold Path,
3
and the fruits thereof those of Stream-Winner,
Once-Returner, Never-Returner, and Arahantship.
[1, 2] Th.—But you admit that the career of a recluse
or religious student is productive of great rewards—to wit,
the fruits of the Four Paths. How then can you deny
positive result ?
[3] Or, if you deny that these four kinds of fruit are
positive result—as you do—then you equally deny that
1 Vipaka—i.e., are they actions engendering for the subject no
positive psychical sequel, such as is always understood by this term ?
2
Samyutta-Nik. 25.
3
Each stage of the Path has the eight factors (Eightfold Path) in
different degrees.
there is positive result in the fruit of giving or of moral
conduct, or of religious exercises, which you maintain. . . .
[4] Now in maintaining these propositions, you must no
less maintain that there is positive result in the fruits of
the Paths. .. .
[5] Again, you will of course admit that good done
in relation to life on earth or in the heavens, material or
immaterial, entails result. Does this not commit you to
admitting that good done in relation to path-graduating1
also entails result [though you deny this by your proposi-
tion] ? Conversely, i f you maintain that good done in
relation to path-graduating entails no result, must you not
also deny result to good done in relation to life on earth or
in heaven ?
[6] A.—[Well, but is not this a parallel case?] You
will of course admit that good done in relation to life on
earth or in the heavens, material or immaterial, entailing
result, makes for accumulation of rebirth.2 Does this not
commit you to admitting that good done in relation to
path-graduating, entailing [as you say] result, makes also
for accumulation of rebirth [though you of course deny
this]?
10. Of Results as again causing Results.
Controverted Point.—That 'result' is itself a state en-
tailing resultant states.
3
From the Commentary.—Because one result [of karma] stands in
relation to another result by way of reciprocity,
4
etc., some, like the
Andhakas, hold that the result is itself necessarily the cause of other
results.
1
Literally, non-worldly, or supramundane. The Commentary
-classes all good done for rebirth as lokiya , mundane. Path-
graduating militated against rebirth.
2
For Buddhaghosa's definition of this term, see Bud. Psy. Eth.,
p. 82, n. 2.
3
Vipakadhamma-dhammo. See Bud. Psy. Eth., p. 253, n. 1.
4
Annamanna-paccayo, or mutuality; one of the twenty-four
relations. The statement here is from the Patthana.
t.s . v .
[1] Th.—If your proposition is true it is tantamount,
to saying that the result of that [result] entails [other]
results—which you deny. .. . Or, if you assent, then you
are asserting that in a given series there is no making an
end of ill, no cutting of f the round of birth and death,,
no Nibbana without residual stuff of life—which is contrary
to doctrine.1
[2] Again, are you asserting that 'result' and 'state
entailing resultant states ' are identical, equivalent terms—
of one import, the same, of the same content and origin ?
[3] That they are concomitant, co-existent, conjoined,,
connected, one in genesis, in cessation, in basis, and in
mental object? All this you deny. . . .2
[4] Again, do you mean that a given bad mental state is-
its own result, a given good state its own result ? That
the consciousness with which we take life is the very con-
sciousness with which we burn in purgatory ? That the
consciousness with which we give a gift of merit is the very
consciousness with which we rejoice in heaven ? . . .
[5] A.—You deny my proposition ; but are not ' results,
[of karma]' the four immaterial aggregates in reciprocal
relation ? If so, surely it is right to say that a result is.
a mental state resulting from other mental states ?
1
A. 'denies this for fear of contravening doctrine.'—Comy. Cf. .
above, I. 1 (p. 43 f.).
2
The opponent regards any one of the four mental groups as
' result entailing the other three as its results' in their mutual relation,
at any given moment.—Comy. But this cannot be, since all four are
mutually co-inhering at that moment as an indivisible whole.
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
8. Of Decay and Death and Karma.
Controverted Point.—That old age and death are a result
of action.
From the Commentary.—Inasmuch as some action does conduce to
that deterioration we call decay or old age, and to that curtailing of life
we call death, some, like the Andhakas, hold that old age and death are
the 'result (vipaka)' of that action. Now there is between morally
bad action and material decay the relation known as karma,2 but the
moral cause and the physical effect differ in kind. Hence the latter is
not subjective result (vipaka). It is unlike any mental state :—con-
tact, feeling, etc.—such as is produced by karma. Besides, it is partly
due to the physical order (utu).3
[1, 2] Th.—The first two sections are verbatim as in the
preceding discourse, save that instead of 'result of action'
(kamma-vipaka), ' result' (vipaka) only is used.
[3] Again, you admit, do you not, that the decay and
dying of bad states of mind is the result of previous bad
states ? But then you must also admit that the decay and
dying of good states of mind is the result of previous good
2
Kamma and vipaka (result in sentience) are two of the
twenty-four paccayas or correlations of things physical or mental.
Compendium, 191 f .
3
In the Comy. p. 101, last line (PTS), read: Utusamutthanadi-
bhedena tang patilabhavasena ayuno ca. . . .
states—which you deny. . . . But in denying the latter,
you imply denial of the former statement. . . .
[4] Or do you hold that the decay and dying of good
states of mind is the result of previous bad states ? You
do, you say. Then you imply that the decay and dying of
bad states is the result of previous good states—which you
deny. . . . But in denying this, you imply denial of the
former statement. . . .
[5] Or do you affirm that the decay and dying of both
good and bad states of mind are the result of bad states ?
You do, you' say. Then you must say no less: 'is the
result of good states'—which you deny. . . .
[6] A.—You say my proposition is false. But surely
acts conduce to the deterioration and to the curtailment of
life ? If so, my proposition is true.
9. Of the Ariyan Mind and its Results.
Controverted Point.—That Ariyan states of mind have
no [positive] result.
1
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Andhakas, hold that the
fruits of religious life, being merely the negative putting away of corrupt
qualities, are not properly states of mind. By religious life is meant
the career of a recluse, or progress in the Paths, as it is said: ' I will
show you the religious life and the fruits thereof,'2 the former being
the Fourfold Path,
3
and the fruits thereof those of Stream-Winner,
Once-Returner, Never-Returner, and Arahantship.
[1, 2] Th.—But you admit that the career of a recluse
or religious student is productive of great rewards—to wit,
the fruits of the Four Paths. How then can you deny
positive result ?
[3] Or, if you deny that these four kinds of fruit are
positive result—as you do—then you equally deny that
1 Vipaka—i.e., are they actions engendering for the subject no
positive psychical sequel, such as is always understood by this term ?
2
Samyutta-Nik. 25.
3
Each stage of the Path has the eight factors (Eightfold Path) in
different degrees.
there is positive result in the fruit of giving or of moral
conduct, or of religious exercises, which you maintain. . . .
[4] Now in maintaining these propositions, you must no
less maintain that there is positive result in the fruits of
the Paths. .. .
[5] Again, you will of course admit that good done
in relation to life on earth or in the heavens, material or
immaterial, entails result. Does this not commit you to
admitting that good done in relation to path-graduating1
also entails result [though you deny this by your proposi-
tion] ? Conversely, i f you maintain that good done in
relation to path-graduating entails no result, must you not
also deny result to good done in relation to life on earth or
in heaven ?
[6] A.—[Well, but is not this a parallel case?] You
will of course admit that good done in relation to life on
earth or in the heavens, material or immaterial, entailing
result, makes for accumulation of rebirth.2 Does this not
commit you to admitting that good done in relation to
path-graduating, entailing [as you say] result, makes also
for accumulation of rebirth [though you of course deny
this]?
10. Of Results as again causing Results.
Controverted Point.—That 'result' is itself a state en-
tailing resultant states.
3
From the Commentary.—Because one result [of karma] stands in
relation to another result by way of reciprocity,
4
etc., some, like the
Andhakas, hold that the result is itself necessarily the cause of other
results.
1
Literally, non-worldly, or supramundane. The Commentary
-classes all good done for rebirth as lokiya , mundane. Path-
graduating militated against rebirth.
2
For Buddhaghosa's definition of this term, see Bud. Psy. Eth.,
p. 82, n. 2.
3
Vipakadhamma-dhammo. See Bud. Psy. Eth., p. 253, n. 1.
4
Annamanna-paccayo, or mutuality; one of the twenty-four
relations. The statement here is from the Patthana.
t.s . v .
[1] Th.—If your proposition is true it is tantamount,
to saying that the result of that [result] entails [other]
results—which you deny. .. . Or, if you assent, then you
are asserting that in a given series there is no making an
end of ill, no cutting of f the round of birth and death,,
no Nibbana without residual stuff of life—which is contrary
to doctrine.1
[2] Again, are you asserting that 'result' and 'state
entailing resultant states ' are identical, equivalent terms—
of one import, the same, of the same content and origin ?
[3] That they are concomitant, co-existent, conjoined,,
connected, one in genesis, in cessation, in basis, and in
mental object? All this you deny. . . .2
[4] Again, do you mean that a given bad mental state is-
its own result, a given good state its own result ? That
the consciousness with which we take life is the very con-
sciousness with which we burn in purgatory ? That the
consciousness with which we give a gift of merit is the very
consciousness with which we rejoice in heaven ? . . .
[5] A.—You deny my proposition ; but are not ' results,
[of karma]' the four immaterial aggregates in reciprocal
relation ? If so, surely it is right to say that a result is.
a mental state resulting from other mental states ?
1
A. 'denies this for fear of contravening doctrine.'—Comy. Cf. .
above, I. 1 (p. 43 f.).
2
The opponent regards any one of the four mental groups as
' result entailing the other three as its results' in their mutual relation,
at any given moment.—Comy. But this cannot be, since all four are
mutually co-inhering at that moment as an indivisible whole.
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